

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

SOTERIOLOGY


BURNEY

a

1893

B

LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
GIFT OF
C. A. Langston, U.C.
Received August, 1893.
Accessions No. 52781 Shelf No.



C. F. Lampson

Aug 4 – 1866

ATONEMENT.


SOTERIOLOGY.

THE SACRIFICIAL, IN CONTRAST WITH THE PENAL, SUBSTITUTIONARY, AND MERELY MORAL OR EXEMPLARY THEORIES OF PROPITIATION.

S. G. BURNEY, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Systematic Theology in Cumberland University.

"Search the Scriptures, . . . they are they that testify of me."—*The Great Teacher.*

"I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say."—*Paul.*



NASHVILLE, TENN.:
CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.
1888.

BT265-
B84

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1888,
By Rev. S. G. BURNEY,
In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

52781

ocl

TO MY

HIGHLY ESTEEMED

PERSONAL FRIEND AND BROTHER,

"WELL TRIED AND TRUE,"

HONORABLE JOHN FRIZZELL,

THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

IN ATTESTATION OF HIS HIGH

MORAL WORTH;

ALSO,

AS A HUMBLE

EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE

FOR THE VALUABLE SERVICES

RENDERED THE AUTHOR

IN BRINGING OUT

THIS BOOK.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION. 1

PART I.—REVIEW OF CHRISTIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.—Preliminary Statement 11
II.—Soteriology of the Apostolic Fathers 24
III.—Soteriology of the Patrists 28
IV.—SEC. 1. Conflicting Theories of Soteriology 35
2. Dissensions Arise 36
3. Anselm Rejected Claims of Satan 37
V.—SEC. 1. Soteriology of the Reformation 43
2. Grotius' Soteriology 45
3. Anselmic and Grotian Soteriology Contrasted . . 47
VI.—SEC. 1. Limborch and Curcellæus 52
2. Arminian Authors 56
VII.—SEC. 1. Limborch's Soteriology 61
2. John Wesley's Views 68
3. Rev. John Fletcher's Views 70
4. Richard Watson on Effects of Atonement . . . 74
5. Dr. Clark's Views 76
6. General Statements 78
VIII.—Dr. Charles Hodge's Theory Considered 82
IX.—Reatus Culpæ et Reatus Pœnæ 108
X.—SEC. 1. Appeal to the Bible 121
2. Reconciliation 122
3. Dr. Hodge's Terms 126
4. Summary of Review 128

PART II.—NATURE OF ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER I.—Preliminary Statements 131
SEC. 1. Divine Justice and Law 133
2. God is Sovereign and Free 137
3. Sin not Debt, but Crime 138
II.—SEC. 1. Natural or Human Atonement 145
2. Some Facts Concerning These Cases of Atonement 151
III.—SEC. 1. Bible Usage of the Word Atonement 162
2. Particular Instances of Its Bible Use 164
3. Poll-tax Atonement 168
4. Atonement in Relation to the Golden Calf . . . 170
5. Atonement for Treason 172
6. Atonement for Seduction 174

CHAPTER IV.—SEC. 1. Some General Statements 176
2. Requirements of Mediatorship 178
3. Men Can Not Make Atonement 181
V.—The Conclusion Reached 186
VI.—The Penal and Non-Penal Theory of Christ's Death Contrasted 190
VII.—No Penalty in Atonement, Human or Divine 206
VIII.—SEC. 1. Christ's Sufferings Like Those of Moses 219
2. Infinite Personality 220
3. Christ's Last Prayer on the Cross 221
IX.—The Tabernacle Atonements 226
X.—The Scape-goat Considered 248
XI.—Relation of Christ's Suffering to His Propitiation . . . 258
XII.—The Question Tested by the Bible Facts 271
XIII.—SEC. 1. Christians Bearing One Another's Burdens . . . 288
2. Another Text Relied Upon by Penalists 289
3. Christ a Ransom for Many 297
4. Christ Redeems Us by His Blood, Etc. 299
5. The Prepositional Argument 303
XIV.—Some Special Questions Concerning Atonement 307
XV.—SEC. 1. Was Christ Bound by the Same Divine Law that Binds All Other Men? 322
2. Did Christ Obey the Law in Place of Those for Whom He Died? 323
3. How Are We Saved by the Mediation of Christ? 330
4. How is Unification With Christ Secured? . . . 339
XVI.—SEC. 1. Sufficiency and Redundancy of Merit in Christ . 345
2. Typal Relation Between Adam and Christ . . . 350
3. Relation of Believers to the Law 354
4. Why Are All Not Delivered by the Obedience of Christ? 356
5. The Scriptures Teach a Non-Penal Scheme of Salvation 358
XVII.—SEC. 1. Libertarian Substitution 361
2. Impartation of Spiritual Life Not in Conflict With Natural Law 364
XVIII.—SEC. 1. Anselmic and Pelagian Soteriology Compared . . 372
2. Substitution an Incubus to Christianity 376
3. All Fiction Excluded 378

PART III.—EXTENT OF ATONEMENT. 380

PREFACE.

In the following pages is presented a scheme of Soteriology different in many respects from any theory known to me. Yet it may be true that there is not a new idea in the whole work. New ideas are rare things.

Be this as it may, the ideas—the facts with which I build—are so combined and adjusted, as to form a theory materially different from any I have seen. Yet, it is on its practical side what anti-Calvinists generally preach.

The work is divided into three parts; the first comprising a very brief statement of all the principal theories of Soteriology from the origin of Christianity to the present time. The more radical defects of these theories have been briefly indicated.

The second part comprises what I conceive to be the *true nature* of the plan of salvation through Christ, the great Sin-bearer and Propitiator. In the discussion of this part of the subject, the respective characteristics of the substitutionary and non-substitutionary theory are often set in contrast.

The third part comprises a brief argument in favor of an atonement for all men.

The matter was originally prepared for the theological classes, and was delivered to them in lecture form. For convenience this form is retained in the book.

At one time I thought of publishing the whole in three volumes, each part forming one volume. But, for reasons deemed sufficient, an abridgement of the whole is published in one volume. All the parts, especially the first and third, have been very much abridged. The third part, as originally prepared for the classes, comprises a full examination of the arguments *for* and *against* a limited atonement.

The arguments against substitution, as presented in these pages, were prepared before "Atonement and Law" became known to the theological classes. The author of this vigorous book rejected the old arguments as quite insufficient, and attempted the defense of substitution by a new line of argument.

Of course my refutation of the old arguments was no refutation of the new. This fact furnished the occasion for my little book, "Atonement and Law Reviewed." That book and this furnishes a complete refutation of the doctrine of substitution in every hitherto attempted mode of defense.

My arguments are directed chiefly against substitution in its rigid Calvinistic form, which is its only real form. For to substitute is to put one thing or person in the place of another. Hence, if one does not take the place of another, then there is no substitution. Hence, if my arguments are conclusive against Calvinistic substitution, they are conclusive against all substitution. For double imputation is the fundamental idea of substitution, or the putting of one thing in the place of another.

Consequently, if there is no change or double imputation, then there is no substitution; or to deny double imputation is to deny substitution itself. It is to affirm and deny the same thing at the same time.

A conditional substitution or change is an inherent impossibility. It confounds the actual and the possible. It affirms that what *is*, *is not*, but only *may be*. To say that Christ is our substitute if we believe on him, otherwise he is not, distinguishes between those in whose place he died, and those for whom he is a substitute. This is manifestly a distinction without a difference; is, in fact a verbal contradiction.

This conditional substitution assumes that the sinner can come to Christ independently of Christ. But the Bible teaches that it is the sufferings and

resurrection of Christ that render repentance, etc., possible. (Luke xxiv. 46.)

On Christ as risen all divine influence depends. We come to God only by him. (John xiv. 6.) Conditional substitution is impossible because it conditions a past event upon a future event. A past event may condition a future event, but manifestly a future event can not condition a past event.

Christ's death is a past event, an accomplished fact. His death was substitutionary, or it was not. If it *was*, then he does not become our substitute by our believing on him; for every body knows that a subsequent act can not change the character of a prior act. But, if Christ did not die as our substitute, then no act of ours can make his death substitutionary; and if he saves us at all he saves us as our benefactor, and not as our substitute.

In view of these facts, I have addressed my arguments chiefly against substitution, as held by Calvinists, rather than the various modified theories proposed by anti-Calvinists.

From 1834 to 1852 I literally had no distinctly defined theory of the nature of the atonement. Perhaps no period of my ministry was more productive of apparent good.

I taught then, as now, that men are saved not by the suffering of Christ, but by Christ himself.

In 1852 I had occasion to study the subject. The consequence was the adoption of a modified form of the Grotian or governmental theory. This I thought preferable to the Anselmic, or satisfaction theory. With this, however, I was never satisfied, as I indicated twenty years after in my only published statement on the subject prior to the publication of "Atonement and Law Reviewed."

One among many reasons for this dissatisfaction is that it assumes a real difference between administrative and retributive law, while, in fact, these are not two laws, but only two aspects of one and the same law.

The great moral law is in respect to God the rule of his administration, and, hence, is conceived of as administrative law. But the same law in respect to men is the rule of obedience, which being a concreation of the human mind is appropriately called retributive law.

All human law is administrative; all divine law is both administrative and retributive. God governs the physical world as well as the moral by law, and all the subjects of law, in the realm of matter and mind, are in some way affected by the administration of their appropriate laws.

Hence, the retributions of moral law are simply God's acts administering his own law. Consequently, these are not two laws but one, which we may consider under two phases, viz.: administrative and retributive. But, as there is but one law, so there is but one penalty.

While holding this theory, I often tried to discriminate between administrative and retributive penalty. I labored to conceive how Christ could suffer the penalty of the former without enduring the penalty of the latter. Of course I failed. Even an archangel might be very well excused for inability to discriminate between a thing and itself. In the last analysis this governmental theory or administrative theory resolves itself into the satisfaction theory, or into nothing. If Christ suffered retributive penalty in our place, then the satisfaction theory is, of course, true. If he did not suffer this retributive penalty, then he suffered no penalty at all, and the administrative theory vanishes into air.

Seeing these facts, I was shut up to the necessity either of adopting Anselmic penal substitution, or of rejecting substitution *in toto*. This I would have done over thirty years ago if I could have seen how any atonement is possible without substitution.

But I now thank the Giver of all good that *I do see* how real atonement is made without substitution; also, how no real atonement can be made by penal substitution; because salvation by the deeds of the law, whether performed by principal or substitute, is not salvation by atonement or by grace.

In "Atonement and Law Reviewed," it is believed by nearly all those whose opinions I have learned, the new arguments in favor of substitution are hopelessly overthrown. In the present work, if I am not mistaken, the old arguments are as thoroughly answered. Of course an answer to the new is not necessarily an answer to the old, nor conversely, except so far as these arguments rest on principles common to both lines of defense. It will, therefore, contribute much to a thorough understanding of the subject to study both books.

In working out the exceedingly difficult question of atonement, I followed no human authority—not even my "Confession of Faith"—for, highly as I esteem this authority, I have ever recognized it as subordinate to the word of God.

The Bible was my standard of supreme authority. If it had led me into conflict with my Confession of Faith on any points, I should have rejected it on such points without hesitation. Happily, however, the Bible and Confession are in full accord.

Being, as I verily believe, in full accord with the Bible, I have a conscience void of offense toward God; and being in full accord with our Confession of Faith, I have a conscience void of offense toward my brethren. I have not discussed atonement as an isolated question, but in its relations to other vital questions. It is not merely a treatise on atonement, but is rather a full scheme of soteriology—a somewhat detailed statement of the plan of salvation. While this fact will give critics a wider field for the exercise of their astuteness, it will be more satisfactory to those who desire to gain rather than give light.

Among anti-Calvinistic substitutionists, there never has been a *consensus* as to the exact sense of substitution. Hence, we have about as many theories as writers. These theories not only contradict one another, but each one involves the principle of self-contradiction, viz.: that in some sense Christ's death *does* and *does not* save us. To construct a non-suicidal scheme of anti-Calvinistic substitution is an inherent impossibility. We might as successfully attempt to construct a triangular circle.

In fact, what some mean by substitution is properly benefaction. Tradition and habit have bound them with the fetters of a false terminology which

involves them in a false theory, requiring the help of legal fictions and realistic assumptions.

The plan presented in this work rejects substitution and all legal fictions and realistic conceits, and deals with law, sin, its penalties, and salvation in a practical common sense way, as the scientist deals with the facts of nature, taking his theories from his ascertained facts, and not his facts from his theories, as substitutionists are wont to do. If I have presented the plan of salvation in a form more honoring to God, more in accord with his justice and benevolence, more intelligible to the human mind, and more in accord with our noblest instincts and the demands of reason; more in accord with all that is known of God and law in the realms of matter and mind, and especially in better accord with the Bible, than any possible scheme of substitution can be, then the reader, I think, can not reject it without injustice to himself.

Of the ultimate general acceptance of the theory, I have not the shadow of a doubt.

I, of course, am sensible of no defects in the argument. I am, however, sensible of defects in other respects.

The order of the discussion is not as perfect as it might be. Some repetitions also occur. These, though considered a blemish in authorship, may

prove of some advantage to the reader by familiarizing him with ideas and forms of statement with which he is not familiar.

I invite thorough investigation—do not deprecate legitimate criticism; what is erroneous ought to be exposed and corrected. But I do deprecate captiousness, caricature, and misrepresentation — the *cheapest* and the meanest of polemic vices, and the chief stock in trade of "*small critics.*"

If "this work be of man it will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye can not overthrow it." "O my Father . . . not as I will, but as thou wilt."

INTRODUCTION.

The Infinite and the Unconditioned alone is incapable of mistakes. God can not err. But the infinite and unconditioned can not create the infinite and the unconditioned. This would be to create beings equal to himself, which is on many accounts absurd. The very idea of a *created unconditioned, self-existent* being is a contradiction in terms. The limitation is not in the *divine power*, but in the incongruity of the thing itself; for what is created can not be unconditioned or self-existent.

The Infinite, therefore, can produce only the finite. But finiteness in a rational creature necessarily gives the possibility of mistake or sin, but does not necessitate or cause it. It gives the possibility of sin; else neither man nor any of the angels had fallen. It does not create the necessity of sin; else *all* the angels had fallen. Hence, we conclude that all rational creatures are created with the *possibility of sinning*, but not with the necessity of sinning.

The old conceit that God could create a moral world, absolutely incapable of sin, is contradicted by all that we know of God and of the nature of moral government. Such a world would require the utter negation of all creature freedom and a necessitated

virtue or obedience, which is a contradiction in the adjective.

Certainly God is free, but his freedom does not consist in a choice between the possible and the impossible—between a world *capable* of sinning and a world *incapable* of sinning, but in choosing between *creating* and *not creating*. This conclusion is supported by the fact that sin does exist among all orders of rational creatures known to us.

How can the creation of rational creatures under such liabilities be reconciled with the wisdom and goodness of God? Certainly we can not know God to perfection. His thoughts are not as our thoughts nor his ways as our ways. We may know more as to *what* he does than as to why or how he does things. Still it is perhaps not impossible to vindicate to human reason his goodness in the creation of the angel world. This I shall not here attempt.

As far as we know there is a marked difference between the conditions in which angels and men were created. The former without an animal nature and without the capacity of progeny, but the latter with an animal nature and with progenitory capacity.

These two facts constitute an immense difference between the primitive states of angels and men, and in this difference, perhaps, we should find the reason for the great difference in the divine economies toward them. The first human pair brought evil upon themselves by voluntary disobedience, just as did the fallen angels. Why, then, were they favored with a different economy and one more favor-

able than was given to the angels? The reasons may be, first, that they were, because of their dual nature, subject to greater temptations.

The sensuous organism, the seat of carnal appetites, is distinctly recognized as a fruitful source of evil. The animal desire for food is named as a prominent ingredient of the temptation in Eden, and the first temptation with which the sinless Christ was assailed after his forty days' fast was an appeal to his sensuous appetite.

The angels, it is suppposed, were by their nature free from this fruitful source of seduction. They were capable of assault only through the aspirations and susceptibilities peculiar to mind or spirit. But the first human pair were subject to all the temptations common to both the animal and spiritual nature. This may be one reason why they were favored with a different and better economy than were the angels. Secondly, the fact that the first human pair were intended as the progenitors of a numerous race, any one, or all, of whom might be involved in moral evil by the disobedience of an ancestor constitutes, perhaps, the chief reason why God deals with angels and men by different methods.

We know so little of these matters, particularly of the angels, that it is not very safe to dogmatize. The case of the descendants of Adam is immensely different from that of Adam himself. His evils came through his own voluntary action. His children are born into a state of evil. They, of course, were in no sense the originators of this evil state. They

are involved in the evil consequences of a sin over which they have no more control than they have over their own creation, and that, too, by an order of things which God has established. But exactly what that order is, or how Adam's sin involved his posterity in moral evil is a question that has been much discussed, but never very satisfactorily settled. The most popular solutions proposed are the following:

1. It is maintained that the first human pair, when they sinned, comprised all human nature; consequently that their act was the sin of human nature and the sin was as really the sin of every human being as it was of the first pair. Hence, all are alike justly condemned to eternal death.

This seems to be the theory asserted in the Westminster Catechism. It assumes that *realism* is true. Its fallacy I have sufficiently exposed in my work on anthropology.

2. Others, rejecting *realism*, teach that Adam was divinely constituted the federal representative of his race, and, having sinned, his sin became by imputation the sin of all his posterity and justly subjects them "to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and the pains of hell forever."

This seems to be what is taught in the Westminster Confession of Faith. This view assumes that guilt is transportable from one person to another. It rests on legal fictions—that is, on airy *nothings*.

3. Another solution is that Adam was in some way the representative of his race which would have been involved in his sin had he not repented and

been brought into a saved state prior to the birth of Cain. Hence, his fallen nature is not imputed nor imparted to his progeny, who are consequently born in the same state in which Adam was created.

Numerous objections lie against this theory, not the least of which is that in the last analysis it saves the sinner, or rather human beings, by works, just as Adam would have been saved by works if he had never sinned at all.

This seems to be the theory held by Arminius and some—not all—of his followers.

4. A fourth view bearing on the question is that Adam's sin had no evil effect upon his children; that they are born in the same state in which Adam was created, and become sinners by force of the examples of others.

This scheme is hard to reconcile with the Bible, and, if possible, still harder to reconcile with itself. According to the scheme, a man can not become an exemplar without previously sinning; but he can not sin without a previous example. This brings the matter to a dead lock—renders the inception of sin impossible. Whose example led Eve into sin? or whose example caused the first sin? It is too plain to require elaboration that if there can be no sin without prior example, and no example without prior sin, then the possibility of sin is quite excluded.

5. The most satisfactory solution of the perplexing question, I think, is this: Adam by disobedience corrupted his moral nature, and by natural generation transmitted that moral corruption or spiritual death to his children, just as he trans-

mitted his physical, intellectual, and æsthetical nature to them by heredity; like produces like.

This view simplifies the whole subject, makes it intelligible to the common mind, supersedes the necessity of all scholastic and realistic conceits, such as federal representation and judicial imputation, and sufficiently accounts for the depravity of children, without committing us to the *regressus* involved in the assumption that sin is the result of example, and is, above all, in strict accord with the Bible.

But a question paramount in importance to that just considered is, How can the divine goodness and honor be harmonized with any method of administration that makes Adam's sin a source of moral evil to his posterity?

I reply, I should not know how to answer this question, if it was so, that no remedy is provided for this fearful evil—an evil which, unless it is set aside, or in some way compensated, must result in endless death—the death of the immortal soul; and for what? Well, for a sinful nature—the source of actual personal sin—over which we have no more control than over our own creation. I repeat, if no remedy was provided, no means by which escape from such evils is possible, then I do not know how to answer the question.

That an ample remedy has been provided in the gracious mediation of Christ is universally allowed by all Christian communions, except those that hold to unconditional election and reprobation. By some it is maintained that the evils brought

upon us by our connection with the first Adam are exactly counteracted or done away by our relation to the second Adam.

This, I think, is an inadequate and an unscriptural view of the subject. If the mediation does this much and no more, it certainly does something for us, but possibly too little to save many; for on this hypothesis I do not see how we can escape the necessity of saving ourselves by works. But salvation *is all of grace*, and in no sense by works. I prefer to say that as our relation to the first Adam insures our depravity, and death in sin, so our union with the second Adam insures our salvation. Good works are the normal fruits of this union, and not its cause. Fruit has no power to change the quality of the tree that bears it.

Hence, I rejoice in the conviction that we gain immensely more by union with the second Adam than we lose by our relation to the first Adam. For Adam's obedience could have saved no one but himself, the Confessions of Faith to the contrary notwithstanding. Under the law each must obey for himself. But it is much easier for sinners to believe in Christ than it was for Adam to keep the law.

The mediation of Christ in the interest of humanity not only vindicates the divine justice and wisdom, but is a most marvelous display of the divine goodness and mercy, such as could not be conceived by finite minds but for its gracious revelation in God's word. For, rightly understood, it is the supreme object of adoration in heaven and

earth. It is the ineffable God in Christ, reconciling a sinful and lost world unto himself.

The question is often pertinently put as to whether mediatorship—a days' man between God and his rational creatures—is an *essential*, or only an *incidental* characteristic of a moral government?

In reply, I suggest that in relation to beings created, as we suppose the angels are, without progenital relationship, a mediator is probably not an essential provision. At least I see no reason why it should be so, nor have we any intimation from the Bible that any has been provided.

But in regard to beings created and related as are human kind, the case is quite different. So much so, that a mediator seems to be a prime necessity, or what is necessary both to vindicate the divine honor and to make it possible for men to escape the consequences of inherited evil. The divine fatherhood seems to require some such provision for those created in his own image but subjected to unavoidable moral evil.

It is generally represented that the act of God in providing a mediator was the result of his knowing that the first man would sin and involve his posterity in ruin, and that compassion moved him to provide the requisite means of salvation for some or all.

This view of the subject seems to make the mediation of Christ a sort of afterthought; also implies that Adam's acts, as foreseen by the Creator, had much to do in determining, modifying, or changing God's plan of administration in relation

to human beings. Such a procedure might not be unworthy of finite beings, but seems to me to be derogatory to the wisdom of the infinite Creator.

The mediation of Christ, I prefer to believe, is no afterthought, no mere expedient devised to meet an unexpected emergency, no adventitious adjunct to a previously formed but defective plan. The mediatorship of Christ is rather a fundamental part of the divine purpose in relation to humanity, so that the functions of the first and the second Adam are reciprocally complementary. Our relations to the two Adams mutually imply each other, and should be regarded as the product not of two but of one and the same divine act; so that the purpose to create humanity was the purpose to provide mediatorship for them.

This view of the subject releases us from the necessity of disparaging the divine excellence by assuming that his plan of administration was determined, or in any way modified, by the conduct of Adam, as it was foreknown to the Creator.

Hence it is that the mediation of Christ is as old as the creation. He was "a lamb slain from the foundation of the world." His mediation, too, was just as real and as efficacious before his incarnation as it is now. He was always the "light of the world," "the way and the truth and the life," "the resurrection and the life." His incarnation, death, and resurrection add nothing to his life-giving, soul-saving power. They rather are the means by which he reveals himself to the world and manifests his love to humanity demonstrates his power over

sin and death, and shows himself an all-sufficient Savior, able to save to the uttermost all that trust in him. This manifestation is of immense moral significance, an inestimable boon to humanity, and constitutes the essential difference between the Old and the New Testament dispensation.

But how does Christ, as mediator, save man? This question is variously answered. Some propose one thing and some another. The Bible method I think is presented (imperfectly, however) in the following pages. To this the reader is respectfully referred.



PART I.

REVIEW OF CHRISTIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

The mediatorship of Christ is the great central doctrine of the Bible. Christ is declared to be "the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe." But how he saves men—whether by his precept and example, or by relaxing the rigor of his law in the interest of the guilty and helpless, or by obeying the law as a substitute of the guilty, both in its preceptive and penal requirements, or by imparting his own spiritual life to those who are dead in trespasses and sins—is a question about which good and great men very widely differ.

The doctrine that Christ saves men by becoming their substitute in law and suffering in their place has obtained large currency in both papal and Protestant countries. Anselm (1109), Archbishop of Canterbury, a scholastic theologian of eminent piety and wonderful intellectual acumen, it is generally allowed, was the first to formulate this view of the subject.

The leading positions of Anselm's theory, as

given by Dr. Shedd, (His. Chris. Doct. Vol. II., pp. 277–8) are as follows:

"Beginning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines this as the withholding from God what is *due* to him from man. Sin is debt. But man owes to God the absolute and entire subjection of his will to the divine law and will.

This is not given, and hence the guilt, or *debt*, of man to Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not consist in simply beginning again to subject the will entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving *satisfaction* for the previous cessation in so doing. God had been robbed of his honor in the past, and it must be restored to him in some way, while at the same time the present and future honor due him is being given. But how is man, who is still a sinner, and constantly sinning, to render this double satisfaction, viz., satisfy the law in the future by perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring its whole penalty?

It is impossible for him to render it; and yet this impossibility, argues Anselm, does not release him from his indebtedness or guilt, because this impossibility is the effect of a free act, and a free act must be held responsible for all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical maxim that the cause is answerable for the effect.

But now the question arises: Can not the love and compassion of God abstracted from his justice come in at this point and remit the sin of man without any satisfaction?

This is impossible, because it would be irregularity (*aliquid inordinatum*) and injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in the person of the transgressor, nor in that of a proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not subject to any law or regulation of any sort; it enjoys more liberty than

righteousness itself, which would be a contradiction and a wrong.

Furthermore, it would contradict the divine justice itself, if the creature could defraud the Creator of that which is his due, without giving any satisfaction for the robbery. Since there is nothing greater and better than God, there is no attribute more just or necessary than that punitive righteousness innate to deity, which maintains the honor of God.

This justice, indeed, is God himself; so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself."

Remarks.—1. We are here taught that man is a sinner, and can not save himself. This is certainly true.

2. We are taught that God can not save the sinner, unless justice receives prior satisfaction for human sin. This plainly excludes the possibility of salvation; for, confessedly, the sinner can not satisfy justice for himself, and for God to satisfy his own justice in the place of the sinner would be to suffer the penalty of his own law—that is, to suffer the consequences of not loving himself, which is simply inconceivable. But, if this was possible, it would be the same thing as pardoning sin without any satisfaction at all.

If A owes B and is unable to pay, and B deposits the amount of the debt to the credit of A, the debt is not paid but forgiven without an equivalent value. This is not satisfaction of law, but abrogation.

Again, if it was possible for God to satisfy justice in the sinner's place, such an act would in itself be

an act of mercy, and in no sense in order to mercy, and would *ipso facto* release the sinner from condemnation, just as B's act in putting the amouut of the debt to A's credit releases A from his indebtedness.

3. We are here taught that "justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself." This is a scholastic conceit, founded upon *realism*, and involves numerous absurdities:

(1) It depersonalizes the deity and reduces him to an impersonal principle. It leads inevitably to fate and atheism.

(2) It makes justice dominate the divine will in such a way that God may will to do what his justice forbids his doing. Hence, it is claimed that God can not show mercy without first satisfying justice, to do which, as we have seen, is itself an act of mercy.

(3) Certainly God is just, but he is never called justice in the Bible or anywhere else except in realistic philosophy. But he is called Love. Justice and love are both attributed to God. If justice imperatively requires the punishment of sin, then love still more imperatively requires the pardon of sin. Both attributes are immutable, and reconciliation is impossible; for justice requires satisfaction prior to any act of love, but for God to satisfy justice is itself an act of love. This clearly demonstrates the utter absurdity of founding the necessity of atonement in the divine attributes, as Anselm and all substitutionists are wont to do.

Anselm having stated what he conceived to be

required by divine justice, proceeds to indicate how these requirements are met by the God-Man. He says:

"There are two ways in which this attribute (justice) may be satisfied. First, the punishment may be actually inflicted upon the transgressor. But this would be incompatible with his salvation from sin, . . . because the punishment required is eternal, in order to offset the infinite demerit of robbing God of his honor."

Remarks.—1. It is here taught that punishment satisfies justice, or the law. This vital error will be subsequently fully exposed. It is sufficient here to suggest that if punishment satisfies law or justice, then Satan is as really satisfying law as are the angels. But to satisfy law is to be free from condemnation of law—that is, to bear the consequences of not loving God, as the law requires, is to satisfy the law and be free from condemnation. This philosophy exterminates the difference between obedience and disobedience, and hence between spiritual life and spiritual death, between heaven and hell.

2. We have here given a false ground of the eternity of punishment. The punishment of sin is alleged to be eternal because it is infinitely demeritorious. This can not be so, for no act of a finite creature can be either infinitely meritorious or demeritorious, because this would be exactly equal to saying that a finite being is capable of an infinite obedience or infinite disobedience, which is palpably absurd. Infinite demerit, then, can not be the ground of eternal punishment. Sin and its

punishment are coterminous, just as cause and effect. If Satan should cease to hate, and come to love God, he would necessarily cease to bear the penalty—that is, the consequence of not loving God. Persistent or endless disobedience is the real ground of endless punishment.

3. It is here distinctly taught that punishment "offsets infinite demerit." This logically teaches that Satan is as truly free from demerit as are those that have never sinned. The man that pays his debts as he makes them is as truly out of debt as he that never makes debts; or the man that offsets his demerit by any means is as free from demerit as he that never sinned.

4. Anselm says: "The second and only other way in which the attribute of justice can be satisfied is by substituted or vicarious suffering."

Remarks.—This proposition will in due time be sufficiently considered. I wish here to note an incongruity inherent in all substitutionary schemes of salvation, viz.: they assume as the basis of the scheme that "justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself," and hence that justice *dominates* the divine will. But in order to make room for substitution, it becomes necessary to reverse this position, and allow the divine *will* to dominate divine *justice*, or rather to exterminate it from the divine mind; for to punish the innocent in the place of the guilty is not only an act of *will*, but is an act utterly destructive of every principle of *justice*. This would not be tolerated by any human government. The theory

abounds with many such glaring incongruities from which no human ingenuity can free it, some of which will be noted in their proper place.

5. Anselm informs us that no mere finite being can perform the office of substitute for sinners. This is certainly true, and he might have said, No other being can fill such an office in the sphere of moral or divine law. He says:

"Only God, therefore, can make this satisfaction. Only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity. But on the other hand, man must render it; otherwise it would not be a satisfaction for *man's* sin."

Remarks.—This is sufficiently profound, but whether true is another matter. God, it seems, is in a strait. He has been robbed of his honor by the "infinite demerit of sin." He demands that this demerit shall be "offset" by the punishment of a substitute, so as to save the transgressor. But no finite being can be a sufficient substitute. But God alone is infinite. He, then, alone can satisfy himself. "Only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity."

How is this? If I owe a man a debt, and he determines that I shall not pay it, but that some other person shall pay it, but can find no other person that can satisfy it, then of course he must lose the debt or pay it himself. But if he pays it to himself, or satisfies his own claims against me, what is that but forgiving the debt; or if the claim can be satisfied only by the infliction of penal suffering upon the substitute, then he must punish himself.

Can God inflict penal wrath upon himself? If punishment alone can satisfy the claim, and only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity, then it follows that God must satisfy the claim against me by inflicting the punishment upon himself.

6. But while God makes the satisfaction he must make it through a man. He says: "But on the other hand man must render it, otherwise it would not be a satisfaction for *man's* sin."

Remarks.—This is certainly very deep or dark, or both. One point of difficulty is to know the precise difference between *making* satisfaction for sin and *rendering* satisfaction for sin. A difference is evidently intended, but usage, I think, does not recognize it. We are left to conjecture as to what it is. God makes the satisfaction, and man renders the satisfaction. But the satisfaction can be made only by suffering the full penalty of the law, which is "eternal death." But this same satisfaction is rendered by man. Deity makes the satisfaction—suffers eternal death—to satisfy the Deity, and man renders the satisfaction—eternal death—for the same purpose. Who then suffers eternal death, in which the satisfaction consists? Is it God, or man, or both? This to an ordinary common-sense man seems a real difficulty. But the astute author escapes, or thinks he escapes, by the aid of his realistic philosophy. He does not mean that God as God suffered eternal death, for this would involve consequences too shocking to be admitted. Nor does he mean that man as man endured eternal death as a substitute for men. But he means that

the God-Man, as a theanthropic person, suffered the equivalent of this eternal death. He continues:

"Consequently, the required and adequate satisfaction must be *theanthropic*—that is, rendered by a God-Man—as God, the God-Man, can give to Deity more than the whole finite creation combined could render. Furthermore, this theanthropic obedience and suffering was not due from the mere humanity of Christ. This was sinless and innocent, and justice had no claims, in the way of suffering, upon it. And, moreover, only a man's obedience, and not that of a God-Man, could be required of a man. Consequently the divine-human obedience and suffering was a surplusage in respect to the man Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party"—the elect world.

Remarks.—1. The doctrine is that God, apart from humanity, did not and could not, as a substitute, obey the law and suffer its penalty in the place of man. This is certainly true.

(2) That Christ, as man, apart from divinity, could and did obey the law preceptively for himself; that, being sinless, he was not required to bear any penalty on his own account; nor was it possible for him as a man to obey the law and suffer its penalties in the place of others. This is certainly true.

(3) That God, as the God-Man, "can (and did) render to deity more than the whole finite creation combined could render"—that is, that the God-Man could render more obedience, and at the same time endure more penal suffering than all finite creatures combined.

A purely divine person could not do this. A

purely human person could not do this, but a God-Man, a theanthropic person *could*, and actually did this wonderful thing.

Perhaps we should never cease to admire the ingeniousness of this conceit; and if it was any thing more than a conceit, we should never cease to be grateful to its author for so wonderful a revelation.

But when we expel the realism upon which it rests, the pretty vision vanishes into thin air.

The illusion is in this "God-Man," "this theanthropic obedience and suffering," "this *Divine-Human* obedience and suffering."

Christ possesses both a divine and human nature. This fact is expressed by the use of these composite terms. The terms themselves are mere names or symbols of things, and not themselves substantial entities. But Anselm invests them with attributes of substantial entitiveness, and attributes to the God-Man qualities and powers not proper to either a purely divine or human being—*e. g.*, the power of rendering "to the Deity more than the whole finite creation combined could render." This pure divinity could not do; this pure humanity could not do. But the God-Man, the human and the divine in combination, it is assumed, could do this marvelous thing.

If it could be proved that the God-Man could do this, it would not prove the substitutionary theory to be true; for other insuperable difficulties array themselves against it. But if substitutionists can not prove the doctrine of realism, or that names or

word-symbols have the powers of substantive entities, then the whole substitutionary scheme of salvation dissolves into dust.

Having discussed this doctrine at some length in "Atonement and Law Reviewed," and as I shall have occasion to refer to it subsequently, I shall say only enough here to show the reader the impossibility of the God-Man's rendering any such obedience and enduring any such suffering as are ascribed to him.

1. We call Christ a theandric person. But this does not imply that he did or could perform any theandric acts, or any acts neither strictly divine nor human, but something essentially different from both. His divine and his human nature were not amalgamated, forming a *tertium quid* and of course his acts, none of them, were amalgamated acts, comprising a human and a divine element. On the contrary, his every act was either purely *human* or purely *divine.*

Man has a body and a mind, but all his sufferings are purely physical or mental—they are not amalgamated sufferings, but all have their source either in the body or in the mind, not equally in both. They deeply sympathize with each other. But this they could not do if the suffering had its source equally in both. The application is easy enough, and you can make it for yourselves.

2. Even if theanthropic "obedience and suffering" were possible, it brings no relief. Because just so far as the God-nature participates in the obedience and suffering, just so far does God, as a

substitute for men, obey the requirements and suffer the penalties of his own law, or render obedience to himself and at the same time pour his wrath and righteous indignation upon himself. This is too plain to require a word of explanation.

3. If it should be admitted that Christ, as a theandric personality had omnipotent power, still it is true that the terms of the law which he obeyed exclude the possibility of his rendering any substitutionary obedience, either preceptively or penally. For the law explicitly requires obedience *according to ability*. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all* thy heart, soul, mind, and strength." Of course Christ as a man could do this only for himself. If we say that he as a theandric person rendered an obedience which neither the divine nor the human nature could separately render, then we require him as a man to love God with more than all his ability. To require him to love with all his ability on his own account, and at the same time to love in the place of millions of others, would be to require an impossibility. Hence, it is so plain as scarcely to require saying, that if the God-Man obeyed the law and endured its penalties in the place of men, then that obedience was rendered exclusively by his divinity, and in no part by his humanity. This no man, not even the most inveterate realist, would be willing to admit.

It is said that the "Divine-Human obedience and suffering was a surplusage in respect to the man Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party."

This assumes that the God-Man was capable of rendering to God more love [love is the fulfilling of the law] than the law required. But we have just seen that the terms of the law exclude the possibility of any supererogatory obedience. Consequently there is absolutely no surplusage of "obedience and suffering to overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party"—unless, indeed, it comes from the God side of the God-Man. But this is equivalent, as we have seen, to pardoning sin without any atonement at all.

These statements I have thought proper to make in regard to the fundamental principles upon which Anselm, with marvelous ingenuity, rears his colossal scheme of soteriology. The merits of the theory as modified and supported by his admirers will be considered in subsequent discussions.

CHAPTER II.

SOTERIOLOGY OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS.

It is generally admitted that the Christian writers who immediately succeeded the apostles give no clear intimations that they believed that Christ saves men by a penal death. They distinctly recognize him as the Savior of men. They speak of his sufferings, his death, his righteousness, etc. But no one claims that they teach with any precision that Christ suffered the punishment of sin in the place of those for whom he died. Yet it is persistently claimed that this doctrine was held by them. I will here cite the principal passages in their writings that are relied upon in support of this claim. These I take from the "History of Christian Doctrine," by W. G. T. Shedd, D.D., Vol. II., p. 208, *et seq.*, to which the reader is referred.

1. Polycarp, a pupil of John, says:

"Christ is our Savior; for through grace are we righteous, not by works; *for our sins he has even taken death upon himself*, has become the servant of us all, and through death for us our hope, and the pledge of our righteousness. The heaviest sin is unbelief in Christ; his blood will be demanded of unbelievers; for to those to whom the death of Christ, *which obtains the forgiveness of sins*, does not prove a ground of justification, it proves a ground

of condemnation. Our Lord Jesus Christ suffered himself to be brought to death *for our sins;* let us therefore without ceasing hold steadfastly to him who is our hope, and the earnest of our righteousness, even Jesus Christ, 'who *bare our sins* in his own body on the tree.'"

This seems to be the sum total of the proof that Polycarp believed that Christ as a substitute died in the place of men in such a sense as to bear their guilt and punishment and infallibly insure to them eternal life. It is hardly necessary to say that there is not a solitary word in the whole quotation that *teaches* or even *implies* the doctrine.

Still it is easy to see how substitutionists deceive themselves by such passages, viz.: if it is said that "Christ died for us," they assume that he died penally in our stead. They thus beg the whole question by gratuitously assuming to be true what they are required to prove to be true.

The language of this apostolic father, if interpreted in the light of its own terms, can not be reconciled with the substitutionary scheme. If the theory is true, how could Christ "become the servant of all?" or "the hope and pledge of righteousness to all?" or how could his blood be demanded of unbelievers, since all for whom his blood was shed necessarily believe? or how can his blood be demanded of those for whom it was not shed? or how could his death be a ground of condemnation to those for whom he did not die?

Much more might be said, but need not. All Polycarp says is in harmony with a non-penal the-

ory, but can not be reconciled with the penal scheme. [How Christ bore sin will be explained in due time.]

2. The next witness called is Ignatius (†116). Dr. Shedd says:

"The *expiatory* agency of Christ is explicitly recognized by Ignatius. In one passage he speaks of Christ as the One who gave himself to God, '*an offering* and sacrifice for us.' In another place he bids believers to stir themselves up to duty '*by the blood* of God.' In another place he remarks that 'if God had dealt with us according to our works we should not now have had a being;' but that now, under the gospel, we 'have peace *through the flesh and blood and passion of Jesus Christ.*'"

These quotations instead of proving penality actually disprove it. Offering and sacrifice are incompatible with penality. I need not offer another word. They can claim pertinency to the issue only on the assumption that Christ could not suffer for us unless he suffered in our stead—the very point which requires proof.

3. The next witness quoted is Barnabas, companion of Paul. He says:

"The Lord endured to deliver his body to death that we might be sanctified *by the remission of sins which is by the shedding of that blood.*"

This is every way as favorable to non-penality as to penality.

4. Clement of Rome, a disciple of Paul, is next invoked in the interest of substitution. His language is:

"His (Christ's) blood was given for us, poured out for our salvation; *he gave* by the will of God his body for our body, his soul for our soul."

It is pure assumption to say that "for" is here intended for "instead of." This will be elsewhere more fully considered. That Clement did not hold the penal theory is fairly evinced by the fact that he has much to say of Christ as a "high-priest." No high-priest, or any other priests, Jewish or pagan, ever bore the guilt and punishment of those for whom they ministered. Substitution requires no priest. As a theory an *executioner* is all it needs. This will subsequently be seen.



CHAPTER III.

SOTERIOLOGY OF THE PATRISTS.

In this period of the history of the church the claims of Satan were extensively recognized.

If sin is a debt, and Christ paid the debt, to whom did he pay it? This question divided theologians for near a thousand years. The most influential writers insisted that Satan, in seducing the progenitors of mankind, acquired a valid right to their services; and that Christ, in order to save men, must satisfy this satanic claim: otherwise *injustice* would be done to Satan.

SECTION I.—Irenæus, in his book against heresies, says:

"The word of God [the *Logos*], omnipotent and not wanting in essential justice, proceeded with strict justice even against the apostasy or kingdom of evil itself [*apostasiam*], redeeming from it [*ab ea*] that which was his own originally, not by using violence, as did the devil in the beginning, but by persuasion [*secundum suadelam*], as it became God, so that neither justice should be infringed upon, nor the original creation of God perish."

Here we have a distinct recognition of the rights of Satan, which justice required should be in some way satisfied.

Irenæus says not one word about Christ's satisfy-

ing the justice of God for men, or redeeming men from its claims, but from the kingdom of evil only. But Anselm utterly rejects the claims of Satan. It is therefore the extremest folly to attempt to harmonize the views of these two writers; for this can be done only by maintaining that Christ died to satisfy the just claims both of God and Satan.

Yet it is claimed that there is no contradiction. This claim is based on the following quotation from Irenæus' Epistle to Diognetus:

"God himself gave up his Son a ransom for us [*huper hēmōn*], the holy for the unholy, the good for the evil, the just for the unjust, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for the mortal. For what else could cover our sins but his righteousness? In whom was it possible for us, the unholy and the ungodly, to be justified, except the Son of God alone? O sweet exchange! O wonderful operation! O unlooked for benefit! that the sinfulness of many should be hidden in one, that the righteousness of one should justify many ungodly."

On this extract I remark: (1) That it of itself teaches nothing distinctively as to the nature of Christ's sufferings, whether they satisfied the claims of God or Satan. If Irenæus was consistent with himself he meant the latter.

(2) What it does teach is that men are saved by Christ's righteousness, acquired by satisfying the claims of Satan to whom he believed men owed some sort of allegiance, just as a man imprisoned for debt is saved by the kindness of a friend who pays the debt. Much more might be said in proof

of this position. But this is not Anselmic substitution, with its invariable double imputation.

SECTION II.—It is well known that Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, Basilides, and Valentinus held views in direct conflict with the substitutionary and penal scheme of salvation. They did not regard the death of Christ as a penal satisfaction to divine justice. If this doctrine is the great central doctrine of Christianity, and was taught by Christ, the apostles, and the apostolic fathers, it is marvelous that the most learned and pious men of that early period should hold opinions in utter conflict with it. That such men might err on minor and speculative doctrines is fairly presumable; but that they should teach doctrines contrary to the central truth of Christianity, which correlates all other Christian doctrines to itself, and yet be recognized as lights and leaders in the Christian world, is in itself incredible. The fact that they do not *recognize* the doctrine of penal satisfaction in any form as true or false is sufficient proof that it had no existence in their day.

SECTION III.—Athanasius (373) is quoted in support of the substitutionary theory. He acknowledges the claims of Satan, but "has less to say" of these claims "than his predecessors." Still, it is insisted that he also recognized the claims of divine justice in contradistinction to those of Satan. If this is so, then Christ had a double work to perform: to satisfy justice as a divine attribute, and to satisfy the "just" claims of Satan. How could he do this? He died but once. How could that

single death be so disposed of as to satisfy these adverse claims? Are we at liberty, without the most absolute proof, to attribute to this most astute author such palpable absurdity? Such proof does not exist. In vindication of Athanasius' consistency, I suggest that he believed, in common with others, that Satan, by conquest, had acquired a property right in men; and that Christ, by his sufferings, had satisfied this just claim, and thus redeemed men; just as captives taken in combat were redeemed by the payment of a ransom.

All that Athanasius says on the subject can, I think, be more easily reconciled with this view than with the notion that Christ suffered penally to satisfy the claims both of Satan and of God. For it would be an easy matter to show that a number of his expressions can not be harmonized with the Anselmic theory at all.

SECTION IV.—Augustine (430), it is well known, directed his attention principally to anthropology. He accepted the soteriology current in his time. He consequently unhesitatingly allows the claims of Satan. In his work, "De libero arbitrio," he says:

"God the Son being clothed with humanity subjugated even the devil to man, extorting nothing from him by violence, but overcoming him by the law of justice; for it would have been injustice if the devil had not had the right to rule over the being whom he had taken captive."

Here we have a distinct avowal of the legal rights of Satan in men, and also the origin of those rights

—capture. According to the custom of the times a man captured belonged to the captor, and a stipulated price paid to the captor released, redeemed, the captive. This was exactly Augustine's conception of the plan of salvation. Satan captured Adam and Eve. This gave him a just right to them and their posterity. Christ rendered to Satan a just equivalent, and thus released them, or a part of them, from bondage to Satan, and this liberation from Satan was a full release from all legal liabilities to punishment. To require a ransom to be paid for one captured into slavery to the captor, and another ransom to be paid to the party from which he was captured would be an unprecedented procedure. It is simply incredible that the astute minds of Athanasius and Augustine should advocate any such absurd things.

They were evidently misled by the false assumption that the divine government is analogous to human governments in regard to the law of right. Knowing that Christ does ransom men from condemnation, they concluded that he ransoms them by penal suffering, rendered to satisfy the claims of Satan. As the absurdity of this view of soteriology becomes more apparent as the centuries pass away, many of the leading minds sought to replace the claims of Satan with the claims of abstract justice. Hence, the Anselmic scheme. That Augustine himself held views utterly antagonistic to those of Anselm is apparent from the following facts:

1. He expressly denies any *absolute necessity* for atonement at all, and asserts only a *relative necessi-*

ty. In this he posits the atonement in the divine will, and not in divine justice. In this he and Anselm are in point-blank conflict.

2. He blends justification and sanctification, or supplements the righteousness of Christ with the personal righteousness of the individual. In this he is contradicted by Anselm, and very properly, too.

3. Augustine boldly asserts the rights of Satan, which Anselm rightly rejects *in toto.*

4. Augustine teaches a general atonement, or that Christ died for all men. This is contradicted by the Anselmic theory, which can avoid universalism only by denying general atonement.

A few facts may be pertinently stated in connection with the preceding discussion:

1. The Apostolic Fathers—the immediate successors of the apostles—presented the plan of salvation mostly in the language of the sacred Scriptures—that is, they preached a crucified and risen Christ as the Savior of all men, especially of them that believe. They say nothing of the claims of Satan, or of satisfying abstract justice. They make Christ himself the Savior of men.

2. Their simple, matter-of-fact soteriology was superseded by wild speculations, founded upon a few misapprehended Bible texts, such as Col. ii. 15; Heb. ii. 14, concerning Satan and the kingdom of evil. The result was that the claims of Satan were largely recognized, and Christ's death acknowledged as a satisfaction of these claims, and so general and so deeply rooted were these convic-

tions that it required near a thousand years for the church to free itself from the obnoxious figment.

3. The astute and pious Anselm, impressed with the fallacy of the rights of Satan, and perceiving the evil tendency of supplementing the merits of Christ with human merit, as the ground of salvation, put forth his wonderful power to free Christianity from these grievous incumbrances. Had his success equaled his abilities, he would have achieved wonders for the Christian world. Unfortunately, however, he was thoroughly permeated with the realistic philosophy, and lived in an age when scholars dealt with fancies as facts, and abstractions as realities. The result is a scheme of soteriology, remarkable for its ingenuity, but the outcome of which is that Christ died to enable God to show mercy to sinful men, the fallacy of which has previously been indicated.

4. It seems worthy of mention that this wonderful man constructs his soteriology of realistic material furnished by his own fertile brain, and wholly independent of the Bible. The Bible never authorized him to say that "justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself"—never authorized him to say that Christ died to satisfy justice. These conceits are the products of his own inventive genius.

CHAPTER IV.

SECTION I.—*Conflicting Theories of Soteriology.*

The Apostolic Fathers, like the apostles themselves, it is generally said, had no formulated scheme of soteriology. It is certainly true that they had no scheme of salvation apart from a living Christ.

They indulged in no inane speculation concerning the relation of Christ's mission to divine justice, or as to what effects it had upon God, or upon the divine government, or upon the moral and legal states of men. They did not teach that Christ's beautiful example, or his wise precepts, or his marvelous self-denial, or his sufferings, or his death, or his resurrection, however valuable these things may be, ever saved any body or assured salvation to any one.

On the contrary, they taught that Christ himself —not his precepts, not his death, not his resurrection—but the *crucified*, but *risen* Christ saves men by making them *partakers of his own spiritual life*. They preached him as "the light of the world," as "the true light that lighteth every man," as "the way, the truth, and the light," as "the resurrection and the life," who is himself the "propitiation for the sins of the whole world," "the Savior of all men, especially of them that be-

lieve," who "came into the world to save sinners, even the chief."

They preached facts, not figments, and their theory, their philosophy of salvation, was in their facts. They preached a living Christ, who came to save the world by taking away the sins of individuals, as he took away the maladies of those that came to him when he was visible to human eyes. They preached a living Christ, a quickening spirit, who though invisible is as truly present in this world as he was before his ascension, and raising up men to spiritual life by the same power with which he raised Lazarus from the dead.

This was the gospel in its simplicity and in its power—God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.

SECTION II.—*Dissensions Arise.*

Within two centuries the gospel had attracted to the church men of all shades of philosophy and religion, all classes seeking to modify the new religion by their peculiar faith. Speculation was rife and wild. Error came in like a flood. The simplicity and spirituality of the gospel gave way to forms and ritual observances. Sacraments and ordinances were substituted for the living Christ. To his suffering or death was attributed a power which belonged only to himself as the living and life-giving spirit. His sufferings, it was imagined, offset the sufferings which were due to men's sins, because of their subjection to the prince of evil. This view was boldly maintained by the leading minds of the church, such as Irenæus, Athanasius, Augustine,

and many others; while others, such as Gregory the Great and others, denied the claims of Satan, and held that Christ suffered *penally* to satisfy the claims of punitive justice, imminent in the divine nature and dominative of the divine will.

This conflict lasted about a thousand years, during the first part of which the claims of Satan were greatly in the ascendancy, and during the latter part the claims of justice held the supremacy. The conceit that Satan had property rights in all humanity, which must be equitably met before men could be rightfully freed from sin, was the original form of the doctrine of penal substitution, I have not a doubt. This view gradually merged itself, during the course of centuries, into the conceit that Christ died to satisfy divine justice. This, I think, was not a triumph of truth over error, but the triumph of one error over another. The one unduly exalts Satan, the other absolutely depersonalizes the Deity.

SECTION III.—Anselm boldly and *rightfully* rejected the claims of Satan, and boldly and *wrongfully* asserted the claims of abstract justice, assuming that "Justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself."

His scheme, however, met with only partial favor, some accepting it fully, others with material modifications, and others rejecting it outright.

1. Abelard.—This acute schoolman rejected *in toto* the scheme of Anselm, except as to the claims of Satan. His view of the subject is succinctly

given in History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. II., p. 287, and is as follows:

"The Deity can pardon upon repentance. There is nothing in the divine nature which necessitates a satisfaction for past transgressions, antecedently to remission of penalty. Like creating out of nothing, redemption may and does take place by fiat, by which sin is abolished by a word and the sinner is received into favor. Nothing is needed but penitence in order to remission of sin. The object of the incarnation and death of Christ, consequently, is to produce sorrow in the human soul. The life and sufferings of the God-Man were intended to exert a moral impression upon the hard and impenitent heart, which is thereby melted into contrition and then received into favor by the boundless compassion of God."

It is sufficient here to say that this scheme is insufficient as a plan of salvation. It makes no provision for a change of man's spiritual nature, except such as may be produced by his mental acts. It is, in fact, a plan of salvation by works under favorable circumstances.

2. Lombard (1164) rejected Anselm's theory and accepted that of Abelard in its fundamental principles. He admits, however, that the claims of justice are met to a limited extent by the sufferings of the Redeemer. "They deliver man from the *temporal* penal consequences of sin, provided baptism be administered and penance be performed."

These statements show an utter misapprehension of the gospel plan of salvation, both on its divine and its human side. It restricts the merits of Christ

to the temporal consequences of sin; and yet supplements these merits with human works. A sinner saved by this plan, I should think, could never know to whom he should return thanks—whether to Christ or himself.

3. Bernard of Clairvaux (1153), condemns the soteriology of Abelard, asserts the claims of Satan, which he holds were met by the sufferings of Christ, and of course disagrees with Anselm in this respect; he agrees with Augustine in denying an *absolute*, and in asserting only a relative, necessity for atonement. In this, too, he is in conflict with Anselm.

4. Hugo St. Victor (1140), Dr. Shedd says:

"Approaches somewhat nearer in technical respects to . . . Anselm than did . . . Bernard. While unwilling to give up the old patristic notion of a satisfaction of Satan's claims, he is distinct in asserting and exhibiting the relations of the work of Christ to the divine nature. The sacrificial element as distinguished from the legal is very apparent in this schoolman. . . . 'The Son of God,' he says, 'by becoming man, paid man's debt to the Father, and by dying expiated man's guilt.'"

The absurdity of these views is too apparent to require special notice.

5. Bonaventura (1272) is one of the most astute of the schoolmen. He agrees, except as to the absolute necessity of atonement, with Anselm, and labors with much earnestness and skill to free the scheme from objections. He raises a number of questions, which, to a shrewd mind, having right

conceptions of God and a moral government, would seem to be impertinent and trifling, such as:

"First, Whether it was fit in itself (*congruum*) that human nature should be restored by God.

Secondly, Whether it was more fitting that human nature should be restored by a satisfaction of justice than by any other method.

Thirdly, Whether any sinless creature could render satisfaction for the whole human race.

Fourthly, Whether any sinful man, assisted by divine grace, could make satisfaction for his own sins.

Fifthly, Whether God was under obligation to accept the method of satisfaction by the death of Christ.

Sixthly, Whether God could have saved the human race by some other method."

These questions were evidently suggested by false notions of God, justice, satisfaction, penal suffering, and the mission of Christ. The soteriology of this author is subject to the objections that lie with crushing force against the penal theory in all its forms, and will here receive no further notice.

6. Thomas Aquinas (1274) is considered "the strongest systematizer among the schoolmen." In answer to the question "Was it necessary that Christ should suffer in order to the salvation of man?" he discriminates between different kinds of necessity. He says:

"If by necessity be meant that which from its very nature can not but be . . . then there was no necessity for the suffering of Christ.

Again, if by necessity, external compulsion be meant, then the sufferings of Christ were not nec-

essary. But, thirdly, a thing is necessary when it is indispensable in order to the attainment of some other thing, and in this sense the death of Christ is necessary. It is not, indeed, a matter of necessity that a man's sin should be pardoned, but if it be pardoned it is necessary that Christ should first make satisfaction to justice for its commission."

This discrimination between different kinds of necessity is proper. Christ's death was necessary—not in the sense that it could not but be, nor in the sense of external compulsion—but necessary as a means of human salvation. But Aquinas, in common with penalists, mistakes utterly the sense in which Christ's death was necessary as a means of salvation. His death was necessary, not to satisfy justice in relation to others, but because if he had not died he could not have risen, and if he had not risen he could not have become a quickening spirit, and if he had not become a quickening spirit he could have saved nobody, and would be no Savior. This will be made plain in subsequent discussions.

In reply to the question, whether redemption could not have been accomplished in some other method, he teaches that:

"Though it is, abstractly considered, possible to save man in some other manner, it becomes impossible, when once God has determined to accomplish the work in the way and manner he has."

In this statement he rejects the very foundation of Anselm's theory, which posits the necessity of atonement in divine justice, independently of the divine will. He further says:

"If God had willed to liberate man from sin without any satisfaction, he would not have done any thing contrary to justice. . . . If God sees fit to remit that penalty, which has been affixed to law only for his own glory, no injustice is done."

It is thus seen that Anselm and Aquinas are in irreconcilable conflict as to the foundation principles of the penal scheme of salvation. Aquinas is more in harmony with Augustine and the papal church generally than with Anselm.

7. Duns Scotus asserted a scheme of soteriology in violent conflict with his predecessors, and divided the papal church into two great parties, called Thomists and Scotists. The foundation of his theory was: "*Tantum valet omne creatum oblatum pro quanto acceptat Deus illud et non plus.*" He denied the infinite demerit of sin, and the infinite value of Christ's sufferings. He held that:

"God was pleased to accept this particular sacrifice as an offset and equivalent for human transgressions; not from any intrinsic value in it, but because he so pleased. He might have accepted any other substitute, or he might have dispensed with accepting any substitute at all."

Duns Scotus makes penal satisfaction purely a matter of divine *pleasure* and not of *justice*, and all oblations are worth just what God may be pleased to accept them at, and no more. His scheme, upon the whole is, perhaps, not more unreasonable or unscriptural than that of Anselm, but it evinces an utter misapprehension of the mediation of Christ.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.—*Soteriology of the Reformation.*

Anselm was a warm admirer of Augustine, whose anthropology he seems to have accepted in full. He, it is conceded, was the first theologian who attempted a systematic formulation of a substitutionary and penal scheme of soteriology. It was but natural, all things considered, that he should construct his soteriology to meet the requirements of Augustinian anthropology. In brief, his soteriology may be regarded as the natural product of a false anthropology, false views of human freedom, and false conceptions of the nature and possibilities of the moral law; or regarded as the theological complement of universal predestination, unconditional election and reprobation, irresistible grace, and philosophical necessity, so called.

Anselm did his work with a masterly hand, so much so that eight hundred years of keen dialectical sifting has been able to add but little of any value to the theory.

The Reformers, too, were warm admirers of Augustine. Accepting his anthropology without questioning its truth, they very naturally accepted the Anselmic soteriology, which is dove-tailed into it.

The distinction between the active and passive

obedience of Christ is an addition, but surely no improvement to the theory. The Reformers also rejected the Anselmic conceit that the elect were equal in number to the fallen angels.

The Reformers, according to Dr. Shedd, have much more to say than does Anselm as to how men are saved or put into possession of Christ's active and passive obedience. Different doctrinal statements are given in their answers to this question. These differences are more in terminology than in the doctrine. Perhaps we can find no answer more explicit or of higher authority than that given in the Westminster Confession (chap. x., secs. 1, 2):

"All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased in his appointed and acccepted time effectually to call, by his word and spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from any thing at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it."

This is sufficiently explicit and sufficiently monergistic.

SECTION II.—*Grotius' Soteriology.*

This is radically different from that of Anselm, and very much like that of Duns Scotus. Grotius was a distinguished scholar and jurist, and lays his legal learning largely under contribution in formulating his soteriology.

We may learn the leading principles of his scheme from the following quotations taken from "History of Christian Doctrine." He says:

"All positive laws are relaxable. Those who fear that if we concede this we do an injury to God, because we thereby represent him as mutable are much deceived. For law is not something internal in God, or in the will itself of God, but it is a particular effect or product of his will. But that the effects or products of the divine will are mutable, is very certain. Moreover, in promulgating a positive law which he might wish to relax at some future time, God does not exhibit any fickleness of will."

In proof of this he refers to the abrogation of the ceremonial law.

In reply to the objection that "guilt should be punished, . . . and therefore, that punishment is not a matter of 'optional choice,' neither is it relaxable," he says:

"It is to be noticed that it does not always follow that injustice is done when justice is not done. . . . It is not a universal truth that if a thing may be done with justice, it can not, therefore, be omitted without injustice."

What Grotius says of justice is true; what he says of law is not true of the great moral law of

God, but is true only of ordinances which are intended as servitors of this moral law.

Grotius says:

"He who sins deserves to be punished. . . . But that any and every sinner be punished with *such a punishment as corresponds with his guilt* is not absolutely and universally necessary."

He teaches that God has the absolute right to relax or even abolish law, but that it would be improper to do either without weighty reasons. He says:

"The all-wise Legislator has a most weighty cause for relaxing this law, in the fact that the human race had lapsed into sin. For if all mankind had been given over to eternal death, as transgressors, two most beautiful things would have utterly perished out of the universe—reverence and religion toward God, on the part of man, and the exhibition of a wonderful benevolence toward man on the part of God."

Grotius holds that, as a matter of fact, the law is not abrogated or relaxed as to *all mankind*, but only as "to a certain class of persons," viz.: believers. "This relaxation consists in merely dispensing with the penalty; the law as a precept or rule of duty is untouched and unrelaxed."

But it is asked, if God by an act of will can relax and even abrogate the law, why did Christ die, or make any atonement at all? To this Grotius replies:

"The necessities and requirements of the created universe render it unsafe (for God) to exercise his

power and right to remit the penalty of the law without any satisfaction of any kind, on the ground, therefore, that the interest of the creature, and not on the ground that the attributes of the Creator require it, must there be an atonement in order to remission. . . . So many and so great sins can not be remitted with safety to the interests of creation, unless God at the same time give some kind of expression to his detestation of sin. The sufferings and death of the Son of God are an exemplary exhibition of God's hatred of moral evil, in connection with which it is safe and prudent to remit that penalty which so far as God and the divine attributes are concerned might have been remitted without it."

Grotius here distinctly announces the fundamental principles of what is variously called the Governmental, Rectoral, and New Calvinistic theory of atonement, according to which Christ suffered penally not to satisfy retributive, but administrative justice; he died in the "interest of creation, and not in the interest of the divine attribute of justice;" his death was purely exemplary and expressive of God's hatred of sin. As a theory it avoids some of the hard points of the Anselmic scheme; but is itself involved in inexplicable confusion, as will be seen.

SECTION III.—*The Anselmic and the Grotian Soteriology Contrasted.*

These soteriologies differ so widely both in their radical principles and in their details that it seems not improper to note some of their antagonisms.

1. Anselm posits the law in the divine nature so that God being what he is the law necessarily is as

it is. Grotius makes the law the product of the divine will. In this Grotius is right and Anselm wrong.

2. Anselm makes the law unabrogable, and even unrelaxable. Grotius makes it relaxable and even abrogable, if God should will either. In this Anselm is right, and Grotius is wrong, as we may see.

3. According to Anselm's notion of the law, its abrogation would be the destruction of the Deity and its relaxation a modification of his nature, just as the destruction of any of the primary properties of matter would be the destruction of matter itself, and a change of the properties of matter would be a modification of matter itself.

But according to Grotius' idea of the law, its abrogation would be an exemption from all obligation, and its relaxation a partial exemption.

But according to the true conception of the law, its abrogation would be the destruction of the created mind itself, and its relaxation a modification of the nature of the mind. For the law is a concreation of the mind—is written upon the heart—and as such is as truly a product of the divine will as is the mind itself. Hence, an abrogation of the law would involve the destruction of the mind and its relaxation an essential change of the mind, just as the abrogation or modification of the essential properties of matter would involve its destruction or modification. Hence, while divine ordinances or laws of expediency, which are only objective and are only survitors of the great moral law may be abrogated

or relaxed, no concreated and subjective law can be so dealt with without disastrous consequences.

Anselm is fatally at fault when he makes the law indigenous to the divine nature and independent of the divine will. Grotius is equally at fault when he fails to make the law indigenous to the human mind, or *subjective* as well as objective, and asserts it to be abrogable and relaxable.

4. Anselm asserts an absolute, and Grotius a relative, necessity for atonement for sin. Anselm posits this necessity in the divine attributes; Grotius posits it in the exigencies of the divine government. Both are radically wrong, for the real necessity is found in the lapsed state of humanity, or rather in the purpose of God to save sinners. It is man that needs a mediator, not God.

5. Anselm makes the death of Christ *ipso facto* satisfy justice or law, expiate the guilt and necessitate the salvation of all for whom he died. Grotius makes the death of Christ exemplify God's hatred to sin, and so vindicate the righteousness of the divine government as to justify God in relaxing the law as to its penalty in regard to believers, but leaves the sinner to meet the preceptive requirements of the law by his own obedience; thus rendering, as he believes, salvation possible to all, inevitable to none, but sure only to believers. Both are radically wrong, for the death of Christ of itself satisfies *substitutionally* no law, expiates no guilt, relaxes no claims, and saves no souls.

The risen Christ alone saves. This, I trust, will be made sufficiently plain.

6. Anselm's scheme involves the doctrine of salvation *by works* in its most rigid form. Perfect obedience to the law is salvation by "deeds of the law," whether this obedience is rendered by a substitute or by a principal. Hence, if Christ fully obeyed the law for the elect, then they are as truly saved by the deeds of the law as if they had rendered that obedience themselves. But if salvation is by works, then it is not by grace.

Grotius' scheme is obnoxious to the same charges in a different form, unless we should choose to call relaxation of law, or "dispensing with penalty," an act of grace.

According to Anselm this obedience was rendered wholly by the substitute, and the salvation of the elect is purely a matter of law—hence not of grace. According to Grotius the obedience is rendered partly by the substitute, and partly by the sinner himself; or the obedience of the substitute and that of the principal so supplement each other as to meet the full preceptive requirements of the law, the penalty being dispensed with by relaxation. If this relaxation is regarded as an act of grace, as Grotius no doubt considered it, then it is plain that his scheme saves the sinner partly by the legal obedience of Christ, partly by his own obedience, and partly by the grace of relaxation.

[*Note.*—This question is here only incidentally mentioned, and will be more fully considered in another connection.]

Between two theories so manifestly false there is perhaps no grounds for a rational choice. We

know that salvation is purely and exclusively by grace—not by the works of the law performed by either principal or substitute. "By the deeds of the law (whether performed by Christ or the sinner) shall no man be justified." It is not Christ's deeds that are "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth," but Christ himself. It is not the Lord's deeds that is our righteousness, but the Lord himself. It is not Christ's works, his death, etc., that is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, but Christ himself. We are saved by grace, not by works personal or substitutionary.

CHAPTER VI.

SECTION I.—*Limborch and Curcellaeus.*

The writings of these authors present us with a form of Arminian soteriology as distinguished from that of the Reformers. Dissenting radically from the Augustinian anthropology, consistency imperatively required them to reject the Anselmic soteriology, or at least to materially modify it. The fact that their earnest endeavor was only a *partial* success is attributable not to a want of ability, but rather to the difficulty of freeing themselves from the influence of an *inherited* faith and popular prejudices. They, however, made some material advancement in the right direction, discarded some of the errors of the popular faith, and freed the doctrine of propitiation from the ungracious limitarianism which Augustinian anthropology had imposed upon it. Their endeavor was to avoid what they deemed the errors of Socinianism, on the one hand, and those of the Reformers on the other. This Grotius had attempted to do, but his doctrine was not acceptable to them because he represented that the atonement was made in the interest of the moral government, and not to satisfy divine justice. Limborch, in criticising Grotius' opinions on this point, raises the question: "*An Christus morte sua, circa Deum aliquid effecerit?*"

He answers in the affirmative, insisting that Christ, by his death, did in some way satisfy the divine nature in behalf of sinful humanity.

Limborch says:

"Jesus Christ may be said to have been punished [*punitus*] in our place, in so far as he endured the greatest anguish of soul and the accursed death of the cross for us, which were of the nature of a vicarious punishment in the place of our sins. [*Quæ poenæ vicariæ pro peccatis nostris rationem habuit.*] And it may be said that our Lord satisfied the Father for us by his death, and earned righteousness for us in so far as he satisfied not the rigor and exactitude of the divine justice, but the just as well as compassionate will of God [*voluntati Dei justæ simul ac misericordi*], and went through all that God required in order to our reconciliation."

The very form of these statements shows that Limborch was satisfied neither with the doctrine of Anselm nor that of Grotius; that he believed the truth to lie between these conflicting theories. He denies that the sufferings of Christ satisfied divine justice in its rigor and exactitude, but asserts that these sufferings did satisfy the just and compassionate will of God. He evidently means that the death of Christ was more than exemplary and governmental, as Grotius taught; that it did satisfy justice or law in some way, but not in the Anselmic sense. He made a laudable effort to find a position between Anselm and Grotius by agreeing with both in some things and differing with both in some things.

Curcellaeus expresses himself with more de-

cision and precision on the points upon which he touches than does Limborch. He says:

"Christ did not make satisfaction by enduring the punishment which we sinners merited. This does not belong to the nature of a sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. For sacrifices are not payment of debts, as is evident from those offered under the law. The beasts that were slain for transgressors did not expiate the penalty which they merited, nor was their blood a sufficient *lutron* for the soul of man. But they were oblations only by which the transgressor endeavored to turn [*flectere*] the mind of God to compassion, and to obtain remission from him. Hence, the formula in the law applied to those who had expiated their sins by offering a sacrifice: "And it shall be forgiven him."—Leviticus iv. 26, 31, 35.

Limborch and Curcellaeus sufficiently agreed in opinion. Their views may be expressed in the following propositions:

1. They reject, with decision, the notion that Christ's death satisfied divine justice, expiated the guilt of all for whom he died, and rendered their final salvation a matter of pure justice.

2. They hold that Christ's death was of the nature of a vicarious punishment for sinners, and earned righteousness for us in so far as it satisfied the just as well as compassionate will of God, who, by an act of will, remits the sins of all believers.

The different parts of the theory are hard to put together so as to give a clear idea of how the sinner is really saved.

Christ's death was in some way penal and vicari-

ous, and "earned righteousness for us in so far as he satisfied the just as well as the compassionate will of God." Yet the sinner's salvation is not assured, nor even possible, without a gracious pardoning act. Now the trouble is to understand just how much in the matter of salvation is due to Christ's penal and vicarious death—his righteousness earned for us—and how much to the gracious act of God's "compassionate will." It seems that the sinner is saved, *partly by vicarious obedience, and partly by a gracious* pardoning act.

But salvation secured in whole or in part by the deeds of the law, as we have seen, is not salvation purely by grace. One radical defect in the scheme is this penal and vicarious element. In this it is *less self-consistent* than the Anselmic, which saves the sinner exclusively by substitutionary obedience to the law. Another defect in the plan is this: If any sinner for whom Christ suffered vicariously and penally in any sense, happens not to comply with the conditions of this gracious pardoning act, then, of course, the penalty, or some part of it, is twice endured, by Christ and by the sinner.

3. A third and more grave objection to the plan is, that it saves the sinner in part by a vicarious punishment, and, hence, with a penal righteousness. But, in utter condemnation of this scheme, the Bible teaches that it is Christ himself that saves sinners, and not his sufferings or death.

4. This scheme is highly commendable for two distinct things:

(1) It rejects the self-contradictory notion of penal sacrifices.

(2) It refuses to make salvation inevitable to some and impossible to others, and thus maintains the possibility of moral retribution.

SECTION II.—*How men are saved according to Arminian Authors.*

No scheme of soteriology is complete that does not clearly indicate how it secures salvation from sin.

The Arminian theory is in many respects radically different from the Anselmic or Calvinistic. The latter infallibly saves all for whom Christ died; but, being intended for a part only, only a part can be saved.

The Arminian theory asserts that Christ died for all, and that his death infallibly secures justification to all in a state of infancy, and that none are lost except those that commit actual sin and fail to repent. Arminius himself is not very full nor very clear in his teaching on this subject.

The following statements (taken from Dr. Miller's "Conflict of Centuries," pp. 95, 96), indicate his views. He says (Vol. I., 317):

"For, if 'original sin condemns no one,' it is a necessary consequence that all those will be saved who have not themselves committed actual transgressions. Of this class are all infants without exception."

He says (Vol. I., 318, 319):

"All those will be saved who have not committed actual transgression. Because God has taken

the whole human race into the grace of reconciliation, and has entered into a covenant of grace with Adam and with the whole of his posterity in him. . . . And since infants have not transgressed this covenant, they do not seem to be obnoxious to this condemnation. . . . When Adam sinned in his own person and with his own free will, God pardoned that transgression. There is no reason, then, why it was the will of God to impute this sin to infants, who are said (by Augustine) to have sinned in Adam before they had any personal existence, therefore, before they could possibly sin at their own will and pleasure."

Remarks.—1. It is here taught that God pardoned Adam's sin. This is a charitable but a gratuitous assumption. It may or may not be true. To build a theory upon it is not quite safe.

2. It is also taught that God entered into a covenant of grace with Adam, and took the whole human race into the grace of reconciliation. This, I suppose, means that Adam was regenerated as well as justified, and as none but Adam and Eve existed at the time of the making of this covenant, all their posterity come into the world in the same justified and saved state.

I do not understand Arminius to mean that Adam's subsequent obedience would insure the salvation of all or any of his posterity, as Augustinianism teaches would have been the consequence of his continuous obedience under the legal covenant; but that each individual must keep the covenant for himself.

Arminius does not here specify the terms of this

gracious covenant, or indicate wherein it differs from the first or legal covenant, which Adam transgressed.

If one sin is sufficient to produce a forfeiture of covenanted blessings, and bring condemnation, then, wherein does this covenant of grace differ from the original covenant of works?

If one sin does not bring condemnation, then, how many may be committed without incurring it?

If a person, as an adult, keeps this covenant through life, is he saved by grace or by works?

If a child dies in infancy, by whose righteousness or obedience is it saved—by its own or that of Adam, or that of Christ? I know some say, it is saved, as to its body, by Christ in the resurrection. But the material question is, by whose obedience is its *soul saved?*

As a matter of fact, the infant is capable neither of obedience nor disobedience and, hence, seems to be a proper subject neither of justification nor of condemnation. Yet, we must needs save it, soul and body. Augustinians have no more trouble with infant salvation than with adult; for with them the salvation of adults and of infants is purely monergistic.

But how the infant is saved is a troublesome question to non-necessitarians. Arminians are not well agreed among themselves. Some save them, or seem to save them, at least as to their souls, without Christ; others through Christ, some with and others without regeneration.

Unless it has the mind of Christ, it is none of

his. This it can not have except by being made partaker of Christ's nature in regeneration. If this regeneration is unconditional, it seems hard to escape the doctrine of a necessitated virtue or obedience. I do not claim to be able to relieve the subject of all embarrassment. I think, however, that *conditioned* infant regeneration is not an impossible or absurd thing.

1. What changes actually occur in the capacities of the soul as the spiritual world begins to open upon the mental vision—whether the mind becomes more vigorous and capable of clearer apprehension of truth—we do not know.

But assuming that such favorable changes do occur at this juncture in the capacities of the intellect, then, of course, the emotional and volitional power will be proportionally increased, and the voluntary acceptance of Christ becomes possible to the infant mind before it has left the body.

But assuming that no such advantageous changes occur, still it is perhaps not impossible for regeneration—such as is needed to fit the soul for communion with Christ—to occur by its normal method.

2. As the beatific vision unfolds to the infant spirit, unconscious of evil, in its transit across the border line, it, ere it leaves the body, may be so enamored of the loveliness of Christ and the heavenly world as to yield to him with all its will power—though it may be little more than instinct—and be filled with the love of a new-born soul. If it is not distinctly conscious of faith in Christ it may be rapturously conscious of a new-born love, and *love*

is bliss. Christ loves it, but does not love in its stead, but imparts his own nature to it as the altar imparts its holiness to the gifts placed upon it, and thus enables it to love for itself; and to love is to be saved and happy; for "love is the fulfilling of the law."

3. We know that very young children have a ready capacity for the beautiful, and without any rational comprehension of beautiful objects, seek to appropriate them.

Why, then, may not the infant spirit, as it approaches the spirit land, be enamored of the loveliness of the glorified Christ, and seek to appropriate him as it is wont to do with other objects that delight it?

I do not offer this as a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem of infant salvation. It, however, avoids the extreme monergism of Augustinianism, on one hand, and on the other the ungracious notion that infants may be saved without regeneration.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION I.—*Limborch's Soteriology.*

"The man who elaborated, and set forth more luminously than all others, the Arminian theory, was Philip Limborch [1633–1717]." I do not propose a general examination of the doctrines of this able advocate of Arminianism, but will briefly notice his views as to how atonement saves man. He says [see Schaff's History, Chap. II., 27]:

"Adam as being the common parent of all mankind, exposed all his posterity to the same miseries to which himself was liable. For it is not to be supposed that Adam's sin had no effect but upon himself alone, which is said to be the error of Pelagius. But all the miseries into which he fell by his sin are entailed upon his posterity. . . . All are subject to the same fate, viz., death. However, this death is not to be looked upon as properly a punishment inflicted on Adam's posterity; for it is impossible that the innocent should be punished for another's offense, but is a natural necessity of dying, derived from Adam, on whom it was inflicted as a punishment."

Remarks.—1. It is here taught that Adam's sin affected his posterity, entailing upon them all the miseries that were visited upon himself. But by "miseries" is here meant not moral, but only physical evils, such as pain in parturition, disease, and death.

2. It is here assumed that all miseries, including physical death, are the results of Adam's sin, which is contradicted by every science that sheds a ray of light on the subject.

On this point Limborch indorses Augustine, who attributed physical death and all physical evils to Adam's sin.

3. Limborch antagonizes the Augustinian assumption that all suffering presupposes guilt in the sufferer. He teaches that what Adam suffered as a punishment, viz., death, his children suffer from natural necessity, and without any fault of their own. In this, however, he is not consistent with himself. If the children are subjected to physical death without personal guilt, why was Adam not subject to it without personal guilt, or before he sinned, or without any voluntary agency of his own? Yet the death of the children, Limborch teaches, was the natural result of Adam's sin. This assumes the death of Adam to be judicial, or a penal visitation of a supernatural providence; but the same death in relation to his children, to be a non-judicial and non-penal result of a natural necessity, or a natural providence; and yet it was in some way conditioned upon Adam's sin, or physical death was judicial and penal in Adam, but is natural and non-penal in his posterity.

Now, I submit, whether punishment judicially inflicted upon the parent ever becomes, because of the offense thus punished, the natural and non-penal heritage of the children. If there is any uniformity in nature then we must believe that if

physical death was penal in Adam, then it must be so in his children; if not penal but natural in the children then it was only natural in Adam.

I protest against the notion that God changed the order of the physical world on account of Adam's sin.

4. Limborch teaches that Adam's sin was judicially visited with physical and moral evils upon himself, and these physical evils become the heritage of his posterity by natural necessity or natural heredity. When he says, "All the miseries into which he fell by his sin are entailed upon his posterity," he, by "miseries," means only temporal evils, as expulsion from paradise, pain in childbearing, the wife's subjection to the husband, earning bread by the sweat of the brow; but Adam's guilt was not entailed either judicially or otherwise. He, however, admits

"That infants are born in a less degree of purity than Adam was created, and have a certain inclination to sin, which they derive not from Adam, but from their next immediate parents."

This seems to be a fatal admission; for "a less degree of purity" implies some degree of *impurity*. If as Limborch says truly, "Our first parents (were not) created holy, but only innocent and upright," then they were not fit for heaven, for without holiness "no man shall see the Lord." If children are born with a less degree of purity than had Adam, and he was created only innocent—not holy or righteous—then of course they are not fit for heaven.

This natal "inclination to sin derived . . . from parents" implies in the case of infants, disqualification for heaven. Certainly we should distinguish between an inclination to sin and the act of sinning. The first is the state of the sensibility, and the other an act of the will. But if the inclination is not resisted by an act of will, it becomes sin; to hate a brother is murder. The inclination to sin will surely lead to sin, if it is not counteracted by an adverse inclination; and we have no evidence of any adverse natal inclination in infants.

Pelagius is more consistent with himself than Limborch. The former denied all natal deterioration in the child, and thought it needed no regeneration to insure it against punishment. The latter admits it less pure than Adam, and to be inclined to sin, yet thinks it fit for heaven without any spiritual change.

Again, Pelagius and Limborch exactly reverse each other in regard to natural evils. What Pelagius attributes to the natural course of things, as physical pain, death, etc., Limborch attributes to a judicial curse inflicted upon Adam as a punishment, all of which comes upon his children as an inheritance, or from natural necessity.

If infants are free from such moral defection as disqualifies them for heaven, I do not see how they are in any proper sense saved, as to their souls, by Christ.

Arminius admits, or seems to admit, the possibility of a transmission of disqualification for heaven by heredity, or by covenant; but insists that as a

matter of fact Adam was converted prior to the propagation of his species, and could, therefore, transmit only his regenerated nature. But Limborch denies that such disqualification can be transmitted from parent to child; but insists that natural evils, as pain and death, are actually transmitted.

These astute theologians also differ as to the relations of Adam and his children, Arminius making it both natural and federal, and Limborch only natural. In relation to these positions, two inquiries seem pertinent:

1. If Adam could and did transmit physical evil, as pain and death, or the forfeiture of animal life, why could he not transmit moral evil or spiritual death? Sin is itself disobedience to moral law. Why, then, should it involve Adam's posterity in physical evil only? or why should it involve them in physical evil at all? Might we not as reasonably say that the violation of physical law involves not physical but only moral evils? To these and other similar questions, the theory in hand can, I think, give no satisfactory answer.

2. How can a natural agency produce supernatural results? This would be the case if Adam transmitted his regenerated nature to his descendants.

It is a charitable assumption that Adam was regenerated and saved, but there is, I think, no conclusive proof. Even if he was regenerated, he manifestly could not impart that regenerated state to his children, for that was a derivation from Christ—a supernatural change in his relation to

God, which he could not himself produce, no more than the leopard can change its spots.

If Adam could have created by his own acts an independent and saving righteousness for himself, then he might have transmitted his own regenerated state to his children. In this event he would have been his own savior, and that by works of the law.

We thus see how Adam could originate a sinful nature in himself by disobedience, and how he could transmit that sinful nature to his children; also see why he could not, even if he was really regenerated, transmit that regenerated state to his progeny. Because the natural can not propagate the supernatural. This is the all-sufficient reason why the children of regenerated parents are born unregenerate, and require regeneration just as the children of unregenerate parents.

The divinely ordained law of heredity transmits what is indigenous to the mind, but not what is supernaturally imparted to the mind. Hence, all the children, both of regenerate and unregenerate parents, are the children of wrath by nature, or natural *generation*, and all may become the children of God by grace or *regeneration.*

Nothing, I think, is gained to the infant world or to the divine administration by either the scheme of Arminius or that of Limborch. For, while it is claimed that infants are born in a saved state, yet it is conceded that they generally, if not invariably, fall as did Adam, and require to be saved by regeneration or re-regeneration. For, beginning ex-

istence in a saved state, if they ever sin, or cease to love God with all the heart, etc., they become unsaved and require to be re-saved by Christ.

Of course, if they never sin, they can have no consciousness of sin and no consciousness of a change of state in relation to God, and seem to be as truly their own saviors as are the unfallen angels.

To the charge that the child seems to be saved independently of Christ, Limborch makes this reply:

"He is their Savior, not because he cleanses them from sin, for infants are incapable thereof, but because he delivers them from death [in the resurrection] which they derived from Adam by natural generation, from which they could not be freed but by Jesus Christ. We therefore maintain that children dying in infancy are saved not by their own innocency, but by the redemption of Jesus Christ."

This answer is shrewd enough, but is subject to many objections, only a few of which will be here indicated.

1. It seems to condition the activity, if not the very existence, of the mind upon the life of the body which savors of materialism.

2. It makes Christ the Savior of infants because he delivers them from physical death in the resurrection. Well, is he not the Savior of the wicked in the same sense, if there is a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust?

3. It seems to imply that Christ is the Savior of

infants only as to their bodies, but the Savior of adults both as to soul and body.

I think it a better and more biblical vindication of the divine administration, and greatly simplifies the perplexing question, to admit *outright* and *flatly* that infants are made partakers of Adam's moral corruption (not of his sinful act) by natural generation, and that they are saved from this by becoming partakers of Christ's righteousness in spiritual regeneration.

SECTION II.—*John Wesley's views.*

"John Wesley was reared and trained under the direct influence of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, which . . . are intensely Augustinian, both in origin and doctrine. These articles he believed and defended with his characteristic conscientiousness a great part of his life. . . . Accordingly we find him at one period of his career asserting these views as unqualifiedly as Augustine or Luther."

In answer to question 15, he says:

"In Adam all die—that is, (1) Our bodies become mortal. (2) Our souls died—that is, were disunited from God, and, hence, (3) were all born with a sinful, devilish nature. By reason whereof (4) we are children of wrath, liable to death eternal. (Rom. v. 18; Eph. ii. 3.) Works v. 195."

"Mr. Wesley was a progressive man. He made changes slowly, but when truth presented itself to his great and honest heart, he embraced it though it involved radical changes."

"In 1784 Mr. Wesley prepared a 'Sunday service,' especially designed for the Methodists in America. In this he abridged the thirty-nine articles to

twenty-four, and made many and great changes both in these and in the office of baptism. The ninth article of the thirty-nine, which became the seventh in our twenty-five, he cut down until almost every vestige of Augustinian phraseology was eliminated. . . . Mr. Wesley abridged it until it reads thus in our (Methodist church) seventh:

"'Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk) but it is the corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil and that continually.'"

Remarks.—In this quotation we have:

1. A distinct recognition of original sin, or corruption of humanity.

2. A denial that it consists in following Adam as Pelagians affirm.

3. The affirmation that it is transmitted by natural generation.

4. That every man is very far gone from original righteousness.

5. That man because of his natal state is inclined to evil continually.

Dr. Miller, in his "Conflict of Centuries," interprets Wesley to mean that this "original sin," or corruption of nature common to all, is not of the nature of sin. If it is not, then why call it sin of any kind? If we are born with this original sin, which inclines us to evil continually, must it not be removed from the infant in order to give it a capacity for heaven, or for loving God?

I think Mr. Wesley thought so. When he says nothing is sin strictly but a voluntary transgression of a known law of God, he speaks of actual, outward transgression, and not of original sin or corruption of nature common to all men. If he believed that infants need a change of nature so as to be inclined not to evil but to good, then his two utterances are not in conflict, but if he believed that infants need no change of any sort, then I can not harmonize his statements.

SECTION III.—*Rev. John Fletcher's views of the influence of atonement upon men.*

If I understand this able and popular author, he saves the infant not by its own personal righteousness nor innocence, nor by regeneration or any change of its moral nature, but by the impartation of Adam's regenerated nature to it. The following quotations give his views. He says (Checks, Vol. I., 161):

"1. The Scriptures tell us that Christ in all things hath the pre-eminence. But if Adam is a more public person, a more general representative of mankind than Jesus Christ, it is plain that in this grand respect Adam hath the pre-eminence over Christ. Now, as this can not be, as Christ is at least equal to Adam, it follows that as Adam brought a general condemnation and universal seed of death upon all, so Christ brings upon them a general justification and a universal seed of life.

"2. I never yet saw a Calvinist who denied that Christ died for Adam. Now, if the Redeemer died for our first parents, he undoubtedly expiated the original sin—the first transgression of Adam. And

if Adam's original sin was atoned for and forgiven to him as the Calvinists, I think, generally grant, does it not follow that though all infants are by nature children of wrath, yet through the redemption of Christ they are in a state of favor or justification? For how could God damn to all eternity any of Adam's children for a sin which Christ expiated? A sin which was forgiven almost six thousand years ago to Adam, who committed it in person?

"3. The force of this observation would strike our Calvinistic brethren, if they consider that we were not less in Adam's loins when God gave his Son to Adam in the grand original gospel promise than when Eve prevailed on him to eat the forbidden fruit. As all in him were included in the covenant of obedience before the fall, so all in him were likewise interested in the covenant of grace and mercy after the fall."

Remarks.—These statements are very perspicuous, and teach with sufficient distinctness the following points:

1. That Adam was not only the natural head, but also the covenant representative of mankind; that his sin "brought a general condemnation and a universal seed of death upon all."

2. That Christ is in like manner a representative of all represented by Adam, and "brings upon them a general justification and a universal seed of life."

Here it is plainly taught as need to be that Adam by virtue of his representative character, brought condemnation and moral corruption, or spiritual death, upon all men; and that Christ by virtue of

his representative character brought justification and moral purification or spiritual life, to all; or that the obedience of the second Adam exactly reverses the legal and moral effects of the disobedience of the first.

3. The principle of representation here set forth is identical in kind with that taught by Augustine, but differs from it in the extent of its application on the Christ side—that is, the first Adam represented all, and, hence, all are the children of wrath; but the second Adam represented only a part, and, hence, only a part can be saved.

4. Fletcher teaches, as do Calvinists, that the atonement infallibly saves in one sense all for whom it is made. This he does when he says: "Now, if the Redeemer died for our first parents, he undoubtedly *expiated* the original sin—the first transgression."

Calvinists, when they assert this doctrine, mean that all for whom Christ died will be necessarily and eternally saved; but Fletcher means that Christ having died for Adam, he undoubtedly expiated his sin, and that his posterity are consequently born in a saved state, or saved from the effects of Adam's sin. According to Augustinianism all infants commence existence in a state of spiritual death, but Christ died for a part only, and all these will necessarily be saved. According to Fletcher all infants commence existence in a state of spiritual life. If they die in infancy they are infallibly saved. If they attain to accountability they may lose this spiritual life and be lost, unless they repent and be-

lieve in Christ. In this event they are twice pardoned, first seminally and then personally. This seems to require that the obedience of the second Adam shall more than offset the disobedience of the first, which somewhat spoils the theory.

According to one scheme, all are inevitably saved that God intended to be saved. According to the other, all come into existence in a saved state, but all attaining adult age may be lost by personal transgression.

Both schemes, I think, comprise some vital truths —both some radical errors—both rest equally upon legal fictions, or conceptions which have no foundation in facts; both regard the relation between Adam and his posterity as unique and legal, or judicial, and both regard Christ's death as affecting the legal state of millions of beings before they have any existence—thus confounding potentiality with actuality. This is to deal with figments as solid facts. I always existed as a potentiality in Adam, and Adam in the Deity. If the possible and the real are identical, then I am as old as Adam, and Adam is as old as the Deity. The reader may furnish many other illustrations of this fallacy if he chooses.

But this inveterate realism characterizes and vitiates all the schemes of soteriology that seek to offset the demerit of one act by the merit of another act. It was not Adam's unrighteousness as an entity, apart from his personality, that corrupted humanity, but Adam himself. It is not Christ's

righteousness apart from Christ that saves men, but it is Christ himself that saves.

SECTION IV.—*Richard Watson on the effects of atonement.*

Watson, like Wesley, was originally a fairly orthodox Augustinian in his views of original sin, and continued so during the greater portion of his life; at least, this seems to be a fair inference from the teachings of his "Institutes." His opinions, however, were very much changed in favor of Arminianism.

In his comment on Matthew xix. 14, having explained "the kingdom of heaven" as "the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth, and also that glorious reign of God over redeemed and glorified men in a future world," he says:

"If little children are the subjects of his spiritual kingdom on earth, then, until the moment that by actual sin they bring actual condemnation upon themselves, they remain heirs of eternal glory; and if they become the subjects of the latter by dying, then a previous relation must have existed upon earth between them and Christ as their Redeemer and Sanctifier."

Remarks.—It is here taught by fair implication: (1) That children are born in vital union with Christ, and "remain heirs of eternal glory" "until the moment that, by actual sin, they bring personal condemnation upon themselves."

(2) That they were redeemed and sanctified *seminally*, or as potentialities in Adam, or before they

have any real existence, or instantly upon their nativity.

(3) That they may, and probably always, forfeit their vital union with Christ, and their heirship to eternal glory "by actual sin" unless they die in infancy. If they do bring personal condemnation upon themselves, then they, of course, must be re-redeemed, or re-delivered, and re-sanctified, in order to their salvation. This process may, of course, be indefinitely repeated.

Now, I submit whether it would not be better to allow that children are not born in vital union with Christ and heirs of eternal glory; that they are not redeemed (saved) and sanctified thousands of years before they exist, but that they are redeemed from sinful propensions and sanctified, or put in vital union with Christ after they are born. If Christ is able and willing to redeem them from sin and sanctify them thousands of years before they exist, surely he is able and willing to do so after they are born.

The pre-natal sanctification and redemption of non-existent beings from non-existent sins is a subject hard to deal with in a satisfactory way. But the sanctification and redemption of actually existent beings from actual evil is far less difficult of comprehension. It quite perplexes me to know how God could feed and clothe men thousands of years before they exist, and equally so as to how he can sanctify and save beings before they exist. We know quite well that thousands of years ago God did provide means in the economy of nature

by which he feeds and clothes men as they come into being through successive generations, and it seems not at all unreasonable that he, thousands of years ago, made provision, in the economy of the moral world, by which he sanctifies and saves men as they come into being through successive ages.

NOTE.—Mr. Watson *infers* that children are "in vital union with Christ," and . . . heirs to eternal glory from the fact that they are said to be "of . . . the kingdom of heaven."

To be of the kingdom of heaven I think is not necessarily to be in "vital union with Christ." "The kingdom of heaven," as used in the New Testament, often, perhaps generally, includes not only those actually saved, but those in a salvable state. The words are about equivalent to *gracious dispensation*, or Christ's mediatorial reign. That all in the kingdom were not in a saved state is quite clear. The kingdom of heaven is like to a man that sowed good seed in his field, but an enemy sowed tares. The wheat and the tares were in the same field, or kingdom. The five foolish virgins were in the kingdom. The man not having on a wedding garment was in the kingdom. It is not safe to say that all in the kingdom are in vital union with Christ.

SECTION V.—*Dr. Clarke's views.*

Commenting on Matthew xix. 14, in speaking of little children, Dr. Clarke says:

"A great part of God's kingdom is composed of such literally; and those only who resemble little children shall be received into it. Christ loves little

children because he loves simplicity and *innocence.*"

These three propositions are literally true; and Augustinians would have no hesitation in adopting them, because they are capable of explanation in full harmony with their doctrine. Nor is it at all certain that Dr. Clarke meant to teach that children are born without a sinful nature. Indeed, he elsewhere seems to teach a contrary doctrine.

Dr. Clarke, of course, believed that infants, dying in infancy, are saved; but he did not deny their depravity, nor do I think he intended to teach that they are born with a fitness for heaven.

Commenting on Ps. li. 5, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me," he says:

"A genuine penitent will hide nothing of his state; he sees and bewails not only the acts of sin which he has committed, but the *disposition* that led to those acts. He deplores not only the transgression, but the carnal mind which is enmity against God. . . . Notwithstanding all that Grotius and others have said to the contrary, I believe David to speak here of what is commonly called original sin; the propensity to evil which every man brings into the world with him, and which is the fruitful source whence all transgressions proceed."

He adopts, as a suitable paraphrase of the text, the following very expressive words:

"As my parts were developed in the womb, the sinful principle diffused itself through the whole, so that body and mind grew up in a state of corruption and moral imperfection."

No Augustinian, I think, would care to assert infant depravity more vigorously than Dr. Clarke has here done. He evidently did not believe that the death of Jesus Christ prevented the transmission of moral defection from Adam to his posterity.

SECTION VI.—*General statements concerning Arminian soteriology.*

From this very brief notice of these distinguished and learned authors of the Arminian school, we are able to see with some degree of distinctness wherein they agree, also disagree with Augustinians concerning the atonement and its actual effects upon those in whose interests it is provided.

These agreements and disagreements the reader can note for himself.

A few general statements may be allowed.

1. These Arminian authors from whose writings I have quoted, it should be remembered, especially the earlier of them, labored under serious disadvantages. Augustinianism was the doctrine of Luther and of the Reformers generally; also of the papal Church, at least, ostensibly. To oppose it was to incur condemnation at the hands of the Protestant clergy generally; to subject themselves to no small degree of theological odium; to incur persecution, misrepresentation, and an unenviable notoriety.

This is the common heritage of those whose convictions and conscience require them to dissent from the popular faith. In addition to all this, some of them had been reared in the Augustinian faith,

and could not be reasonably expected at once and fully to free themselves from their inherited opinions. This, we know, is one of the most difficult achievements of the human mind.

But these men, good and great, were true to their convictions, and had the moral heroism to defend them at whatever disadvantage.

That they, under the circumstances, should make no mistakes—commit no errors was not to be expected. Not to do so, all things considered, would have been marvelous.

2. In some things, *some of them*, I think, departed too far from Augustinianism, not in denying infant reprobation, limited atonement, and "irresistible grace," but in denying infant depravity and the necessity of some change establishing in them a tendency to love God (which alone qualifies for heaven), and in predicating a continuance in a saved state upon human works — making such works a condition, rather than the fruit, of a saved state.

3. In some things, I think, some of them did not go far enough from Augustinianism. (1) In asserting with Augustinians, as some of them do, that Adam was some sort of a covenant or judicial representative of his posterity, other than as other parents are; and a corresponding, judicial, and representative element in the official character of Christ. There are, I think, absolutely no substitutions with double imputation in the sphere of divine law, physical or moral. (2) In agreeing,

as some of them do, with Augustinians, that there is some sort of merit in penal sufferings, and that Christ suffered penally, as a substitute for men, they, I think, greatly erred.

4. The reader will observe that there is by no means perfect accord in doctrine among them. They, perhaps, agreed better in what they denied than in what they affirmed. This diversity of views on abstruse and important questions under the circumstances, was unavoidable. This is no disparagement of the men, or of their churches. It rather evinces their candor, independence, and conscientiousness, and is, therefore, to their credit rather than discredit. There was sufficient accord of opinion to justify co-operation and achieve success. Arminianism has become a wonderful power for good.

5. The reader will also observe that these writers generally, including Limborch, who had a stronger anti-Augustinian tendency than Arminius, admit that the sufferings of Christ were in some way substitutionary and penal. These several schemes of atonement may, therefore, be regarded as modifications of the Anselmic soteriology; and just in so far as they are substitutionary and penal are obnoxious to the same objections that lie against the Anselmic scheme.

Having made this brief statement of the various schemes of soteriology, and criticised some of their postulates, I now propose a more formal examination of the substitutionary principle and its defenses

as made by later writers. Of those who hold the substitutionary scheme in its less inconsistent form, Dr. Charles Hodge may be considered an able—perhaps the ablest—representative. For this reason his presentation of the subject will be specially considered.

CHAPTER VIII.

SECTION I.—*Dr. Charles Hodge's advocacy of the penal theory of atonement considered.*

Dr. Hodge's finished scholarship, eminent abilities, and life-time devotion to theological studies entitle his opinions on the subject of soteriology to profound respect.

In his Systematic Theology he has discussed the subject at considerable length, and with marvelous skill. His presentation and defense of the rigidly substitutionary and penal theory of atonement are superior to any thing I have seen. The presentation is so specious, its hard points so adroitly disposed of, that many whose instincts and reason recoil at the doctrine itself, reject it without professing to be able to disprove it.

Perhaps any adverse theory—any theory denying that Christ's death was penal and substitutionary—would be deemed radically defective if it did not at least indicate some method of escape from the conclusions which Dr. Hodge's arguments are intended to support. We can not believe things known to be contradictory. Though we may accept, for reasons which we deem sufficient, one theory without being able to point out the fallacies of an opposite theory, yet, it is more satisfactory to know precisely wherein the rejected theory is at fault.

It, therefore, seems proper that, in rejecting the penal theory, so ably advocated by Dr. Hodge, I should indicate my objections to his arguments. Only his leading positions will be noticed, and this not in labored detail, but in the briefest manner compatible with clearness.

Dr. Hodge adopts the following statement of Christ's work, given by Delitzsch (Theo. Vol. II., p. 543):

"If a man keeps in view our desert of punishment, and allows the three saving doctrines of Scripture to stand in their integrity, namely:

1. That God made Him who knew no sin to be sin for us—that is, imputed our sins to Him.

2. That Christ, although free from guilt, laden with our guilt, was made a curse for us—that is, suffered the wrath of God due to us; or, as the Scripture also says, that God executed on his Son judgment against sin, He having taken upon Him flesh and blood, and offered Himself as a sacrifice for us for the expiation of sin.

3. That in like manner his righteousness is imputed to believers, so that we may stand before God, as he had submitted to the imputation of our sins, in order to their expiation; if these premises remain unobliterated, then it is as clear as the sun that Christ suffered and died as our substitute, in order that we need not suffer what we deserved, and in order that we, instead of dying, should be partakers of the life secured by his vicarious death."

This is a fair statement of the theory; and to its defense Dr. Hodge addresses himself with a zeal, a wealth of erudition, and a fertility of invention

seldom surpassed. He knows his forces, and marshals them with consummate skill; and, like a good strategist, claims a sweeping victory in every rencounter. Never, perhaps, was a bad cause favored with a more gallant defense. Every thing in this defense is admirable, except the argument itself. This, I think, is sadly at fault.

Let us see whether there is sufficient ground for this opinion.

SECTION II.—Dr. Hodge says (Vol. II., p. 468):

"Expiation, propitiation, reconciliation, and intercession are the several aspects under which the work of Christ, as a priest, is presented in the word of God."

Comment.—1. The word "expiation" never occurs in the Bible, (old version) but is unfortunately introduced into the new.

2. By expiation *here* is meant exemption from liability to punishment; or that none for whom Christ died can ever perish. This contradicts Rom. xiv. 15.

3. By "reconciliation" Dr. Hodge means God's reconciliation to those for whom Christ made expiation, and not man's reconciliation to God. This contradicts Rom. v. 10, 11; 2 Cor. v. 18–20.

4. His scheme is, Christ's death procures expiation, expiation procures propitiation, propitiation procures God's reconciliation to the elect, and this reconciliation insures their regeneration and preservation to everlasting life. (See Vol. II., p. 514.)

SECTION III.—Dr. Hodge objects to the word atonement "to express the work of Christ."

1. He says it is ambiguous. He says (p. 469), "To atone is properly to be, or cause to be, at one." "In this sense to atone is to reconcile." But it is also in the second place, used to express that by which the reconciliation is effected. It then means satisfaction."

Comment.—"Satisfaction" and "compensation," like expiation, are extra-biblical; and the ideas they are intended to express also extra-biblical. They smack, too, of "*quid pro quo.*"

2. He says:

"Another objection to its general use is that it is not sufficiently comprehensive. As commonly used it includes only the sacrificial work of Christ, and not his vicarious obedience to the divine law. The atonement of Christ is said to consist of his suffering and death. But his saving work includes far more than his expiatory sufferings."

Comment.—Our author objects to the word atonement because, "as commonly used," it does not include Christ's "vicarious obedience"—that is, his active obedience in contradistinction to his passive obedience, so called. I have elsewhere sufficiently exposed this inane distinction between "active and passive obedience." What act of Christ's *antemortem* life was vicarious, or was performed in the place of any one else—much less of all mankind, and which has been set to their credit? It certainly would be gratifying, if not profitable, to know this.

"But his . . . expiatory sufferings?"—sufferings which insure all for whom he died against all penal suffering? Well, Christ never endured any such suffering. This is plain from reference to Rom. xiv. 15, and will be made abundantly plain in this discussion.

3. "A third objection is that this use of the word atonement is a departure from the established usage of the Churches of the Reformation."

Comment.—The Reformers used the word to include expiation, propitiation, and reconciliation. In this they were certainly not quite exact. The Reformers are high authority, but the Bible is higher, and in the use of this word modern usage is nearer the Bible than the Reformers.

In the Bible this word is always used in the sense of propitiation—never in the sense of expiation—rarely, if ever, in the sense of reconciliation. (If ever used in the sense of reconciliation, it is in reference to the scapegoat—Lev. xvi.) Yet, according to its generally accepted etymology, its literal meaning is reconciliation. If this is the literal meaning of this hybrid word, and if in the Bible its general, if not invariable, meaning is propitiation, as is elsewhere seen, then the word in the Bible is used, not in its literal, but metonymical sense—the sequence put for its antecedent—a form of trope of frequent occurrence in the Bible. This view of the subject is strongly favored, if not conclusively proved, by the significant fact that the word atonement never occurs in the New Testament New Version at all, but is replaced by the word propitiation.

Our author pithily says, "It is important to adhere to old words, if we would adhere to old doctrines." In this I heartily concur, and for this reason I protest against such Bible exotics as "expiation," "piacular," "satisfaction," "compensation," "just equivalent," etc. These words have well-nigh excluded the living Christ from modern soteriology.

SECTION IV.—Dr. Hodge very properly discriminates between debt and crime. But it is not believed that he properly characterizes either debt or crime.

He says (p. 476):

"The word satisfaction is the one which for ages has been generally used to designate the special work of Christ in the salvation of men. . . . There are, however, two kinds of satisfaction which, as they differ essentially in their nature and effects, should not be confounded. The one is pecuniary, or commercial, the other penal, or forensic. When a debtor pays the demand of his creditor in full, he satisfies his claims, and is entirely free from any other demands. . . . It is a simple matter of commutative justice—a *quid pro quo*—so much for so much. . . . It matters not to him (the creditor) by whom the debt is paid—whether by the debtor himself, or by some one in his stead—because the claim of the creditor is simply upon the amount due, and not upon the person of the debtor."

Comment.—The question here raised—as to whether "the claim of the creditor is simply upon the amount due," or "upon the person of the debtor"—is a point concerning which penalists can not

agree among themselves. Those that make sin a debt place the obligation upon the person of the debtor. Those denying that sin is a debt put the claim "upon the amount due." Dr. Hodge's view seems to be an impracticable one. A debt implies both a debtor and a creditor. An obligation on the part of the former implies a right on the part of the latter. The right of the creditor is personal, and therefore real, but the obligation "upon the amount due" is impersonal, and hence, unreal, for all rights and obligations are personal. Dr. Hodge says the claim is "not upon the person of the debtor." In this I think he errs. I think he also errs in his characterization of crime. He continues, "In the case of crime the matter is different. The demand is then upon the offender. He himself is amenable to justice."

Comment.—Justice, like "the amount due," is an impersonality, to which a person can not be amenable.

He continues, "Substitution in human courts is out of the question." But other substitutionists contradict this, and say that "substitution is a normal provision of law." He says:

"The essential point in matters of crime, is not the nature of the penalty, but who shall suffer. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. And the penalty need not be, and very rarely is, of the nature of the injury inflicted. All that is required is that it should be a just equivalent. For an assault it may be a fine; for theft, imprisonment; for treason, banishment, or death."

Comment.—Two radical errors, common to all substitutionists, may here be noted, both of which are exposed in "Atonement and Law Reviewed."

1. The tacit assumption that divine law is like human law. In human law the penalty does not grow naturally and necessarially out of the offense, but is arbitrarily and judicially determined by the law maker. This is a radical defect in all criminal human law; for the penalty may never be in exact accord with the degree of guilt. Of a thousand murders, no two of them may be of exactly the same degree of criminality, yet the penalty inflicted upon all is exactly the same. Omniscience alone is competent to put the punishment in exact accord with the criminality.

Most substitutionists formally admit subjective law—law written upon the heart—but others deny it utterly, and affirm law in commandment only. But those that formally admit subjective law logically deny it when they assume divine law to be analogous to human law, which is necessarily law in commandment only. Especially do they commit logical suicide when they admit subjective law, and yet assert the doctrine of substitution with invariable "double imputation." Dr. Hodge is sensible of this difficulty, and attempts to escape it by distinguishing between *reatus culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*, to which attention will in due time be given.

Human law is law in commandment only. Of such law only can it be said that "the penalty need not be, and very rarely is, of the nature of the in-

jury inflicted." Instead of "very rarely" Dr. Hodge should have said *never*. Even in the *lex talionis*—an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth—there is only an external similarity between the offense and its penalty. In this case, as in all other human punishments, the penalty is judicially fixed, and does not come necessarily out of the nature of the offense.

I do not know exactly what is meant by the words, "the injury inflicted." If they are intended to mean an injury inflicted by the offender upon justice or God the idea is extravagant. They may be intended as the equivalent of the words *offense committed.*

This immutable and vital truth should be distinctly apprehended and never forgotten, viz.: that the natural penalties of all divine law—physical and moral—are determined both as to nature and severity by the nature and turpitude of the offense. From this rule there is no departure. Judicial visitations form no exceptions. They are extra-natural, but do not supersede the natural, as will be elsewhere seen.

From these brief statements the reader can not fail to see that our author fails to properly characterize debt, because he makes it obligation upon a thing and not upon a person. Also fails rightly to characterize crime against God's law, because he predicates of it what is true only of crime against human law. The first error is of small consequence; the second is of immense significance, as we shall see.

2. Dr. Hodge continues:

"Another important difference between pecuniary and penal satisfaction is that the one *ipso facto* liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free, and that completely. No delay can be admitted, and no conditions can be attached to his deliverance. But in the case of the criminal, as he has no claim to have a substitute take his place, if one be provided, the terms on which the benefits of the substitution shall accrue to the principal are matters of agreement or covenant between the substitute and the magistrate who represents justice."

Comment.—1. It is one of the absurdities of the substitutionary theory that many of the elect, whose sins Christ, it is claimed, has fully expiated, are permitted or rather necessitated to pass a large part (possibly the whole) of life in sin and suffering as murderers, liars, thieves, libertines, etc. Dr. Hodge's explanation may do credit to his polemic abilities, but seems to me to bear hard on "the contracting parties." (See page 360.) That the Father and the Son who, in "the stipulations of the compact" into which they entered, should by covenant leave the elect, whom God "loved with a peculiar and discriminating love," to sin and suffer in this manner, is unreasonable if nothing worse. The mystery becomes the more appalling when we remember the relation between God and these neglected elect ones. That relation, according to our author, is this: Christ has obeyed the law both preceptively and penally, and expiated their sins—that is, released them from liability to punishment. God is propitiated toward them, is reconciled to

them, and is actually bound by covenant (p. 362) "to renew their hearts, to satisfy and comfort them, and to qualify them for his service and kingdom." But why this terrible tardiness in fulfilling these covenant promises? Is God "slack concerning his promises?" Well, they "are matters of agreement or covenant between the substitute (Christ) and the magistrate who represents justice" (God)! The reader will not fail to remember that "the wages of sin is death," and that "to be carnally minded is death," and that these unregenerated elect ones are carnally minded, and are actually enduring the wages, the penalty of sin; and yet, according to Dr. Hodge, their sins are actually expiated—that is, they are released from punishment, Christ having been punished for them.

2. Our author says: "The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free, and that completely." This I heartily indorse. But when he says the case of the criminal is different in regard to time of deliverance, I beg to dissent.

Dr. Hodge says: "The deliverance of the offender may be immediate, unconditional, and complete." This seems eminently just and proper. But he continues, "or it may be deferred, suspended on certain conditions, and its benefits gradually bestowed." This delay seems unjust, and without any reason except to meet the requirements of the theory.

Now, why should the debtor be released the instant his debt is paid? Simply because there is no claim against him. The act of paying *ipso facto*

releases. Then why is not the "criminal" in like manner released the instant justice receives "plenary satisfaction" for his guilt? "A just equivalent," it is said, has been received. There is then absolutely nothing against him. Every principle of right and honor requires his instant release, as truly so in the case of the criminal as of that of the debtor. Justice having received plenary satisfaction, has no more right to delay release an instant than the creditor has to demand a thousand dollars more than is due on his bond. This is too plain to admit debate.

Suppose A is sentenced by the court to ten years in the penitentiary for crime, and faithfully serves out his time, and the State official should detain him in prison one or five years longer, would this be just or honorable? Would not the State or its officials be liable for damages, and would not any court in Christendom allow damages? Suppose A is condemned to be hung till dead, and B on the scaffold proposes to become his substitute (the law consenting), and actually is hung till dead, and the State authorities should refuse to release A, or rather actually hang him some, would not the law receive more than its due? and is it not as great an outrage for justice to receive more than its due as to receive less?

It may also be pertinently said that if the regeneration of some of the elect is delayed through long years of sinning and spiritual death, by covenant stipulations between the High "contracting parties," then it follows necessarily, either that justice

receives more than is just, or that Christ did not render plenary, but only partial satisfaction to justice, and the elect rebel is required to suffer his own punishment in part, and thus complete the incomplete work of his substitute. It also follows that Christ died more for some of the elect than for others. This, perhaps, is no more incomprehensible than is Dr. Hodge's assumption that Christ "died unequally" for the elect and reprobate. These are only a part of the logical difficulties that beset Dr. Hodge's characterization of criminality and its expiation.

SECTION V.—Substitutionists have great trouble in satisfying one another as to the kind and degree of suffering that was necessary on the part of Christ to satisfy justice in behalf of men. The household seems to be hopelessly divided against itself.

1. Some teach that his suffering was the same, both in kind and degree, as that to which all men are liable. This, though perhaps the most revolting, is the least inconsistent of all substitutionary schemes. The essential idea of substitution is sameness, both as to kind and degree. If I engage a man to take my place in any affair, and he does not do both as to kind and degree what I am required to do, he is in no proper sense my substitute. This is too plain to require discussion.

But this view of the suffering of the sinless Christ is so abhorrent to our instincts that it is very seldom asserted.

2. Some hold that Christ suffered in degree, but not in kind what all for whom he died would have

suffered in time and eternity. This is not substitution in any proper sense. If I am required by law to do a particular thing, and engage another man to do it in my place, and he, instead of doing it, does an equal amount of other work, he does not act the part of a substitute; nor will the law release me. If, however, the governor choose to accept what is actually done, in lieu of what I am required to do, then this is a matter of sovereign prerogative, and not of law or justice. Hence, it is manifest that if the elect world is required by justice to do one thing, and Christ does another thing, and God accepts what he does in lieu of what they are required to do, then the atonement is not a matter of justice, but of sovereign prerogative. But atonement by sovereign prerogative is "the holy horror" of the less inconsistent substitutionists.

3. Another school of substitutionists deny that Christ's sufferings were the same either in kind or degree with those to which the elect would be liable; but allege that these sufferings were "a just equivalent," of equal value, and, therefore, "a real satisfaction," "a plenary satisfaction to justice." Dr. Hodge, I think, should be regarded as the peerless champion of this theory. He shall speak for himself. He says (p. 471, *et seq.*):

"All . . . that the Church teaches when it says that Christ satisfies divine justice for the sins of men, is that what he did and suffered was a real adequate compensation for the penalty remitted and the benefits conferred. His sufferings and death were adequate to accomplish all the ends designed by the

punishment of the sins of men. He satisfied justice. He rendered it consistent with the justice of God that the sinner should be justified. But he did not suffer either in kind or degree what sinners would have suffered. In value his sufferings infinitely transcended theirs. The death of an eminently good man would outweigh the annihilation of a universe of insects. So the humiliation, sufferings, and death of the eternal Son of God immeasurably transcended in worth and power the penalty which a world of sinners would have endured."

"It was an act of pure grace that God arrested the execution of the penalty of the law, and consented to accept the vicarious sufferings and death of his only begotten Son."

Comment.—1. As a scheme claiming to be vicarious, this is farther removed from real substitution than those previously noticed. It can be called substitutionary only by courtesy. It is rather atonement by sovereign prerogative than by substitution. God "consented to accept," etc. *To consent* is an act of will, of sovereign prerogative, and not of abstract justice. In this scheme the will is dominant, both as to the kind and degree of suffering, and justice is made subordinate, and is content to receive just what sovereign prerogative chooses to give; and yet Christ's death is a satisfaction to justice!

2. Some of the ideas expressed in the last quotation seem to call for a brief notice.

(1) That what Christ "did . . . was a real adequate compensation for . . . the benefits conferred." It will be remembered that Dr. Hodge makes Christ's "active obedience" so called, constitute a part of

the atonement. To this he here refers. But this doctrine is in conflict with Rom. v. 18. "Through *one act* of righteousness the free gift came unto all men." Compensation? To whom or what? Can God receive compensation? Can an impersonal thing like justice?

(2) That what Christ . . . "suffered was a real adequate compensation for the penalty remitted." Compensation in penalty? If penalty endured by a substitute compensates God, or justice, or any thing else, then, of course, it can *do no less* when endured by the principals.

Hence, it inevitably follows that Satan and his hosts are compensating God or justice for all their sins. It is so plain as scarcely to need saying that there is no merit, no power in penalty to compensate any thing. When pain comes to have the power of removing its cause, then penalty may *expiate* guilt or take away guilt.

3. In the next sentence our author teaches that the end of punishment is to satisfy justice? It scarcely needs to be said that, if such is its design, it utterly fails of its end. This is sufficiently demonstrated elsewhere.

4. "He rendered it consistent with the justice of God that the sinner should be justified."

If Christ's penal sufferings render it consistent with the justice of God that sinners should be justified, do not the penal sufferings of the fallen angels or any one else have the same power? Surely penalty can not be more efficacious in the substitute than in the principal. Certainly God can be

just in justifying all those who through faith in Christ are made partakers of his righteousness; but not in justifying all for whom Christ died. If this were so, I hesitate not to say universalism would be true. Dr. Hodge understands the text to which he alludes (Rom. iii. 25) to teach that Christ's sufferings constitute the propitiation, and hence, that it is what Christ has done that expiates sin and insures the salvation of the elect. But the text does not say this nor mean it. On the contrary it makes Christ himself the propitiation, or propitiatory. Nowhere in the Bible is Christ's sufferings or death called a propitiation, but Christ himself is the propitiation; or it is not what Christ has done that saves us, but Christ himself.

See Rom. iii. 25; John ii. 2; iv. 10.

5. That the penal theory of atonement logically expiates all sin may be further shown by the following facts:

It is laid down as a fundamental law that there can be no pardon without punishment. Dr. Hodge quotes with approbation (and often re-affirms it) the following from Ebrard (p. 477):

"Guilt, as we know, can be removed only by punishment. 'Either the sinner himself must bear the punishment, or a substitute must be provided to assume the guilt and bear the punishment, and thus freedom from guilt, or righteousness, be secured for the offender."

Dr. Hodge says:

"This is the fundamental idea of atonement or satisfaction. . . . And this is the essential idea of

the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ as it is presented in the Scriptures."

Comment.—It is here announced as a universal principle (1) That penal suffering is the basis, and only basis, of pardon, or that there can be no pardon without antecedent punishment.

(2) That penal suffering is equally efficacious in securing freedom from guilt, whether endured by the principal offender or by his substitute.

Now, it is a most marvelous thing that good and great men who advocate this principle of expiation can not see that it of necessity expiates—blots out—takes away the unrighteousness of Satan and all other rebels in the moral world, and actually invests them with righteousness commensurate to the claims of justice or the divine law, and necessarily insures their salvation.

All this is so plain as scarcely to require comment. I need only here indicate a few points. If there is no pardon without punishment, then there is no punishment without pardon; just as we may say, there can be no effect without a cause, so there can be no cause without effect. It is not meant that punishment and pardon are convertible terms, any more than that cause and effect are convertible terms, but that punishment to the full satisfaction of justice insures the pardon. Hence, there can be no punishment without a resulting pardon, just as there can be no cause without an effect, for what produces no effect is not a cause.

But, according to the doctrine, punishment may be endured either by the principal or by a substi-

tute, and it is just as efficacious in one as the other. Hence, if Christ's penal sufferings as a substitute satisfies justice and procures pardon, so does Satan's penal sufferings satisfy justice and secure pardon for himself, and so of every other sinner.

SECTION VI. — Penalists have serious trouble among themselves as to the particular character of Christ's suffering. They all agree that they were penal—inflicted on him as a punishment of the sins of men; but what is included in this penalty is not agreed. Dr. Hodge gives what he deems the most satisfactory solution of the difficult problem.

He says (p. 474):

"The words penal and penalty do not designate any particular kind or degree of suffering, but any kind or any degree which is judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice. The word death, as used in Scripture to designate the wages or reward of sin, includes all kinds and degrees of suffering inflicted as its punishment. By the words penal and penalty, therefore, we express nothing concerning the nature of the sufferings endured, but only the design of their inflictions." "We only say on the one hand that his sufferings were neither mere calamities nor chastisements designed for his own benefit, nor merely dogmatic, or symbolical, or exemplary, or the necessary attendants of the conflict between good and evil; and on the other hand we affirm that they were designed for the satisfaction of justice. He died in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly."

Comment.—1. This, instead of being a clear and satisfactory solution, seems to me to imperil all forms of atonement—refuses to say more than "that

Christ's sufferings were penal," and "were designed for the satisfaction of justice," and were so not because of their nature, but only because they were designed to be so.

(1) The "words penal and penalty do not designate any particular kind or degree of suffering, but any kind or degree which is judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice." Or, "their character as penal depends not on their nature, but on their design." Hence, "the very same kind and amount of suffering may in one case be a calamity; in another a chastisement; in another a punishment." This clearly denies any necessary connection between sin and the character of its punishment; also between the degree of guilt and the degree of punishment. It also makes the punishment of sin not a matter of inflexible justice, but purely of will—of sovereign prerogative.

Now, this may be accepted as substantially true of human governments and punishments, but of all divine law and penalties it is fearfully false.

As we have seen, the penalties affixed to human laws are of necessity arbitrary, temporary, and judicial, having no necessary connection with the offense; but in divine government the punishment is determined, both as to kind and degree, by the offense. In the sphere of divine law, physical and moral, *like produces like*, in relation to sin and its penalties, as it does in relation to parent and progeny. But according to our author, the kind and degree of penal suffering is determined, not by its nature, but by its design; justice requires the pun-

ishment, but the offense, in no sense, determines the kind and degree of the punishment. These are judicially determined by the administrator, and are administered, not by natural but by supernatural providence. The punishment comes not necessarily out of the abnormal state of the offender, but as a judicial act of God, just as the punishment of the murderer comes from the hands of the hangman; or sin and punishment are not causally, but only contingently related.

Holding such views of punishment, Dr. Hodge is not inconsistent with himself in asserting that Christ did not suffer either in kind or degree what men would have suffered; nor is he inconsistent with himself in holding that "God arrested the execution of the law, and consented to accept the vicarious suffering and death of his only begotten Son." He is, however, in violent conflict with the Bible, and reason as well, in both these particulars.

(2) According to the theory, any suffering, physical or mental, may be a calamity, or a chastisement, or a punishment, just as God designs it. Hence, the suffering of a substitute need not be the same in kind with that of the principal, for one kind is just as adequate to satisfy justice as another, if God designs it as such; or whatever suffering God designs as a satisfaction of justice is an adequate satisfaction. This, the reader will not fail to see, makes penalty purely a matter of will, and not of justice at all. Hence, it logically follows that if God chose to do so, he could save the elect

by a decree or act of will without any atonement at all.

If God had designed it any suffering, physical or mental, possible to Christ, would have been an adequate satisfaction to justice. The only reason why his suffering, consequent upon his forty days fast, did not satisfy justice for all the world, is that God did not design it. If he had been a galley-slave, or a hod-carrier, his suffering under such labors would have been adequate to satisfy justice, if God had so designed, for "their character as penal depends not on their nature, but upon their design."

(3) Another fatal consequence of the doctrine "that the very same kind and amount of suffering may in one case be a calamity; in another a chastisement; in another a punishment," is that justice is minimized, dwarfed, and practically reduced to zero. Justice demands penal satisfaction for sin. But any suffering becomes penal only by design, and any kind and amount is an adequate satisfaction if it is designed to be so. Now, what necessarily follows? Thus: To "design" is purely an act of will, or sovereign prerogative. An act of will may substitute one kind of punishment for another, and one degree for another; rather, the will, irrespective of justice, fixes both the degree and kind of punishment that must be endured by unsaved sinners, and which must be accepted as "a real adequate satisfaction to justice," and then substitutes a punishment for Christ different in kind and less in degree than that fixed for sinners. This Dr. Hodge clearly

teaches. In this change the claims of justice are set aside, and it must accept as a real adequate satisfaction whatever sovereign prerogative may happen to give. This does not quadrate with the Anselmic idea of justice.

Now, it is a self-evident proposition that the right to substitute one kind and one amount of punishment for another is the right to set aside punishment altogether, and to save the sinner without any atonement, or expiation, or satisfaction to justice.

The right to take my house for half value without my consent is the right to take it for nothing. The right to relax is the right to abrogate law.

(4) If it should be said that God's infinite perfection gives an infallible guaranty that he will always do right, and that his designs or purposes will always be in the strictest accord with justice, I cordially accept all this as true, and rejoice in it. But according to Dr. Hodge it is not true. God fixed the kind and amount of penalty proper to the sins of the elect. This kind and amount of penalty were in exact accord with justice. But when God accepted Christ as the substitute "of his people," he changed the penalty materially both as to kind and amount. If the penalty as fixed for sinners was just, then of necessity the penalty as fixed for their substitute was unjust. If the latter was just, then the former was unjust. Dr. Hodge's theory, take it as we will, makes God unjust, if the atonement was made primarily to satisfy justice.

(5) Another perplexity arising out of our author's doctrine perhaps should be noticed. He says:

"The word death, as used in Scripture to designate the wages or reward of sin, includes all kinds and degrees of suffering inflicted as its punishment."

Of course every kind and degree of suffering is either penal or it is not. It can not be both; yet our author seems to make it both. His theory of Adamic sin requires him to make absolutely all suffering penal; but his theory of Christ's suffering requires him to make some suffering only a calamity or non-penal, and some penal, according as God designs it for one or the other. The design, we are informed, makes all the difference, and this difference affects God alone, and not the sufferer; it matters not a particle with him whether his suffering is a calamity or a punishment. If I burn your house, the effect to you is the same whether my design was malice, or revenge, or plunder, or any thing else. I alone am affected by the design. If the "character" of sufferings "depends not on their nature, but on their designs," then it does not matter a particle whether a man's sufferings are calamities, chastisements, or punishments. The sufferings of Christ and of Judas as to themselves were exactly the same; their sufferings differed only as to God—that is, in his designs.

(6) Our author very much confuses "calamity" and "punishment." He says: "The word death, as used in Scripture to designate the wages or reward of sin, indicates all kinds and degrees of suf-

fering inflicted as its punishment." The proposition might be interpreted to mean that all suffering is penal, or to mean that some is not penal. He expresses himself more clearly elsewhere, saying (p. 120):

"The wages of sin is death; . . . therefore death must include not only all the miseries of this life and the dissolution of the body, but also all that is meant by spiritual and eternal death."

The doctrine, here and elsewhere taught is, that all suffering of which men are the subjects—physical and mental—is strictly and exclusively a punishment of sin. Why, then, does he say:

"Suffering without any reason of its occurrence is calamity; if inflicted for the benefit of the sufferer, it is chastisement; if for the satisfaction of justice it is punishment. The very same kind and amount of suffering may in one case be a calamity, in another a chastisement, in another a punishment?"

The answer is, he thus classifies suffering so as to justify himself in saying that the value of Christ's sufferings depended "not upon their nature, but upon their design." The strategy is bold but involves him in contradiction.

To say that all suffering is a punishment of sin, and then classify sufferings as calamities, chastisements, and punishments is glaringly illogical. It makes a thing differ from itself. It is to say that calamity is a punishment, and yet differs radically from a punishment. Truth is not self-contradictory.

I do not object to the classification of human sufferings as calamities, chastisements, and punishments. The radical error lies in the Augustinian assumption that all human suffering is a punishment of sin—sin in the person of the sufferer—a conceit repudiated alike by reason and revelation.

CHAPTER IX.

SECTION I.—*Reatus culpæ et reatus poenæ.*

Dr. Hodge says (p. 476):

"The word guilt . . . expresses the relation which sin bears to justice, or, as the older theologians said, to the penalty of the law. The relation, however, is twofold.

First, that which is expressed by criminality and ill-desert, or demerit. This is inseparable from sin. It can belong to no one who is not personally a sinner, and it permanently attaches to all who have sinned. It is not removed by justification, much less by pardon. It can not be transferred from one person to another.

But, secondly, guilt means the obligation to satisfy justice. This may be removed by the satisfaction of justice personally or vicariously. It may be transferred from one person to another, or assumed by one person for another."

On page 188, *et seq.*, we have the same doctrine given at greater length. I will cite only a few sentences:

"The guilt of our sins is said to have been laid upon Christ—that is, the obligation to satisfy the demands of justice on account of them. . . . When a man has been punished his liability to justice or obligation to the penalty of the law . . . is removed. It would be unjust to punish him a second time for that offense. . . . This distinction

theologians are accustomed to express by the terms *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pœnæ*."

Comment.—This distinction as to different phases of guilt is deemed of vital importance to the substitutionary scheme of atonement. It is supposed to show how a sinner's liability to punishment may be transferred to another, while his criminality still remains his own, and to thus remove the apparent absurdity of saying that guilt in the sense of criminality may become the guilt of another. It is certainly shrewd but not satisfactory.

1. It discriminates between pardon and justification. The idea seems to be that the sinner is pardoned when Christ became his substitute, but is not justified until he believes. Pardoned from eternity—justified in time. This brings no relief, for it is as easy to justify as it is to pardon a sinner from eternity. The Bible makes no such distinction. Nor can we have any clear conception of a difference between a divine act in pardoning and such an act in justifying a sinner forensically. If they are different, then there are two legal divine acts, separated by indefinite time, and yet conditioned one upon the other, and infallibly insuring the one the other.

2. "Guilt means the obligation to satisfy justice." This is impracticable realism, dealing with the abstract as with the concrete—with conceptions as with realities.

Guilt has no existence except as a state of the mind, and justice exists only as a quality in mind. Both are impersonal, and for this reason alike incapable of "obligation" and "satisfaction." Our

author means that suffering satisfies justice. Now, if guilt can be obligated, and can discharge that obligation by suffering, and justice can be satisfied by that suffering, then guilt and penalty are lifted wholly above the sphere of the real into the sphere of the abstract, and have no existence except as mental conceptions. Why not deal with sin and its consequent suffering in a common sense practical way, as we deal with other stern realities?

I should much prefer to say that the guilty sinner is subject to punishment. It is not his guilt that is punished but the sinner himself because of his guilty or abnormal state. Suppose that I should say, "Sickness from poison means obligation to satisfy the laws of health," what would physicians think of me? And, suppose I should duplicate the absurdity by saying that the suffering produced by sickness cures or removes the sickness, as penalists say suffering removes its cause, how long could I escape the asylum?

Penalists have been led into such absurdities largely by attempting to construct the moral government of God after the models of human government, whereas the true analogies of the moral government are found in the government of the physical world; because God is the law-maker and ruler in the physical world in a sense in which he is not in human governments.

3. "This [guilt] may be removed by the satisfaction of justice personally or vicariously." The logical correlate of this proposition saves every sinner in the universe; Satan and his hosts not ex-

cepted. How is this? Thus: "Guilt in the sense of *reatus poenæ* may be removed by the satisfaction of justice." Suffering alone satisfies justice and releases from *reatus poenæ*. Christ rendered this satisfaction for the elect. Satan and all other sinners render it personally each for himself. Hence, just as Christ's suffering satisfied justice and released the elect from the *reatus poenæ*—liability to punishment—exactly so, and in an equally satisfactory manner, do the personal sufferings of Satan and others satisfy justice and release them from *reatus poenæ*.

This releases Satan and every other sinner from liability to punishment exactly in the same sense as does the satisfaction of Christ release the elect. This satisfaction by personal suffering is in every way just as perfect as that rendered by Christ, for, if this is not the case, then justice never gets its due, nor can it help itself; for it is the only satisfaction it can ever receive.

Hence, we have all rebeldom released from the *reatus poenæ*, or liability to punishment.

Now, let us look after the *reatus culpæ*, or guilt in the sense of "criminality," "ill-desert," "demerit," "moral pollution."

It is the uniform teaching of Augustinians that those for whom Christ made expiation are infallibly saved—that is, the removal of the *reatus poenæ* infallibly secures the removal of the *reatus culpæ*. Dr. Hodge says (p. 472):

"When a ransom is paid and accepted, the deliverance of the captive is a matter of justice. So, in

the case of the satisfaction of Christ, justice demands the salvation of his people. That is his reward. . . . What reason can there be for the infliction of the penalty for which satisfaction has been made?"

Hence, it follows from the strictest logical necessity, that just as Christ's substitutionary penal suffering removed the *reatus poenæ* of the elect, and thereby infallibly insures the removal of their *reatus culpæ*; so the personal penal sufferings of Satan removes his *reatus poenæ* and thereby infallibly removes his *reatus culpæ*.

The argument may be differently stated:

Penal suffering removes *reatus poenæ*.

Satan's sufferings are penal. Therefore, Satan's *reatus poenæ* is removed.

Justice requires the removal of the *reatus culpæ* of all those whose *reatus poenæ* has been removed by penal suffering.

Satan's *reatus poenæ* is removed by penal suffering. Therefore justice requires the removal of Satan's *reatus culpæ*.

If this argument is in any respect unsound I confess my inability to see it, and would be grateful to any one for indicating its fallacy. But, if the logic is sound, and if the doctrine of penal satisfaction upon which it is founded is true, then Satan and all rebeldom have a guaranty of salvation founded upon immutable justice.

4. Certainly there is an appreciable distinction between criminality and penality, between moral corruption and punishment, and we may indicate

this difference by the technical forms, *reatus culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*, if we choose. But it must be remembered that though they are logically distinct they are both logically and chronally inseparable. Criminality involves liability to punishment, and punishment presupposes criminality.

Of course there is no objection to the distinction itself, but grave objection to the order and manner of relationship between criminality and penality as held by substitutionists.

(1) As to the *order* of relation between crime and penalty, it seems superfluous to say that they are related as cause and effect, or as antecedent and consequence, and that crime is the antecedent and punishment the consequence. Hence, no crime, no punishment. To take away the criminality is to take away, or rather to prevent, the punishment. To remove the disease is to relieve the pain which it produces.

But substitutionists reverse this natural order of the relation between crime and punishment, making the removal of the *reatus poenæ* antecedent to the removal of the *reatus culpæ*—that is, exemption from punishment is the antecedent of deliverance from criminality.

Hence, the sinner is pardoned, released from all liability to penal suffering, when Christ became his substitute, but is left in his criminal and polluted state; morally corrupt, but not liable to the divinely ordained consequence of his corruption! At enmity against God, yet not liable to the consequences of that state of enmity. Such a state of

things, it is self-evident, is impossible in the sphere of either physical or moral law. It would be possible only in the sphere of human law, and *possible* here only because of the inherent weakness of human law. Thus, a man commits a malicious murder, is indicted and tried by the proper court; but, by the bribery or death of witnesses, or by corrupting the court, he procures a verdict of acquittal, and is set free. This verdict operates as a barrier against subsequent prosecution and punishment. This is exactly the state in which substitutionary satisfaction puts all for whom Christ died. His death absolutely delivers from *reatus poenæ*, but leaves them in the meshes of *reatus culpæ*, from which, however, they are at some indefinite time to be wholly or in part relieved.

If this is the method of the "divine government," then, well may we regard the "Great Atonement" as the "Great Exception," and despair of ever harmonizing "Reason and Revelation."

(2) The manner of the relation between criminality and penality is as objectionable as is the order of their relationship as held by substitutionists. Men are delivered from the liability of punishment when Christ—a Lamb slain from the foundation of the world—became their substitute. But these men are born and become, possibly, as hardened in sin as a long life may allow them, before they are delivered from criminality.

This view not only reverses the natural order of cause and effect, as we have just seen, but absolutely separates them by an indefinite period of time.

Such separation is possible only in the sphere of human law. Because of defects of human law the criminal may escape penalty for a longer or shorter period, or may never be judicially punished at all. This possibility results from the fact that the penalties of human law are purely arbitrary—are fixed by judicial authority, and have no *necessary* connection with the crime. The punishment, if it comes at all, comes from without, and through the agency of other minds. Hence, the penalty for the same offense is now this, now that—in one State one thing, and in another something different, according to the judgments or whims of the lawgivers.

But it is not so in divine law. Criminality and penalty, as I have often said, are causally connected, the latter growing naturally out of the former, and is determined by it as the stream comes from the fountain, by which its character is determined. God has immutably fixed this relation between criminality and penalty, and no power short of omnipotence can separate them. But God does not ordain laws in the realms of matter or mind to revoke or modify them on occasion. Hence, the only possible method of escape from penalty is to get rid of the criminality that produces it.

To do this—to condemn sin—to destroy sin—to take away sin—was the grand mission of the Son of God. This he does, not by suffering its penalties, certainly, for this would give sin and Satan the completest possible triumph, but by a radically different method, as will be elsewhere explained.

SECTION II.—It deserves also to be stated that crime and penalty in the sphere of all divine law are strictly co-inceptive and conterminous. Though logically distinct, and related as antecedent and sequence, yet they take origin together, and if the criminality is never removed the punishment is necessarily endless. But the effect continues no longer than its cause. This is so because the penalty inheres in the criminality and comes necessarily out of it, just as all effects inhere in their causes, and come naturally and necessarily out of them.

This is the character of punishment in the sphere of natural providence, which in no way conflicts with punishment by supernatural providence, as will be presently seen.

If these statements are true, how unreasonable it is to represent the great merciful Law-giver, who ordained law for the conservation of the world, as "suspending the law," "modifying the law," "relaxing the law by sovereign prerogative," etc.

Even so great and learned a man as Dr. Hodge speaks in this way. He says (p. 471, *et seq.*):

"It was an act of pure grace that God arrested the penalty of the law." This refers to Adam's sin, and assumes that God on that occasion arrested the penalty affixed to the prohibition. I should say there was no arrest of penalty on that occasion, or any other. If God can arrest the natural penalties which he has ordained and established on one occasion, he can on all occasions; if for one year, then forever. This would reduce the physical and the moral world to chaos.

"In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." I venture to affirm that the threatened penalty was instantly inflicted without any arrest or modification, exactly in the sense in which God intended, and Adam understood it. God is not slack concerning his promises or threatnings, as some *men* count slackness.

The death intended was the natural and God-ordained consequence of the sin which inhered in it. I have elsewhere and repeatedly defined penalty of any divine law to be the forfeiture or loss of the good which the law is intended to conserve. If this is true, how is it possible to transgress God's laws, and yet escape the penalties he has wisely affixed to transgression? How can I hate, and yet escape the consequences of not loving, as the law imperatively requires me to do?

If it should be said that all things are possible with God, and that he can arrest natural law, or set aside penalties; that he stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, etc.

Certainly all things that involve no contradiction are possible with God. He did preserve Daniel among the lions, and the Hebrew children from the violence of fire; but he set aside no law, arrested no penalty. He is represented as having in many instances been turned away from a purpose to punish judicially special sins, but I call to mind no instance of the suspension or arrest of natural penalty. [This subject will be further considered in the following section.]

Dr. Hodge, as a pronounced substitutionist, holds

to the *separability* of crime and penalty. He says (p. 490, *et seq.*):

"The justice of God is revealed in his works. (*a*) In the constitution of our nature. The connection between sin and misery is so intimate that many have gone to the extreme of teaching that there is no other punishment of sin but its natural effects. This is contrary to fact as well as to Scripture. Nevertheless, to be 'carnally-minded is death,' that is, damnation. There is no help for it. It is vain to say God will not punish sin, when he has made sin and its punishment inseparable. The absence of light is darkness; the absence of life is death. (*b*) It is, however, not only in the constitution of our nature, but also in his works of providence that God has revealed his purpose to punish sin. The deluge; the destruction of the cities of the plain, . . . are proof enough that God is an avenger, that he will in nowise spare the guilty."

Comment.—The harmony of these statements with others, and even among themselves, is not very apparent.

1. We have the admission of punishments of sin as natural effects, an instance of which is "to be carnally-minded is death—that is, damnation."

This, I think, is exactly true. "Damnation," then, is a natural, and not a contra-natural providence. But our author says it "is contrary to fact as well as to Scripture" to say "that there is no other punishment of sin but its natural effects;" and names the deluge and many other events as proof of his assertion. Here things radically different are confounded, and confusion follows. You can not fail to perceive quite a difference between

the "death—that is, damnation"—which is the effect of carnal-mindedness, and the death produced by the deluge. One was the death of the soul; the other of the body. One came from within—from the state of the mind; the other from without—from the clouds. The one involved continuous suffering; the other only a transient suffering. One is a necessary consequence of a violation of divine law as a concreation of the mind itself, or a natural providence; the other, a contingent punishment, in no sense conditioned upon the state of the mind, but an arbitrary visitation for a specific administrative purpose or a supernatural providence. They are not commutable, they do not exclude one the other, nor does one presuppose or involve the other. Things so radically different should be broadly distinguished. This may be done by designating one as natural, because it is the natural consequence of sin; the other judicial, because it is arbitrarily inflicted for specific purposes. Both are equally from God, but are inflicted on different grounds, and by different processes.

Dr. Hodge seems to refer spiritual death to nature, and the deluge to providence. This is an inadequate view of the subject. God is as truly "in nature," though not "of nature," as he is "over nature." He was as truly the creator of Cain as he was of Adam, though the processes in these creations were radically different. I protest against *this distinction* between nature and providence as unbiblical and unreasonable.

2. I do not clearly see how the assertion that

God "has made sin and its punishment inseparable," can be reconciled with the assertion "that God arrested the penalty of the law" in reference to Adam's sin, or the often reiterated assertion that Christ suffered the penalty of the law in the place of men. If natural death was any part of the penalty of Adam's sin, and God arrested that death for nine hundred years, it seems that "sin and its punishment [are not] inseparable."

If Christ suffered the punishment of the sins of the elect thousands of years before they were born, it does not appear to be true that God "has made sin and its punishment inseparable." How hard it is for men even of the most brilliant powers to make error consistent with itself! I heartily concur with Dr. Hodge when he says that God "has made sin and its punishment inseparable;" but can not agree with him when he says God arrested the execution of the penalty of the law in relation to the first human sin, or when he says that Christ suffered the penalty in the place of men thousands of years before they are born. To do this would be to affirm and deny the same thing.

CHAPTER X.

SECTION I.—*Appeal to the Bible.*

If the Bible teaches the doctrine of a penal atonement, then, of course, it must be accepted as true, for from its decisions there is no appeal. With all due deference to Dr. Hodge's superior learning and ability, I must be allowed to say, that, instead of taking his theory from the obvious teaching of the Bible, he interprets the Bible by the requirements of his theory. Thoroughly believing his doctrine to be true, he, of course, must at all hazards make the Bible support it. In doing this he, I believe, takes undue liberty with many texts of Scripture. I think no text is intended to teach it, and none can be made to teach it, without a misinterpretation, or misapplication, or illicit inference from it. Like other substitutionists, he uses but few texts, but claims the sanction of the whole Bible.

He, of course, cites those that seem most favorable to his views, and disposes of those that seem to oppose it in a sufficiently cavalier manner. He, as do penalists generally, assumes that Christ could not die *for* men in any other way than in their *place or stead.* He consequently interprets the whole Levitical law in regard to sacrifices as proof of penal substitution, or interprets it by Isaiah liii., and in this way proves his substitution by the con-

current testimony of the law and the prophets. This testimony will be elsewhere examined.

He makes reference to some New Testament texts, which he, however, generally disposes of dogmatically, rarely exegetically, and still more rarely does he interpret them in logical harmony with their contexts.

It would not be a difficult task, though it would be a tedious one, to show that not one of these texts is intended to teach penal substitution.

Many arguments or texts are not necessary to prove a doctrine true or false. One is often sufficient. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider all his arguments or all the texts which he uses in support of his doctrine. A few will serve as an illustration of his general plan.

SECTION II.—*Reconciliation.*

Dr. Hodge, explaining Rom. v. 10, says (p. 514):

"'Being reconciled by the death of his Son,' in verse 10, is parallel to the clause, 'Being justified by his blood,' in verse 9. The one is exchanged for the other as different forms of expressing the same idea. But justification is not sanctification. It does not express a subjective change in the sinner. And, therefore, the reconciliation here spoken of can not express any such change. . . . The death of Christ as satisfying justice, reconciles God to us."

Speaking of Eph. ii. 16, "That he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross," he says:

"Here again the reconciliation of God with man

is effected by the cross, or death of Christ. The change (the reconciliation) is not in man, but, humanly speaking, is in God; a change from the purpose to punish to a purpose to pardon and save. There is, so to speak, a reconciliation of God's justice and of his love effected by Christ's bearing the penalty in our stead."

In reference to 2 Cor. v. 18, "Who hath reconciled us unto himself by Jesus Christ and hath given unto us the ministry of reconciliation," he says:

"This does not mean that God changed our heart and made us love him. . . . It can only mean that through Christ—through what he did and suffered for us—peace is restored between God and man, who is able and willing to be gracious."

Comment.—1. I will not say much that might be pertinently said of this disposition of these plain texts. Dr. Hodge, in Rom. v. 10, makes men the subjects of reconciliation—not God—and identifies it with justification. It is pertinent to say that the Bible never confounds reconciliation and justification; never uses them "as different forms of expressing the same idea." The Bible always uses reconciliation as expressive of a moral and not a forensic state of the mind.

2. In all the other citations Dr. Hodge makes God—not man—the subject of reconciliation; God is reconciled to man.

This contradicts the plain teaching of the texts themselves. They show on their face that it is not God reconciled to man, but man reconciled to God.

Rom. v. 10: "While *we* were enemies *we* were reconciled to God." This is admitted to refer to man, but not to his subjective or moral state. Then, of course, the "*we*" represents unregenerate but justified men. This subordinates the moral state to the legal, and turns Bible philosophy upside down.

Eph. ii. 16: "That he might reconcile both in one body by the cross." Dr. Hodge says, "Here again the reconciliation of God to man is effected by the cross." But the text says as clearly as language can say that both Jews and Gentiles are reconciled to God by the cross. God is the reconciler of men "unto God," and not the reconciler of himself unto himself, as our author teaches. This needs no further comment.

2 Cor. v. 18: "Who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation." Dr. Hodge says:

> "This does not mean that he changed our heart and made us love him. . . . It can only mean that through Christ—through what he did and suffered for us—peace is restored between God and man."

But the text teaches that God is the reconciler who reconciles men to him, and not himself to men.

Again, if reconciliation describes a state of the divine mind, how could the ministry of it be given to men? I can conceive how God, through the ministry of men, can reconcile men to himself; but am utterly unable to see how men could minister

reconciliation as a state of the divine mind, to men, or to God, or any thing else; especially as that reconciliation had been an accomplished fact from the foundation of the world. This being the case, what need for any such ministry? It evidently could effect nothing—could not change God; for God was reconciled to man by the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and could not affect man for he is not the party to be reconciled; nor does he need reconciliation, for, according to the theory, he was reconciled when Christ became his substitute.

Are these the vagaries, the conceits, the incongruities of the Bible, or only of substitutionary penalty? Dr. Hodge quite conveniently omits all notice in this connection of the 19th and 20th verses. Certainly he could have put them dogmatically, if not logically, in harmony with his theory.

"God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself"—not reconciling himself to himself, nor himself to the world.

"We beseech you, on behalf of Christ, be ye reconciled to God." Too self-luminous to admit of specious perversion!

These texts can not be tortured into harmony with penal substitution. They condemn it utterly, because they teach with sun clearness:

First, that men are reconciled to God, and not God to men.

Secondly, that they are not actually reconciled to him by the fact of Christ's death, but *are to be reconciled* by or through his death or cross. For, if

they were reconciled when Christ became their substitute from eternity, then God could not be now reconciling them, nor could the apostles without stultifying themselves beseech them to be or become what they already are. How foolish to beseech a man to be or become what he actually is, or what God has already made him!

But the substitutionary scheme logically requires these texts to be explained or rather perverted substantially as Dr. Hodge has done. He is in full accord with substitution, but in glaring conflict with the Bible.

SECTION III.—It may be of some interest to notice Dr. Hodge's terms and how he disposes of them.

His terms are satisfaction, expiation, pardon, propitiation, reconciliation, justification, regeneration, sanctification.

1. Satisfaction is what Christ's penal death rendered to justice.

2. Expiation is the effect of this satisfaction upon the sinner's legal state, releasing him from the liability to punishment.

3. Pardon is the recognition of this satisfaction and expiation, just as the surrender of a bond is the recognition of the discharge of the obligation.

4. Propitiation is the effect of this satisfaction, etc., upon God. He now can be just in justifying the sinner.

5. Reconciliation relates sometimes to God and sometimes to man.

(1) In relation to God it is either identical with propitiation or inseparable from it.

All these changes actually occurred in eternity, or when Christ became a substitute for the elect.

(2) Reconciliation in relation to man is identical with justification, purely forensic in character, involving no change in the sinner's moral states.

This seems sometimes to be an affair of time, and sometimes of eternity. There is no perceptible reason why it might not be as exclusively an affair of eternity as is expiation, except that the Bible happens to condition justification, the reputed equivalent of reconciliation, upon faith, which is not possible till after the sinner is born. The theory is greatly perplexed at this point.

All these changes are purely legal, and affect only God and his purposes in relation to men. They involve no change whatever in man's moral condition; or he is only legally cleansed, but still morally polluted—exempt from punishment, but carnally-minded, and therefore in a state of death, which Dr. Hodge calls "damnation." Legally saved, but morally and really damned.

6. Regeneration is inceptive sanctification in the sense of moral purification. This is purely a monergistic work which God is justly bound to perform for all for whom Christ died "*efficaciously.*"

This moral purification, though God is justly bound to perform it, justice having received "real adequate compensation" for it, may, by covenant stipulation, be indefinitely deferred after birth, and at best comes only by a gradual process.

This is strictly the process of salvation by penal substitution as set forth by one of its ablest defenders.

I wish here to call your attention to two remarkable facts.

(1) If this scheme is true, then the atonement consists exclusively in God's acting upon himself in such a manner as to enable him to "change from the purpose to punish to a purpose to pardon and save" (p. 515).

(2) According to the scheme every characteristic of the atonement, every element in it is purely legal without a single moral feature about it. There is in it absolutely no recognition of any pertinency or adaptation to man's condition as a free, moral agent. A hard necessity reigns over all—over God because he can not pardon sin unless it is first punished, and over man because he has no choice between the acceptance and rejection of salvation; for he, according to the substitutionary scheme, has as little agency in the matter of his regeneration as he has in the removal of his liability to punishment—as little agency in the removal of his *reatus culpæ* as in the removal of his *reatus poenæ*.

God does what his nature compels him to do, and man necessarily receives what God necessarily gives, is the logical outcome of the theory. This is fate, and "fate is atheism."

SECTION IV.—*Summary of Review.*

From this brief summary of the various schemes of soteriology that have been received with more or less favor by the Christian Church from the days

of the apostles to the present time, we may gather some important lessons.

1. The Apostolic Fathers, as we have seen, seem to have had no very distinctly defined theory of soteriology. Barnabas and Clement, of Rome, both disciples of Paul, and Ignatius and Polycarp, both pupils of John, all teach that Christ died for men, and that he is the Savior of all that believe on him, but give us no very distinct statements as to how his death avails to the salvation of believers.

2. Patristic soteriology, as we have seen, was sadly marred and degraded by the assumption that Satan had just property rights in mankind, and that the sufferings of Christ did in some unaccountable manner satisfy these just claims. Some of the most influential men of the Church, such as Athanasius, Augustine, and others scarcely less illustrious, taught this doctrine. Advocated by these champions of orthodoxy, it was, of course, considered orthodox.

3. Anselm, in the early part of the eleventh century, formulated the satisfaction theory. Rejecting the idea that Christ suffered to satisfy the claims of the devil, he assumed that Christ suffered to satisfy the claims of justice, which he deemed the most central attribute of God. "This justice," he says, "indeed is God himself, so that to satisfy it is to satisfy God himself." The Anselmic soteriology was dove-tailed into Augustinian anthropology.

Its fundamental principles necessarily involved the doctrine of universalism, or a limited atone-

ment. For this and other reasons it was generally rejected up to the Reformation. Luther and the Reformers generally adopted it, and it is in its fundamental principles the prevailing theory in all Calvinistic churches of to-day. Those that reject Augustinian anthropology generally reject Anselmic soteriology, in whole or in part. Some such adopt a modified form of it, and some have formulated theories radically different from it.

4. The facts of history show that there never has been a *consensus* in the Christian Church concerning the doctrine of atonement. This is true not only of Christendom as a whole, but is also true of the different ecclesiastical organizations of Christendom.

In fact, the subject is so subtle, so extremely difficult of a lucid and self-consistent exposition, that differences of opinion are quite excusable, provided we hold hard by the Bible truth, that "Jesus Christ and him crucified" is the Savior—the only, but all-sufficient Savior of the world.

It is not theories that save men, but Christ himself, and faith in him assures salvation, whether we know how he saves us or not. Still, men will theorize, and false theories obscure the truth and tend to paralyze the gospel. The theory which puts truth in its simplest form and brings the human mind in closest contact with the living Christ is of all others presumably the best.

To outline such a theory is what is attempted in the following pages.

PART II.

NATURE OF ATONEMENT—NON-PENAL THEORY.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS.

Having briefly reviewed the various forms of the penal and vicarious scheme of atonement, and indicated some objections to the scheme itself in all its forms, I will now attempt a statement of a theory primarily moral, and legal only because it is moral, but radically different from what is generally known as the moral theory.

Let me here remind the class that it is one thing to disprove a given theory, and quite a different thing to establish another in its place.

If two theories only were possible, then to disprove one would be to prove the other. But in this instance this is not strictly true; for while the theories are in many respects contradictory, they are in other respects only contrary, and in some particulars even coincident.

The question which most concerns us is, What scheme best agrees with all the Bible facts that have any bearing on the subject? is best adapted to the

nature and needs of humanity? and best satisfies the demands of human reason?

Let me also suggest that the subject is so many-sided—involves so many collateral and vital questions—as the divine attributes, the essential characteristics of moral government, the nature of sin, moral retribution, confession, repentance, faith, regeneration, justification, etc.—that to present a bird's-eye view of the whole subject is, perhaps, impossible. Such is the complexity of the question that its different phases must be studied, both in detail and also each in its relation to the whole.

What is imperatively required, is so to define and adjust the several parts, that when combined they shall form one symmetrical, self-consistent, and self-supporting whole. Such a presentation of the entire subject would be equivalent to a self-affirmation of its truth, much as the harmonious combination of all the parts of a complicated machine proves the several adjustments to be right. Any scheme of atonement that arrays one Bible truth against another can not be true.

Allow me also to say that the most formidable difficulty that I have encountered in attempting to formulate the doctrine of atonement has arisen from prepossessions in favor of the legal and substitutionary theory. To dispossess ourselves of an inherited faith, especially when it is venerable with age and well-nigh universally accepted by the learned and the good, is one of the most difficult achievements of the human mind. My present views are the result of years of persistent and painful thought.

My own experience, therefore, prepares me to appreciate any difficulties that may beset the minds of others on the subject, and to sympathize with them in their troubles.

SECTION I.—*Divine Justice and Law.*

Certainly God is just. "The judge of all the earth will do right." But it does not follow that justice "is the most central attribute of God;" or that "justice is God," or that what satisfies justice satisfies God, rather than that what satisfies God satisfies justice.

Justice is an impersonal thing, and as such is incapable of making demands or of receiving satisfaction, except in a tropical sense. Persons alone make demands, and persons alone are capable of making and receiving satisfaction.

We have the word justice from the word *jus* and *jus* from *jubeo*, to command, order, or direct. To command presupposes a purpose, and purpose is a product of will. God's purposes are to him the rule of his action, and justice as an attribute in him is his integrity to his purposes. As he can not act contrary to his purposes, he can not be unjust in action, for justice as an attribute is his fidelity to his purposes.

God is love. Love furnishes the motives of his action and infinite wisdom the means for the attainment of his purposes. Hence, all his purposes are both good and wise. Leibnitz is substantially right when he represents justice as "love guided by wisdom." Justice as a divine attribute is simply God's integrity to his wise and benevolent purposes. Jus-

tice and right are coincident. It is impossible for God to be unjust, because it is impossible for him to act contrary to his purpose.

Justice as a characteristic of the divine administration is essentially coincident with the divine will, and of course with the divine law, which is but an expression of that will.

Justice, according to this view, instead of being the most central attribute of God, dominating the divine will, is simply God's fidelity to the wise and beneficent purposes of that will.

God in creation has written his law upon the human mind, and fixed the relation between moral actions and their consequences. These consequences constitute the awards of virtue and vice. This law, as written in the heart, is intended for the good of the subjects.

If obeyed, good, and only good, is the result. This is the reward God has affixed to obedience. If disobeyed, evil, and only evil, is the necessary consequence. This evil consists in the negation of the good, which is the divinely appointed reward of obedience.

We *must* act, and *of necessity*, must act in accord *with* law, or in contravention of it; consequently must experience the reward of obedience, or the penalty of disobedience. We can not do both at the same time. Had it been possible for God to create a moral being capable of the reward or happiness, which he has annexed to obedience, but without any capacity of punishment or unhappiness, probably he would have created man in this

condition. But it is certain that he has not so created him; and so far as we can see, the capacity for obedience is the capacity for disobedience, and the possibility of moral good is the possibility of moral evil. If so, then to create man with capacity for the good, without the liability to the evil, implies a contradiction. But God is just or true to his own purposes, as revealed in the constitution of the human mind, and in his word, both affirming—the former subjectively, and the latter objectively—that "the soul that sinneth it shall die," and that "the wages of sin is death."

This is the aspect of divine justice or law that imperatively requires—not some expedient or plan by which punishment can be separated from disobedience, or effect from its cause, for this would require God to change the necessary relation between disobedience and penalty—but some plan by which the sinner can be changed from a rebel against justice or law, to a state of submission to law or to God. The restoration of the rebel to obedience is by necessary consequence the removal of penalty, just as the cure of the disease is the removal of its painfulness. Hence, the grand object of atonement, as I humbly conceive, is not to satisfy abstract justice by substitutionary penalties and legal fictions, transferred guilt, etc., but to satisfy concrete justice in the sinful soul, to purge the conscience, and enable the sinner to love God and his neighbor as himself.

The great obstacle to human salvation lies not in God's estrangement from men, but in man's es-

trangement from God. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that God so loved the sinful world as to give his Son for its deliverance from sin.

This removal of guilt—both as to *reatus culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*—restores the sinner to obedience —to loving God supremely—and this obedience honors God and magnifies the law, both in its objective and subjective aspects, or the conscience; and this is salvation.

The invariable characteristics of the divine law are:

1. It requires personal obedience. "*Thou shalt love*," etc.

2. Its penalties are coincident with its transgressions. "*In the day* thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

3. It excludes the possibility of substitutionary obedience. "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die."

4. It excludes the commutation of one penalty for another. "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

To interpret divine law by human law leads to false notions of God and his law, of sin, of retribution, and of the plan of salvation. By doing this unwise thing substitutionists have constructed a scheme of soteriology which is in violent conflict with every one of these fundamental and invariable characteristics of the divine law. Hence, they save the sinner without personal obedience of any form; save him temporarily by arrest of penalty; save him everlastingly by substitutionary obedience; save

him by the exchange of one penalty for another; and save him finally by making a commuted penalty, endured by a substitute, a "satisfaction," an "adequate compensation to justice" or law, which is to say that the effect removes its cause.

What is imperatively required is a scheme of salvation that saves the sinner by grace, not by the works of the law, but in the strictest harmony with law. Such a plan is taught in the Bible.

SECTION II.—*God is sovereign and free.*

God is not bound by any central attribute (for one is no more central than another) to do this or that in contravention of his will; but having projected under the prompting of immeasurable love, guided by infinite wisdom, the plan of the moral world, he is free to do whatever he sees best for the accomplishment of his purposes, without any protest from justice. Incompatibility between determinative and executive volitions—between paramount and subordinate purposes—between ends and means on the part of God, would, I suppose, be wrong or unjust, or a want of integrity to his own purpose, plan, or promise. But mutability or want of integrity is impossible to him. Hence, the end of justice, coincident with the end of the divine law, is good, not evil—not good to the greatest number—but good to all and evil to none. Justice is neither incompatible with the bestowal of unmerited favor, as when the householder gave the laborer a penny for his one hour's work; nor is it incompatible with gratuitous favor, as when God spared Aaron and Israel, in the affair of the golden

calf, for Moses' sake, who made atonement for them. Such unmerited favors are no infractions of justice, when they better serve the divine purpose or pleasure, than the withholding of the favor or the infliction of the punishment would be. The Bible abounds with examples of forgiveness without any "real adequate compensation" to abstract justice, so called; also with instances of favors bestowed which justice could not demand. This fact will be clearly demonstrated in subsequent pages.

If these views are correct, it follows that the paramount obstacle to salvation is not in justice, nor in God, but in the state of the human heart—in man's moral corruption, carnal-mindedness, and consequent moral death. What is needed is not a substitute to suffer this death in his stead, but something to take away this carnal-mindedness—the cause of this death, or "damnation," as Dr. Hodge explains it. This penalty can never do.

SECTION III.—*Sin not debt but crime.*

Substitutionists are in conflict among themselves as to whether sin is a debt or something else.

Anselm, the formulator of the substitutionary theory, says, "Sin is debt," and makes the atonement the payment of this debt. Dr. Shedd indorses Anselm, and penalists generally accept this theory. Dr. Hodge, however, denies. He makes it an offense, but makes it analogous to debt. He thus secures to himself a sort of double definition, and skillfully plays from one to the other as occasion may require.

To make sin strictly a debt and nothing but a debt secures some polemic advantages in favor of substitution. This, however, avoids some difficulties only by creating others perhaps more formidable.

To regard sin only as debt is either to minimize sin or to maximize debt. We get the word debt in the Lord's prayer only by taking a word *literally*, which was evidently intended to be taken *tropically*. This is manifest from the fact that Christ explained the word by another, which is never used in the sense of debt. No apostle, no inspired writer ever calls sin a debt.

If we assume sin to be properly debt, and fix our attention upon its essential characteristics as debt, we can not fail to reach erroneous conclusions concerning the nature of sin, and false notions of sin lead to correspondingly false notions concerning the remedy for sin. For this reason the question demands a fair investigation.

I here quote from "Atonement and Law Reviewed:"

"In the last analysis sin and debt agree." Mr. Armour affirms—Paul denies. I concur with the latter, and affirm that sin in the last analysis is lawlessness—enmity to God, carnal-mindedness, and a state described as spiritual death. Debt is not necessarily so. It implies no alienation, no enmity, no motive or desire to injure the creditor, is not necessarily a breach of good morals, implies no disregard to the rights of others, or criminal intention. It often results from providential occurrences, from

misfortune, often from benevolent and pious purposes.

Certainly one man may intentionally defraud another; but then he becomes more than a debtor—a criminal, a sinner in fact. Debt, unaccompanied with bad intention, brings no moral retribution upon the debtor. If it results from unavoidable circumstances it may bring regret, but not remorse; for it is a calamity, not a crime.

If it results from imprudence—its most fruitful source—it is followed with the ordinary penalties of imprudence, and not with the sting of conscious guilt. Whatever temporal evils may arise from it, the soul's salvation is not imperiled by it. Can Mr. Armour say these things of sin? If he can not, why does he strategetically assert the identity of sin and debt?

Again, it is not improper to say that debt is not *necessarily* an offense to the creditor, even if it should never be paid. The creditor is often the best friend to the debtor—loves him most, has the utmost faith in him, and permits him to increase his indebtedness with little, perhaps no, prospect of ever receiving payment. Is this true of sin? Is it not necessarily offensive to God—the abominable thing that he hates? offensive and hateful, not because it personally injures him, but because it is a willful abuse of the beneficent and infinitely wise provisions he has graciously made for the happiness of his rational creatures. It is as truly a curse to the creature as it is an offense to the Creator; for every sin against God is a sin against the trans-

gressor himself, being an infraction of the conditions upon which his good necessarily depends. Sin is to the sinner himself what the self-injected poison of the viper, which, in its delirium of rage, thrusts its fangs into its own flesh and dies of its own venom. Can all this be said of debt? If not, why attempt to identify them? To do this is to maximize debt and minimize sin—to convert the mole-hill into a mountain and the mountain into a mole-hill.

But Mr. Armour makes much ado over the word "debts" in the Lord's prayer. He, however, is presumed to know that the original, *opheilemata*, is used both of debts and also of sins or trespasses; that the word, as used in Matt. vi. 12, is explained in verse 15 by the word *paraptomata*, trespasses; that Luke, in the prayer itself, uses the word sins, *hamartia*, instead of the word debts; that Mark, in the parallel text, uses trespasses, *paraptomata*.

Mr. Armour is also presumed to know that neither *paraptoma* nor *hamartia* is ever translated debt, but that *opheilema* is used in the sense of sin. To build up a mammoth theory on so shallow a foundation is certainly extremely perilous to truth. But this is the only show of Bible authority our author has for calling sin a debt. But the Bible gives no authority for the assumption that sin is debt in any proper sense, or in such sense that it may be transferred from one person to another, as human obligations may be transferred by consent of parties.

A radical point of difference between debt and crime may be thus stated:

If I contract a debt with the purpose or intention not to pay it, then I am both a debtor and a criminal. If I contract a debt with the full intention to pay, and by misfortune become unable to pay, then it becomes, perhaps, a calamity to both parties, certainly to me, because I experience the feelings of sore regret, on account of my inability to pay, but I have no consciousness of intended wrong.

But, if I commit a crime against God, the feeling of *regret* is inevitable to me; also the feeling of *remorse*, which is far different and far worse than *regret*. In a case of debt, my creditor, having a right to do what he will with his own, may graciously forgive me the whole debt, and thus relieve me of my painful regrets.

But in the case of crime, if God should formally propose forgiveness, this could bring no effective release, because I have sinned against the law of right within me, or against myself, from which nothing can relieve me, except a change of my mental state—a purging of my conscience. This difference between debt and crime is radical. Sin is a crime against objective and subjective law—against God and the sinner himself.

To relieve the soul from its abnormal state, from its enmity against God, and the sad disharmonies that sin has produced within, is to restore it to the favor of God. The required change is a change in the state of the soul—not a change in God. Of course he is angry with the wicked, is indignant at their rebellion against himself, and their violations of the law upon which their own good is condi-

tioned. Nor can he ever cease to be angry with them so long as they remain in a state of lawlessness, which is the cause alike both of his displeasure and their unhappiness. It is not God that needs to be changed in relation to the sinner, but the sinner in relation to God. A child in rebellion against a loving but indignant parent needs to be changed, not the parent. The rebellion ended and obedience restored, parental indignation ceases for the reason that its cause no longer exists.

No adjustment of the divine attributes by legal fictions or otherwise is possible, for they are not misadjusted; but, if such an absurd thing was possible, it would be of no value. To reconcile a parent to a rebellious child is not to reconcile the child to the parent or to remove its enmity, and the misery that is born of hatred.

The physician in relieving human suffering does not inanely attempt to doctor or change nature, whose laws the patient has violated. He doctors the patient and strives to relieve his sufferings by taking away his disease—his abnormal state. God, in the realm of hygienic law, and in the realm of moral law, is consistent with himself. He does not in the former relieve human suffering by bringing the sufferer into harmony with natural justice or law, and then in the latter by the reverse process of bringing law into harmony with the sufferer.

This latter very preposterous thing is exactly what substitution attempts to do. It sets God to work to reconcile himself, or justice, to sinners, instead of reconciling sinners to himself. (A very

reasonable inference is that if all men are not saved it is only because God has not succeeded in reconciling himself to men.)

Dr. Hodge and others distinctly avow this doctrine. God reconciling himself to sinners?

Commenting on Eph. ii. 16, he says (p. 515):

"The change is not in man, but, humanly speaking, in God; a change from a purpose to punish to a purpose to pardon and save. There is, so to speak, a reconciliation of God's justice and of his love effected by Christ's bearing the penalty in our stead."

This remarkable passage I have previously noticed, and will now call attention only to the manner in which it is stated. "The change is not in man, but, *humanly speaking*, in God." Well, *un*-humanly speaking, where would the change be? In man or in God? What he means is a puzzle. Does he mean that the change is real or mythical?

Passing a similar expression in the next sentence unnoticed, you will observe the singular assertion that a reconciliation of God's justice and of his "love is effected by Christ's bearing the penalty in our stead."

"God so loved the world that he gave his Son," etc. How could Christ's sufferings reconcile God's justice and love, which had no quarrel? Does sin disharmonize the divine attributes, as well as abnormalize the human soul? Surely if sin can array one divine attribute against another, or create disharmony in the divine nature, then it must be mightier than God himself.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER II.

SECTION I.—*Natural or Human Atonement.*

We have seen that sin is not debt in any proper sense; that it is far worse than debt—an offense against God and a violation of subjective law, a self-degradation and forfeiture of the good which the beneficent law of God is intended to conserve.

Evidently the *sinner* is in a strait, *not God.* The sinner needs a change, not God. The sinner needs reconciling to God, not God to the sinner. God, though angry with the wicked, so loved the world that he gave his Son to save it (anger and love are not incompatible things). But the sinner hates God; his carnal mind is at enmity against God; and this Dr. Hodge says is "damnation."

In the light of such facts it is easy to see that some plan or expedient is necessary to relieve men of their abnormal enmity against God, and thus restore them to the state of loving obedience to God—obedience to God, to law is the only possible immunity against God's anger, as revealed in the stern retributions of his law. The change needed is not the adjustment of the divine attributes, but of man's sinful state; not the removal of his *reatus poenæ* by a substitute, but *reatus culpæ.* If this is so, then the remedy must be primarily moral in character; for moral forces alone are capable of

producing moral changes in free moral beings. Substitutionists admit generally that after men have been legally saved by substitutionary legal conceits, it is still necessary to regenerate or purify the corrupt heart in order to save men. In other words, after they have legally saved the sinner, they are under the necessity of supplementing this legal deliverance by a deliverance from his moral pollution; the latter alone being real, the other fictitious; for to save a sinner in his sins is plainly not to save him at all.

Let us now consider whether an atonement primarily legal in character, or one primarily moral in character is required by the disturbed relations between God and the sinner, or whether the state of the case requires primarily the removal, by substitutionary penalty, of the sinner's liability to punishment, in order to the removal of his criminality, or the removal of his criminality in order to the removal of his liability to punishment.

Must the sinner be pardoned in order to be regenerated, or be regenerated in order to be pardoned?

The real issue is, Does Christ save us by suffering the punishment of our sins in our place, or by delivering us from our enmity against God and restoring us to a loving obedience?

I affirm the latter, and support it by an appeal to known facts of human nature, and facts given in the Bible.

1. The divine law—the supreme law of the moral world—as truly requires us to love our neighbor as

to love God. Hence, it is possible to sin against our neighbor, and this sin men often commit. Sins against our neighbor make "countless thousands mourn," and fill the world with human woe. But is there no remedy for these evils? None, absolutely, if it is true in the sphere of the human law, as substitutionists affirm it to be in the sphere of the divine law, that there can be no pardon without punishment, or that all pardon has its ground and reason in punishment.

These sins generate enmities and strifes which fill the world with needless woes.

But is there no remedy for these ills? None—absolutely none—if there can be no pardon without punishment, as penalists persistently affirm; for if a man's sins against his neighbor can not be pardoned without being first punished, then pardon is utterly worthless. It relieves no suffering, for to be pardoned is to be punished, and to be punished is to be pardoned.

But there is a remedy for these ills which, if faithfully applied, would effectually prevent the miseries arising from sins against our neighbor; and common sense—perhaps I should say human instinct—suggests it. It is confession on the part of the offender, and forgiveness on the part of the offended.

If I sin against you, I instinctively know that I ought to confess and ask pardon. I feel this to be due to myself, as well as to you, for nothing short of confession can relieve me of my mental unrest, my stings of conscience.

You, on the contrary, instinctively know, when I have made confession and asked pardon, that you ought to forgive. You feel that you owe this to yourself, as well as to the offender; and not to forgive is to make yourself, as well as the other party, more or less unhappy, according to the circumstances. If confession is made and pardon granted, unhappiness is prevented.

These facts lie within the sphere of human consciousness. They are matters of constant experience. This is atonement—propitiation and reconciliation—by moral means and for moral ends.

2. If I owe you a debt and pay it, or if another pays it for me, this would be, if sin is a debt, a legal atonement. The transaction is purely legal, and does not in any way necessarily change the moral relations of the parties. If friends before the payment, we may be after it; if enemies before, we may be afterward. It, however, is a gross misnomer to call this an atonement; for debts are not matters to be atoned for, but paid.

3. If I sin against you, or injure you in person, property, or reputation, and you sue me, and I am duly punished, it would be an unpardonable misnomer to say that I am pardoned; for this is punishment, and in no sense pardon; for it does not change our moral relations—does not reconcile us. We may even be more bitter enemies after the punishment than before.

4. If I sin against you, or injure you in any respect, and make full and manly confession, and ask forgiveness, this is atonement on my part, and is

the only atonement possible for me to make. The atonement can not be made by the payment of something of equivalent value, for there is absolutely no standard of equivalence between debt and offense. We could as properly attempt to say how much *sound* would be an equivalent for a given amount of *color*.

If the confession is accepted, reconciliation follows, and harmony between the parties is secured.

If the confession is not accepted, then perpetual enmity and its consequent evils must follow; for the only atonement possible on my part has been offered.

In this case the party originally offended becomes responsible for the evils of perpetual strife, and a real offender against his neighbor and his own peace; for not to forgive upon confession and repentance is as great a breach of moral law and the law of amity as is the original offense; or, if you sin against me, and confess and ask pardon, and I refuse to forgive, then I become as great an offender against moral law as you, and I become responsible for the perpetuation of the strife.

"Seventy times seven" are we required to forgive our neighbor who sins against us if he repents. "If we repent God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins." We are here fairly taught that forgiveness upon repentance is not merely a privilege, but an imperative duty, and that God, in this regard, does himself just what he requires us, both by subjective and objective law, to do.

Perhaps I should say that one of the worst of-

fenses against the peace of society is the refusal to forgive upon confession those that sin against us, for the very simple reason that it makes personal animosities perpetual, or renders harmony and mutual love impossible; whereas, if all offenses were promptly confessed and forgiven as God requires universal harmony among men would prevail.

5. If you sin against me and then repent, and I, instead of forgiving you, take vengeance into my own hands and punish you to my own satisfaction, this punishment does not restore the lost harmony, does not cause me to love you or you me. Forgiveness would restore peace, but punishment perpetuates it; or if this punishment conditions and secures reconciliation, as substitution requires us to believe, then Satan and all his hosts are in a state of reconciliation with God.

6. Another class of atonements may receive brief attention, viz.: such as require the offices of a mediator. In some cases of estrangement among men their relations may be such as to render it difficult for either party to take the initiative, in the way of reconciliation. In such cases the offices of a mutual friend may be of great service. Through him the parties may come to understand each other better, and their obstacles to a reconciliation be thus removed.

Or, the mediator may fail to induce the offender to make confession and to persuade the offended party into a willingness to pardon upon confession. In all such cases the responsibility rests upon the unyielding party.

SECTION II.—*Some important facts concerning these cases of atonement.*

1. These human atonements, as I shall venture to call them, are not strictly analogous to that made by the great Mediator and Atoner, which was in the highest sense unique. Still they are all, except that relating to debt, veritable atonements of their kind, according to the Bible idea of atonement, as we shall subsequently see.

2. I wish it distinctly noted that all possible enmities and disharmonies among men and their subsequent reconciliations have their origin in the sphere of the moral, and not in the sphere of the legal, relations of men; and that the legal grows naturally out of the moral; thus: first, the offense which is moral, then the condemnation, which is legal; first, the confession, which is moral, then the pardon or justification, which is legal. The legal is always subordinate to the moral, and comes necessarily out of it, as effect follows cause.

Hence, there can be no condemnation without antecedent moral corruption as its cause, and of course no pardon or justification without the antecedent removal of this moral corruption.

If this is not true, then it follows that if I sin against you, you must forgive me before I can repent, which we know is a physiological absurdity, and exactly reverses the Bible law of forgiveness.

3. These cases of atonement may be not inappropriately, I think, called natural atonements, or natural propitiations; because they seem to be natural, or indigenous to the human mind; or the

principle which underlies them seems to be a concreation of the soul itself. If I give you just cause of offense, I am instinctively impressed that I ought to make some amends by confession, apology, or something of this kind; and you feel instinctively to realize that I ought to make the acknowledgement. I feel that I have no right to expect your favor unless I make the "amende honorable;" you feel that without the confession on my part, your forgiveness would be unworthily bestowed and actually of no value, because not sought nor even desired.

How strictly coincident in this regard are the requirements of the Bible and the constitution of the human mind? The latter is the mandate of God *from within;* the former *from without.* Let us not forget that the divine is in the human, and the human, though dim, is a copy of the divine; and this fact authorizes the belief that the laws and processes of the human mind are at least real, though dim, adumbrations of those of the divine.

4. From the cases considered we can readily see that this natural law of confession and forgiveness is indispensable to the harmony of human society; perhaps I should say to the very existence of society, for what the world would be without it, is impossible to conceive.

5. If it is the law of God, subjectively and objectively given, that sins committed must be confessed in order to be forgiven, and when confessed must be forgiven in order to harmony and peace, then, we are naturally inclined to inquire wherein

consists this wonderful power of confession or repentance which seems to have its ground in the constitution of the mind itself. Why should it condition and insure forgiveness? Or how does it propitiate?

I answer, we know the fact that confession does propitiate, or make favorable the offended party toward the offender; we know it from experience and from the Scriptures, but the *manner* of the fact is not so obvious.

Still, by a careful observation of the laws of mental activities and states we may learn enough to satisfy us that the relation between confession and forgiveness has its foundation or reason in the nature of the mind itself.

(1) Let it be observed that the moral states of the mind are determined by the motives of action; also that every volition is followed by a corresponding state of the mind as the act of rising up or sitting down is followed by a corresponding bodily state or attitude.

Every external act is an act of executive volition, and presupposes a determinative volition or purpose to which it is subordinate, and of which it is an expression. An external act of disobedience is simply executive of a previously formed purpose of disobedience. In this purpose and its corresponding states consist the guilt, the criminality, the rebellion, the enmity, of which the external act is the revelation or expression (Mark v. 28; 1 John iii. 15). This enmity in one party, when revealed by external acts, necessarily awakens indig-

nation or displeasure in the other party, and happy fraternal relations are of course suspended and must continue so, as long as these respective states of mind continue.

Happily, a change is not impossible. It may be brought about by the parties themselves or through a mutual friend. The offender, seeing his folly, may repent—that is, turn from his offensive purpose. This change of purpose is necessarily followed by a corresponding state of feeling, and the offender is actually reconciled before any confession to the offended party is made. The act of outward confession has in itself no merit, no virtue to propitiate. It is only the revelation to the other party of repentance or change of purpose and feeling in regard to him.

Hence, it is sufficiently clear that this repentance, this change of purpose and feeling; this self-reconciliation is the propitiating, or favor-producing, power, which gives to the offended party ample ground for both real and declarative pardon.

Hence, just as our disregard to the law of amity is the ground and reason of our neighbor's indignation toward us, just so a return to obedience to this law is the ground and reason for the withdrawal of that indignation. As disobedience to fraternal law necessarily involves condemnation, so repentance, which is a return to obedience, necessarily insures release from condemnation, or gives sufficient ground for this release.

This I hesitate not to affirm is the law of forgiveness as revealed both by the Bible and by the facts of human nature.

(2) But, as previously stated, a mediator is in some cases necessary, even among men. The mediator, of course, must be a man, and must also be not a partisan but an impartial friend, whose offices are equally acceptable to both the offender and the offended. He is not in any sense a substitute for either party. He is only the medium of peaceful communication between them, whose business is to make peace and restore the parties to harmony. He does not assume the guilt of the offender and suffer in his stead, thus releasing him from all liability. Just as easily and as appropriately might he assume the indignation and wrath of the offended party. In fact, if he, as mediator, becomes the substitute of one party, he must be the substitute of both; otherwise he is strictly a partisan, and not a mediator at all. If he assumes the guilt of one, then he must assume the indignation and anger of the other, and accomplish the work of his mediatorship by pouring out his wrath upon himself.

Of course the mediator attempts no such preposterous and impossible things. Peace-makers among men are benefactors to human society, human and divine law recognizes them as such, and pronounce them blessed. But if man could not become a mediator without becoming the substitute of one or both parties, few men, I imagine, would ever become peace-makers.

What the mediator really does is not to take the place of one or both the parties, but to help the offender to return to his duty and to do just what the law of fraternal peace requires him to do, and to

induce the offended party to accept this repentance as the condition of forgiveness.

From these common sense truths, it is clear that the *propitiation* is simply in the *repentance* or in the *obedience*, and not in any suffering endured by the offender or any impossible substitute. Repentance propitiates simply because it is a return to obedience—is itself obedience in spirit and intention—which is all the law of fraternal peace requires; and this law, receiving all it requires, of course ceases to condemn; and, if the offended party refuses to pardon, he himself becomes the offender against that law, and is a worse enemy to fraternal peace than the repentant original offender. The hard-hearted and unforgiving brother, who was unwilling to receive his repentant prodigal brother, was a worse man than the returned prodigal. The resolution:

"I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight; I am no more worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants. And he arose and came to his father. But his father . . . ran and fell on his neck and kissed him."

Here we have atonement in its full sense, including reconciliation, propitiation, and pardon.

The prodigal's repentance, as evinced by his actual return to his father, was, as to himself, reconciliation; as to his father, it was propitiation, for what pleased him, satisfied him, delighted him, because it brought back to him his son who was lost and dead, but now found and saved.

These facts also teach us with sufficient fullness and clearness that pardon does not consist, as penalists teach, in the removal of penalty, leaving the soul in its moral pollution or criminal state. A murderer may be arbitrarily pardoned by gubernatorial fiat. This releases him from the gallows, but not from his guilt; but pardon of sin consists in deliverance from the guilt itself which causes the punishment. This is done simply by restoring the disobedient to obedience, much like the removal of effects by the removal of their causes.

6. As we have seen, God recognizes the fact that we may sin one against another, and has most explicitly enjoined the duty of forgiveness. He has so constituted human nature as to condition forgiveness of sins one against another upon repentance. The duty to forgive is as imperatively enjoined as the duty to repent. We have also seen that nothing short of confession, and nothing different from confession, can be a sufficient reason for pardon.

Now, the human bears the image of the divine. It, therefore, is in the highest degree improbable, or, rather, is unreasonable, that God should ordain one law of forgiveness for some sins and a diametrically different law for the forgiveness of other sins. One method of atonement and pardon for sins against humanity and a contrary method of atonement and pardon for sins against God? Can this be possible?

The fact that the human mind is created in the image of the divine mind seems to authorize the

inference that there is at least some similarity in their moral attributes. Hence, that justice, truth, love, mercy, etc., in the human are generically the same as they are in the divine. The differences, which of course are immense, are differences of degree and not of kind. If this is not so, the Bible is certainly not a revelation, but a riddle. But the Bible is a revelation of God, and God is consistent with himself; then it fairly follows that the law of human forgiveness, as revealed in nature and in the Bible, is generically the same as the law of divine forgiveness. That God should make confession the absolute condition of forgiveness in reference to men, and punishment the indispensable condition of forgiveness in reference to himself, is a thing in itself inconceivable. It presupposes that the moral government of God is an ill-considered piece of patch-work, without any determinate end, and utterly without any uniform relation between antecedents and their sequences, conditions and ends—*e. g.*: If my neighbor sins against me, I am bound to forgive him on condition of his repentance; but if he sins against God, that can be forgiven only on condition of punishment inflicted upon the sinner himself or a substitute.

In relation to the human, the punishment is taken away by removing its cause. In relation to the divine, the cause is removed according to covenant engagement by taking away the effect.

7. But while the laws of forgiveness are, in relation both to the human and divine, generically the same, they are in their accidents specifically differ-

ent. For instance, in relation to men's sins against one another, men may be their own atoners, or may be reconciled through a mere human mediator. But this, for reasons hereafter to be given, the offender can not do in relation to sins against God.

8. I have often been asked the question, What become of these sins of humanity against humanity, if they are forgiven upon confession? Are they pardoned without punishment at the hands of the offended party? In reply I will say only what seems to be a satisfactory answer.

(1) If our sins had to be punished at the hands of those against whom we sin as a condition of pardon, then this world would be a pandemonium, society would be impossible, "vindicatory justice" would devour the human race. This is self-evident, and no man would be willing to subject himself to the charge of insanity, by saying that our sins against each other can not be pardoned unless they are first punished; but thousands hold to penal substitution, which asserts that punishment is the only ground, and is the absolute condition of divine forgiveness.

(2) If you can tell me what becomes of pain when it ceases to affect you; or what becomes of the malady which produces the pain, when it is cured; you can answer the question as to what becomes of our sins and their penalties when they are taken away.

(3) In accordance with Bible language these offenses are *pardoned*, *forgiven*, *remitted*, *blotted out*,

or cease to exist as disturbers of the peace of the parties concerned.

But, if pardon is not conditioned upon punishment, what becomes of the claims of justice? I answer, what satisfies the parties concerned satisfies justice. God commands us to forgive, and, as we have seen, not to forgive when confession has been made is to sin against God. You do not feel that you have violated justice when you have forgiven an offense. If this was so, truly our condition would be an anomalous one, and as deplorable as anomalous; namely, unable to forgive without sinning against justice, and yet equally unable to refuse to forgive without sinning against God. This you will perceive is exactly the condition in which substitution puts us, if the laws of human and divine forgiveness are the same in kind—that is, we can not forgive without defrauding justice, nor refuse to forgive without sinning against God.

(4) But, after all, does not society, or the moral world if we prefer, suffer loss on account of sin. I answer, if not to realize what is possible of realization is to suffer loss, then all sin brings a loss; for not to realize a possible good is to experience the deprivation of that good, as not to acquire knowledge is to suffer the evils of not acquiring it. To such loss all moral governments, which are not composed of indefectible creatures, are liable; but, as I have repeatedly said, punishment repairs no losses of any kind. But it should be observed that there is less loss in forgiveness, when it is possible, than in non-forgiveness, simply because forgiveness

checks the evil, while non-forgiveness perpetuates it.

8. The preceding are some of the collateral questions connected with the doctrine of atonement. Their discussion is intended as preparative to the consideration of the great central doctrine of Christianity, viz.: the mediation of Christ.

CHAPTER III.

SECTION I.—*The Bible usage of the word Atonement.*

Having considered the general subject of atonement—including reconciliation, propitiation, pardon, etc.—in relation to our sins against one another, let us now consider atonement in relation to our sins against our divine Father.

As we have seen, the word is not a New Testament word at all, and yet is currently used to express the central doctrine of the Bible. We have also seen that in its popular use it is highly ambiguous, is used sometimes in the sense of reconciliation, or at-one-mindedness; and sometimes in the sense of propitiation, or that which renders reconciliation possible; and sometimes in a double sense, including both reconciliation and propitiation.

In view of this diversity of usage, it is a matter of the first importance to ascertain, if possible, its exact meaning as used by the Old Testament writers.

I hope to be pardoned for saying the very first thing necessary is to lay down the dictionaries, which reflect the vices as well as the virtues of theological authors of the last eight or ten centuries, and take up the Bible and test in the crucible of common sense the word as there used.

To determine the color of objects through colored glass, or to apprehend the truth through perverted symbols, is impossible.

The exclusion of the dictionaries becomes a prime necessity, because theologists have forced into the word what it was never intended to mean, adopting as its lexical equivalents such words and phrases as "*satisfaction*," "*expiation*," "*piacular offerings*," "*penal sacrifices*," "*vicarious obedience*," "*legal equivalents*," "*adequate compensation to justice*," etc.

Such expressions, I feel safe in saying, were never suggested by a careful examination of Bible facts, allowing the Scriptures to be their own interpreter; but by the exegencies of a theory founded upon false conceptions of the immutable attributes of God.

In settling a Bible question, it is of no consequence to ascertain the sense in which terms are used by secular and theological writers. The vital question is, In what sense do the sacred writers use them? This it behooves us now to determine in reference to the much-abused word, atonement.

1. You do not need to be informed that the Hebrew word *kaphar*, translated in our English Bibles *atonement*, means a literal covering, and is the name given to the top, or lid, of the ark of the covenant (Ex. xxv.) as a protection to its contents. Of course the word when used in relation to men and their sins is taken, not in this literal, but in a tropical sense. The chief difficulty is to determine precisely what this tropical sense is, or in what atonement really consists.

The lid of the ark was intended to *protect* its contents from injury, rather than to *deliver* them from injury already existing. But the word is not generally used in this sense. Sin exists and a remedy is required. The remedy is found only in atonement. Thus far all agree. But in what does atonement consist, and how does it deliver from sin?

Penalists say atonement consists in suffering the penalty of sin, and thus saves by this penal satisfaction rendered to justice. I dissent, and affirm that atonement does not consist in deliverance secured by penal suffering, but by a radically different method.

SECTION II.—*Particular instances of its Bible use.*

The word atonement often occurs in the Old Testament, but only in a few instances do the contexts give any distinct idea of what constitutes the atoning power. In these few instances, however, we have clear proof that it does not consist in penal suffering, but in placating or pleasing God by fidelity to him. Note the following instances.

From Leviticus xvi. 11–20, and other texts, we learn that atonement was required not only for the people, but also for inanimate things connected with the tabernacle service. In verse 20, we read:

"And when he (the priest) had made an end of atoning for the holy place, and the tent of the meeting and the altar," etc.

(1) We learn from the context that these things

required atonement only "because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel."

Of course the cleansing of the holy place, etc., by atonement was ritual, because they were not capable of a moral cleansing.

(2) The atonement was made by priests, for none others, unless divinely appointed, could make atonement for any thing pertaining to divine worship.

(3) This atonement was made by blood, just as that for the priest and the people was made, as in verses 11–15. This fact of itself is fatal to penal atonement. According to the theory, the *sufferings* of the sacrificial kid, as a symbolical substitute for the worshiper, constituted the atonement.

This granted, what follows? This: that the kid was a substitute for the holy place and the altar, to make atonement, for which it endured the same penal suffering, both in degree and kind, that it endured for the offerer or sinner. If atonement for the worshiper required penal suffering, then, of necessity, atonement for the holy place and the altar required penal suffering; for, if this is not so, then penal suffering is no part of atonement at all. The matter may be thus put:

Atonement was made for the holy place.

But the holy place had no sins to be punished.

Therefore, atonement is not made by punishment.

A less suicidal view of the subject, I think, is possible.

The holy place had no sins to be punished, but God required it to be relieved of such uncleanness

as comes of connection with the unclean; as the uncleanness that comes of contact with a dead body. But the same sacrificial blood that sanctifies to the purifying of the flesh of the worshiper is capable of sanctifying to the ritual purification of the altar and holy place (Heb. ix. 13, 21, 22). By the blood, the altar, etc., were sanctified—to sanctify is to make holy, to consecrate to God, and whatever is thus sanctified is acceptable, or well pleasing to him.

But to make acceptable is to make atonement.

For whatever is sanctified to him is acceptable, and nothing else. In Rom. xii. 1, we have the exact order, "I beseech you . . . to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God." Sacrifice—sanctification or appropriation to God, and acceptance by God. Heb. ix. 13, 14, gives the same order.

The penal theory requires us to believe that the sufferings of the kid were penal, and that these sufferings made atonement for the altar, or rendered it acceptable to God; and this requires us to believe that God substitutionally punished the altar, in order to make it acceptable to him, or in order to reconcile himself to it. If this is credible, nothing is incredible.

(4) It seems proper here to say that in reference to the sin offerings for the people, the pains endured by the sacrificial victim in dying were deemed of no consequence whatever. They constituted no part of the atonement. They were simply incidental to it. If the blood could have been pro-

cured, and other requirements met without a particle of pain on the part of the victim, the value of the sacrifice would have been diminished not a particle. It seems the climax of pious trifling to assert that the momentary pangs of a kid represented in sacred symbol the torments of the lost soul.

The significance of the sacrifice lies quite in another direction. Penalists attach all value to the suffering of the victim, and none whatever to the blood, except as the proof of the suffering. On the contrary, the whole value was in the blood, and none in the momentary pain incident to its death.

"The life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul" (Lev. xvii. 11).

This teaches that it is not suffering as such, penal or otherwise, but the blood that secures atonement. "The life . . . is in the blood," "for it is the blood that maketh the atonement"—not the suffering as such. The life is in the blood, or the blood enshrines the life, and in shedding blood for sacrificial purposes there is a consecration of life to God. Hence, the altar, etc., sprinkled with this consecrated symbol of life made atonement for it, or rendered it acceptable to God.

The atonement was not in the suffering as such, but exclusively in the giving of the blood, or life, to God.

This truth is fully proved by the sacrifice of Isaac.

(5) It seems supererogatory to say that we have a real atonement in this case, but no penal suffering —no suffering of any kind by the altar, symbolical or real. Exactly so is it in every case. The atonement is the giving of the blood, or life, to God. The blood and life are equivalents. To give one was in intention to give both. Hence, the bloodless sacrifice of Isaac.

We also learn that no less blood was required to make atonement for the holy place and the altar than for an individual worshiper, and no more for the whole Jewish nation, than for one man. Thus the victim and the blood necessary to atonement for the altar was sufficient for the whole nation—millions of people.

This fact is certainly difficult to harmonize with the doctrine that Christ's sufferings were equal in degree to the eternal punishment of those for whom he suffered. But if typal atonement was made simply by obedience to the precepts of the law, we can very well understand how a sacrificial victim sufficient for one was sufficient for all.

It is here clearly seen that the facts in regard to this atonement can not be harmonized with penality.

SECTION III.—*Poll-tax Atonement.*

In Ex. xxx. 11–16, we have an account of what I shall call an Atonement poll-tax. Every man of twenty years of age was required to pay into the treasury a half shekel — "the rich no more, the poor no less."

This money was an offering unto the Lord, and

is called a *ransom* for the soul and the atonement money, and was given to make atonement for the soul.

1. This atonement, as appears from the facts, was made not to secure a return of lost favor, but to prevent the loss of favor already in possession; just as by paying our taxes we prevent the fines and penalties which come from not paying them. In this regard this atonement is in exact accord with the lid, or covering of the ark of the covenant.

It *protects* from injury rather than delivers from evils previously incurred.

2. No blood was shed, without which there is no remission, and no sins were remitted simply because there were none to remit.

3. This atonement was not made by a priest, because the particular sin to which it related, not having been committed, no mediator was necessary. Every man was his own atoner, just as any man, not guilty of any particular sin, may secure divine favor by avoiding that sin.

4. This atonement, called a *ransom* for the soul, consisted purely and exclusively of personal obedience to the preceptive requirements of the law. It was atonement by perfect obedience and by suffering of no kind, penal or otherwise. On this wise the unfallen angels, I suppose, make atonement, propitiate, satisfy justice, law, God, and conscience, and enjoy perfect and continuous blessedness. I wish the class to study these cases thoroughly, for we have atonement here in the exact analogy, in which the lid of the ark was a covering, a protec-

tion to the contents of the ark. It is in utter conflict with penal substitution in every essential feature. If one is true the other can not be true; for one palpably contradicts the other. Judge for yourselves.

SECTION IV.—*Atonement in relation to the golden calf.*

In Ex. xxxii., and in Deut. ix., we have an atonement made by Moses for the children of Israel in the affair of the golden calf. How was this atonement made?

This is the answer:

"And Moses returned unto the Lord, and said, 'O this people have sinned a great sin, and have made them gods of gold. Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin, and if not, *blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book*, which thou hast written.' And the Lord said unto Moses, 'Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book' " (Ex. xxxii. 31–33).

We have a more circumstantial account of this same atonement in Deut. ix. 18, 19. Moses says:

"And I fell down before the Lord as at the first; forty days and forty nights I did neither eat bread nor drink water; because of all your sin which ye sinned in doing that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, to provoke him to anger. For I was afraid of the anger and hot displeasure wherewith the Lord was wroth against you to destroy you. But the *Lord hearkened* unto me that time also."

1. This is expressly called an atonement (verse 30). The vital elements are in the line of personal fidelity to God, who requires supreme love and full

self-surrender to himself. This loving obedience to God and love to his neighbor, Moses manifested in his prostration before the Lord, in his self-abnegation, in confessing the sin of his people, in his forty days' fast, in the entreaty to be blotted out of the book of life, if his people could not be spared.

2. God was propitiated, atonement was made, and divine anger turned away, and the people spared, not because their sins were *expiated*, but for Moses' sake.

They were spared not for the sake of what Moses did, but for the sake of what he was, and he was what he was because of what he did, or because of his persistent fidelity and obedience to God and love for his people.

3. The punishment threatened was not inflicted, either upon Moses, or the people, or any one else. Yet we have genuine atonement, but no penal infliction upon principal or any substitute.

4. What become of the claims of "justice," *the most central attribute of God*, in this case? Not a word is said about it. What was turned aside was divine anger, indignation — not justice, surely. What satisfied God evidently satisfied justice.

5. No typical beast is slain, or sacrificial blood is shed; yet there was a priest and a sacrifice in intention, as when Abraham offered up Isaac. Moses, like Christ, was both priest and sacrificial victim, who offered his life as a sacrifice to God for the sake of his people, and which, because he was what he was, God accepted as a sweet-smelling savor.

6. Moses staked his life upon the issue. He did

not propose to give his life, *as a substitute*, for that of his people, nor *to die* in their stead; but to die with them, or share their destiny—die with them if they must die. But God spared *them* for *his sake.*

Surely the penal theory receives no countenance from the facts in this case, but is condemned *in toto.*

SECTION V.—*Atonement for treason.*

Num. xvi. 41–48, gives us the history of an atonement which is highly instructive.

The congregation of Israel charged Moses and Aaron, because of the destruction of "Korah and his company," with killing the Lord's people. This unjust charge was a virtual impeachment of the justice and honor of God himself, who had punished the sedition and sacrilege of Korah in a summary manner. This charge provoked God to punish the rebellious people. A cloud of wrath covered the tabernacle, and a fearful plague fell upon them. "And the Lord commanded Moses and Aaron to get" out of the way that he "might consume them as in a moment." But Moses and Aaron, instead of getting *out* of the way, determined to stay *in* the way.

They fell upon their faces resolutely purposing to share the destiny of their people. "And Moses said unto Aaron, Take a censor, fire from the altar, and incense, and make an atonement;" and "Aaron made an atonement for the people;" and "He stood between the dead and the living, and the plague was stayed."

1. Here we have a real atonement, a deliverance from temporal death, by the turning away or appeasement of God's indignation. What saved the people was the prompt refusal of Moses and Aaron to get out of the way, and their self-sacrificing purpose to share the destiny of their people, to die with them, if they must die. This was obedience to one requirement of the divine law—*loving* their neighbor as themselves. This was heroic fidelity to their people.

But they were not less faithful to the other requirement of that law—*loving* the Lord their God with all their hearts. This love they demonstrated by their reverence and prostration on their faces and the burning of incense, which is the divinely appointed symbol of confession, prayer, and supplication.

2. This atonement is distinguished by a noteworthy, but very instructive circumstance. This: God commanded Moses and Aaron to do a thing, which they refused to do, and by doing something contrary appeased the anger of him whose command they had disobeyed.

But how could disobedience please God? or obedience displease him? or how could disobedience to a command save the people, obedience to which would have resulted in their destruction?

The paradox is easily solved. God's command to Moses and Aaron to get up from among the people that he "might consume them as in a moment," was intended as a trial of their faith, as was his command to Abraham to sacrifice his son. If

Moses and Aaron had obeyed this command, they would have violated the great moral law of love and sinned against their people; or they would have preferred themselves to their people. But by disobeying this command they proved their loyalty to God's law, and their fidelity to their people.

We thus see that the atoning, or propitiating power in this instance was in obedience, or the merit that comes from obedience.

3. Here we have real atonement, but no substitution, no penalty, no defrauding of justice, but a turning away of divine anger by obedience to the supreme law of love.

SECTION VI.—*Atonement for seduction.*

In Num. xxv., we have an atonement remarkable for the uniqueness of its method. Some Israelites had been seduced into a degrading idolatry by the Moabites. This very much distressed the loyal people, and displeased the Almighty.

On a certain occasion, when the loyal people were weeping before the tabernacle, and deploring the sins of their kindred, Zimri, one of the chief men of the Hebrews, brought Cozbi, a Midianite princess, into the very presence of Moses and the congregation, then weeping over the sins of their people.

Phineas rose up from his intercessions, and followed Zimri and Cozbi into the tent, and with a spear slew them both. The plague, which had already destroyed twenty thousand, was instantly stayed. God said that Phineas had turned away his wrath by this act, and made an atonement for

Israel, "because he was zealous for my sake or with my zeal." And God gave him and his seed an everlasting priesthood, "because he was zealous for his God and made an atonement for the children of Israel."

This atonement may on first thought seem to be essentially different from all others mentioned in the Bible. But upon reflection we find that while it differs in external form from all others, it is in essence—in the mental states—generically like all others. Righteous indignation is the *obtrusive* form of feeling displayed.

This, however, was the natural outgrowth of his zeal for his God, and jealousy for his honor, and this again was the natural and necessary psychological consequence of his love to God and love to his people.

The same love and devotion to God and his people that prompted Moses to fast and pray forty days, and to ask to be blotted out of God's book, if his offending brethren should be destroyed, prompted Phineas to vindicate the honor of God and avenge the insult offered to his people.

This atonement, we can not fail to observe, was made by a *priest*, formally consecrated to the office of mediator. The same act performed by any one not recognized as a priest, it is presumed, would not have been an atonement at all.

Other Bible atonements involving the same fundamental principles, might be here noted, but need not. Others, however, will be subsequently referred to for special purposes.

CHAPTER IV.

SECTION I.—*Some general statements.*

1. The first and the second atonements considered were made in accordance with legal requirements and legally prescribed forms. They were regular ordinances of the theocratic government.

All the others were made without such requirements, and according to no prescribed form. They were suggested by fearful emergencies, which were without anticipation—pure surprises. The atonements were none the less effective, however, on this account, for the purposes intended.

2. They were all made by priests—the divinely ordained mediators between God and men—men separated unto and consecrated to him, for special purposes. Whatever is thus separated and consecrated to God is holy, and belongs to God in a peculiar sense, and commands his care and love (Ex. xix. 5; Deut. xiv. 2; xxvi. 18; Titus ii. 14; 1 Peter ii. 9).

The Levitical priesthood had peculiar duties, peculiar privileges, and peculiar power with God, which no unconsecrated man dare to arrogate to himself. Saul, we learn from 1 Sam. xix., lost his kingdom by arrogating the right, even in what he deemed an emergency, to play the *role* of a priest in offering sacrifices. We also learn from Num.

xvi., that Korah, Dothan, and Abiram, and all that pertained to them, were swallowed up by the earth for a seditious attempt to obtain the priesthood, and for offering incense which consecrated priests alone were authorized to offer; likewise two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly—"men of renown"—were destroyed by fire from heaven for burning incense—a function peculiar to priests.

Even the censors in which these wicked seditionists had burned holy incense were deemed hallowed, and the material of which they were made was not permitted to be put to secular uses, but was manufactured into coverings for the altar.

The careful study of this chapter (Num. xxv.) can not fail to impress us with a sense of the peculiar sacredness of the priesthood, and of whatever pertained to their functions.

I therefore repeat that these atonements were made by priests, and evidently could have been made by none but priests.

3. The punishments, thus turned away by these atonements, were the arbitrary and temporary penalties of special sins, such as idolatry, treason, etc., and not the natural or ordinary penalties of the great moral law. Hence, these atonements could not change the moral states of those for whom they were made, nor relieve them from the natural penalties of sin.

4. Though none but a priest could make atonement for sin against God, yet these atonements that have been considered all lie in the same line with human atonements, or atonements for sin committed

by man against his fellow-man. As far asunder in some respects as heaven and earth, or God and man, yet like heaven and earth, God and man, they have some things in common.

Man is created in God's image; hence, we find something of the divine in the human. In no respect, I feel confident, is *this something* more strikingly displayed than it is in the great law of atonement and forgiveness. While human atonements are adequate for the purposes of social intercourse among men, and Aaronic atonements adequate to appease the anger of God against those guilty of special treasonable offenses against the theocracy, and also to take away ritual uncleannesss, etc., Messianic atonement alone is adequate to secure reconciliation to God and fit the soul for heaven.

SECTION II.—*The requirements of mediatorship.*

The requisites for efficient mediatorship are love to both parties and zeal for their honor and interest. But, while loving both, the mediator differs from both in his mental states, in his purpose and feeling. He has neither the indignation nor wrath of the offended party, nor the remorse and shame of the offending party. *Their* purposes, whatever may be their specific character, are in the direction of discord. His purpose, on the contrary, is to destroy this discord, and restore harmony and peace, and "make through himself of twain one new man, so making peace."

If the mediator succeeds, he turns away—appeases, sets aside—the wrath of the offended party, and *bears*, *takes away*, *destroys* the sin of the of-

fending party. But he never experiences the anger of the one, nor the shame, conscious guilt, and remorse of the other; or becomes the substitute of one or of the other; or, if of either, then necessarily of both; otherwise, he is not a mediator at all, but a partisan. But to do either is just as impossible as it is to change his personality.

The laws of forgiveness in relation to the human and the divine are generically the same, but specifically different, only because of the differences of the relations of the parties.

Among men, as we have seen, self-atonement, or atonement through a human mediator, is possible. But in relation to sin against God, such atonement is simply impossible.

The relations between God and man effectually exclude atonement by mere human agency. Many reasons might be given in support of this proposition; only two, however, will here be named.

(1) *Man's utter ignorance of God, and also of himself.*

He of himself knows not whence he is, nor what he is, nor for what end he was made; and of course knows not what to do, or how to reach the end of his being, or even whether it has any end. He is conscious of the sad disharmonies and unrestfulness of his own soul, and is painfully cognizant of a like mental unrest in others. But how to free himself from this dissatisfaction, or whether deliverance is possible, he does not know. He feels that he is dependent but does not know upon what or whom. He is unhappy but does not know why—that he is

a rebel, but does not know against what—whether against a power within himself, or a power without him and above him.

He has not of himself the knowledge of God as his divine Father, and of course knows not wherein he has offended him, or whether he has offended him at all, or how to procure his favor.

Hence, the very first thing necessary to the restoration of the lost harmony between God and man is a mediator, adequate to reveal God to man, and man to himself.

The God-Man alone is adequate to this double office, for none but the divine in Christ can reveal God to man, and none but the human in Christ can reveal man, as to his spiritual nature and grand possibilities, to himself. (Matt. xi. 27; xvi. 17; Luke x. 21, 22.)

Hence, Christ is the light of the world, revealing God to men and men to themselves.

(2) If sinful man even knew God as thoroughly as God knows himself, and knew himself as thoroughly as Omniscience knows him, he could not make atonement for himself; nor could any mere human being make it for him. For, as we have seen, what is holy, sanctified, consecrated to God *is his* in a peculiar sense, and is *always* acceptable, agreeable, pleasing to him; but the unsanctified, unconsecrated, *is never acceptable.*

This is proved by the scope and animus of the whole tabernacle service, and the uniform teaching of the New Testament. (See Rom. xii. 1; 2 Thes. ii. 13; Heb. ix. 13, 14; 1 Pet. i. 1, 2.)

Nor, as we have shown, is it allowable for any but a priest to offer sacrifice or make atonement for any thing. This, it will be remembered, was fearfully exemplified in the punishments of Saul, Korah, and the two hundred princes—"men of renown."

SECTION III.—*Men can not make atonement.*


Two questions very naturally arise:

(1) Why can a man not consecrated—sanctified—set apart to the priestly office, offer sacrifices or make atonement?

The answer seems to be this: God accepts nothing not sanctified or consecrated to him. Hence, atonement was required for the altar, etc., as also for men. But none but priests, or those whom God has sanctified, can sanctify or make atonement for themselves or any thing else. Hence, the unsanctified can no more make atonement for themselves than they can change their own nature. This will be subsequently noticed.

(2) Why can real atonement not be made for the sinner by any divinely appointed human priests, as Moses or Aaron? Or, why could they not impart their holiness to others, as God had imparted his to them?

The answer obviously is, that God's holiness is original; theirs derived. Hence, they could impart only ritual or ideal holiness—not real—could not impart God's holiness, but only a symbol of that holiness; hence, could make, not a real, but only a ritual atonement for themselves or any thing else. Hence, while they could make ritual atonement for



the altar and holy place, and for men; also turn away God's anger, provoked by sins against the theocracy; they could not make such atonement as to render reconciliation and salvation from sin against the divine law possible.

Hence, it is certainly true that no atonement, made by Moses, or Aaron, or any other human priest, ever saved a soul from the natural consequences of sin, or rendered such salvation possible. None but a priest, capable of making men partakers of God's righteousness, is capable of doing this. The God-Man alone is such a priest.

This distinction between the Aaronic and the Messianic sacrifices and the atonements grounded upon them ought to be specially noted and emphasized.

The Bible never confounds them but makes them as distinct as shadow and substance. These tabernacle sacrifices and atonements were the divinely appointed types of Messianic atonement.

The distinction between these atonements is clearly drawn in Heb. ix. 13, 14:

"For if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling them that have been defiled, sanctify unto the cleanness of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal spirit offered himself without blemish unto God, [sanctify and] cleanse your conscience from dead works unto God."

Here the precise difference between the Aaronic sacrifices and atonements and the Messianic is clearly specified. The former "sanctifies unto the

cleanness of the flesh"—that is, ritual purification, such as purification from defilement by contact with a dead body. (Num. xix. 11, 12.) The latter sanctifies unto the purification of the "conscience from dead works to serve the living God."

If to cleanse the conscience is not to change the moral state and fit the soul for the service of God, then certainly there is no need for regeneration, or moral purification at all; for what more can God require of a soul than to have a conscience purified from dead works, and be thus prepared for the service of God.

Consistent substitutionists are required to identify the effects of Aaronic and Messianic atonement, and deny that either of them can do more than relieve from the liability of punishment.

Dr. Hodge says (p. 509):

"Heb. ix. 14 is especially important and decisive. The apostle, in the context, contrasts the sacrifices of the law with that of Christ. If the former, consisting of the blood of irrational animals, nothing but the principle of animal life could avail to effect external or ceremonial purification, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who was possessed of an eternal spirit or divine nature, and offered himself without spot unto God, avail to the purification of the conscience—that is, effect the real expiation of sin. The purification spoken of in both members of this comparison is purification from guilt and not spiritual renovation. The Old Testament sacrifices were expiatory and not reformatory, and so with the sacrifice of Christ. The certain result and ultimate design in both cases was reconciliation to the favor and fellowship of God."

By reconciliation he means propitiation. I regret to say, but fidelity requires me, that it would be difficult to embody in so brief a space and in so plausible a manner, more grievous error than is contained in this quotation.

It will be sufficient here to indicate the errors, without attempting a formal refutation.

1. We are here taught that to purify the conscience is to expiate sin—that is, to remove the *reatus poenæ*, but not the *reatus culpæ*, as elsewhere explained.

The plain Bible plan is to take away the liability to punishment by purifying the conscience, or to remove pain by curing the disease.

2. We are here taught that the blood of the sacrificial animal and the blood of Christ purify in exactly the same sense—that is, both take away the punishment, but neither takes away criminality. This is flatly contradicted by Heb. ix. 9; x. 2–4, and many other texts.

3. We are here expressly taught that "the Old Testament sacrifices were expiatory"—that is, took away liability to punishment. But the Bible says, "It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins" in any sense. Levitical sacrifices purified ritually and symbolically; but ritual purification does not release either from criminality or punishment. If it did either, then every Jewish worshiper and every baptized person is saved. (See texts above and parallels.)

4. We are here taught that the sacrifice of Christ, just like the Jewish sacrifices, was "expiatory,"

and not "reformatory"—takes away the punishment, but not the criminality of sin. But Heb. ix. 14; x. 2, makes it cleanse the conscience or moral states of men.

5. We are here taught that "the certain result and ultimate design in both cases was reconciliation to the favor and fellowship of God." If this is true, then the salvation of all Jewish worshipers is assured, and also every man for whom Christ died.

6. Dr. Hodge extols the sacrifice of Christ as infinitely superior to those offered by human priests. But, according to his teaching, this superiority consisted chiefly in the superiority of his person over the sacrificial victims; for both had the same efficacy—both were "expiatory"—both rendered certain the reconciliation of those for whom they were offered.

These are only a part of the errors comprised in this quotation.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.—*The conclusions reached.*

In the preceding discussions the following vital conclusions have been, I think, fairly proved in regard to atonements:

1. Our sins against our fellow-men may be confessed and pardoned upon repentance, which is always implied in confession. Repentance is simply a return to duty or obedience, or to that peaceful state which our sin has destroyed. The disharmony is removed by the removal of its cause.

In such cases the offender may be his own atoner, or may have the friendly aid of a mediator. But in no case is the pardon based on a punishment of principal or substitute by the offended party. In these reconciliations there is change of mental states, but no radical change of the moral nature. Hence, no supernatural power is required.

2. We have seen that while man may be his own atoner in reference to his sins against his neighbor, he can not atone for his sins against God. God is by nature holy, but we are by nature unholy. Hence, reconciliation requires not a mere change of mental states, as distinct from the moral nature, but a radical change of man's sinful nature. This sinful or corrupt nature, man himself can not change—he was born with it; he can as easily

change the color of his eyes or his form or any other native characteristic. He needs to be newly created, regenerated, born again. God alone can produce this change of his natal moral state.

Hence, he can not make atonement for himself, or put himself into harmony with God and thereby enjoy immunity from his sins.

3. We have also seen that none but men selected by the Almighty himself for the priestly office, could sanctify, or make holy, or offer sacrifices, or make atonements for any body or any thing; also that these priestly functions extended only to ritualistic and symbolical consecrations, sacrifices, etc.

In regard to these atonements, two important facts were fully demonstrated:

First, they did not change the moral states or moral nature of any thing. Inanimate things, temple, altar, etc., had no moral nature to change, no moral guilt to remove. Nor could they of themselves, independent of Messianic atonement, have any such effect upon priests or people.

These priestly functions expended their entire force in the temple service, in ritual sacrifices, sanctifications, and atonements, all of which were symbolical of the great Messianic sacrifices, and of a less gorgeous but more spiritual worship.

4. We have seen that God's priests were also permitted, not commanded, to make atonement for special sins, committed against the theocracy. Treason is generally punishable with temporal death. God often so punished it. This punishment is generally represented as the product of God's anger, wrath,

or indignation. Never as the vindication or satisfaction of divine justice.

For this sin, Moses and Aaron and Phineas are said in a few instances to have made atonements. But these atonements, while real and adequate for the ends intended, had no relation to sins against the moral law, and from such sins they had no power to save.

These atonements consisted exclusively in turning away God's anger—that is, in making him merciful or propitious.

I suppose it would not have been *unjust* to destroy the rebels, having a right to do what he wills with his own. But it evidently was not *unjust* to spare them.

(Parenthetically this suggests a question for substitutionists to solve. What will they do with justice in such cases? Dr. Hodge sees the difficulty and sets it aside by identifying justice and anger. But this strategy involves the absurdity that God is never just except when he is angry.)

When I say these atonements consisted in propitiation, I mean not that God was well pleased with the seditious people, but that he spared them for the sake of his faithful and consecrated priests, who thrust themselves between God's enkindled indignation and the rebellious people, pleading for mercy, not for themselves but for their kindred, and proposing to perish with them if they must perish.

God, it seems, could not punish the rebels without punishing his consecrated and loyal priests. He must of necessity either punish his true and

faithful priests, for the sake of his enemies; or spare his enemies for the sake of his friends. He chose to spare the wicked for the sake of the true and the good.

According to penalists, God can not pardon the wicked for the sake of the good, but can readily punish the good for the sake of the wicked.

In civil jurisprudence it is deemed better to excuse the guilty than to punish the innocent. Hence, the benefit of every doubt is given to the accused. But in theological jurisprudence, it is deemed more just to punish the innocent in the place of the guilty, than not to punish at all. Justice clamors for its pound of flesh and must have it, however much blood may be lost in getting it.

SECTION II.—*The facts reverse the penal theory.*

1. The facts in regard to these atonements and all others recorded in the Bible absolutely reverse the penal theory of justice. Instead of proving that what satisfies justice satisfies God, they show most clearly that what satisfies God satisfies justice. God is always just, always true to his purpose, which is both benevolent and wise. He can never be unjust, because his purposes can never be in conflict.

But what becomes of the dictum, *no pardon without prior punishment*, in view of these atonements? The penalty threatened was instant temporal death. Did a single man ever suffer this penalty after atonement had been made? Or, did any one ever suffer substitutionally while making atonement?

No; these priests suffered not as criminals, nor as legal substitutes of criminals, which no law, human or divine, ever allowed. They suffered only on account of the calamities of those they loved as they loved themselves. Theirs was the suffering of intense agonizing love for the guilty; love turned to deepest grief, sorrow well-nigh unto heart-breaking.

Think of Moses on the mount in a forty days' fast, prostrate before God, confessing the sin of his people, and pleading for them, saying: "*O this people have sinned a great sin. . . . Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written.*"

Perhaps deeper agonizing love—more thorough self-denial for others' sake was never expressed in more graphic form.

Not for the sake of what Moses did, but rather for the sake of what he was, as manifested by this prayer, God spared the people and honored Moses as their atoner. What is true of this atonement is true of all others made in the interest of sinful humanity. They consist not in penalties, but in the obedience of loyal loving hearts, expressed in confession, intercession, etc.

If the atonement or propitiation made by Christ is penal, then it is contradictory of all others mentioned in the Bible.

If these atonements made by Moses, Aaron, and Phineas are moral in kind, and that of Christ is penal in kind, then we can not ascertain the meaning of the Bible by comparing one part with another, or spiritual things with spiritual things.

CHAPTER VI.

SECTION I.—*The penal and the non-penal theory of Christ's death contrasted.*

Truth and error are generally more clearly apprehended and discriminated when set in contrast with each other.

That Christ did die as a sacrifice for our sins is not in question. That he was made a curse for us, that he bore our sins in his own body on the tree, that he came to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself, are facts not in dispute.

But the question is, In what sense was he made a curse for us, or bear our sins, or put away sin?

The penal theory asserts that Christ was made a curse for us in the sense in which the murderer is accursed, when he dies on the scaffold; that he was a penal sacrifice; that he put away sin by suffering its penalty.

The non-penal theory denies and affirms radically different views. The fundamental points of difference may be thus summarized:

1. The penal theory asserts that Christ's death was a penal sacrifice—made primarily to satisfy justice, as the most central attribute of God, "to satisfy which is to satisfy God himself."

The non-penal theory denies and alleges that this sacrifice was primarily purely moral in character,

and satisfies justice, because it serves God's purposes in meeting the exigencies of man's moral and religious condition.

2. The penal teaches as its ground principle that all pardon is the result of punishment; that there is absolutely no pardon without prior punishment as its ground and reason.

The non-penal protests, and alleges that sins pardoned are not punished, and sins punished are not pardoned; that pardon is exemption from punishment on conditions satisfactory to the pardoning power.

3. The penal teaches that Christ's death propitiates only because it was a punishment for the sins of mankind.

The non-penal denies that there is any propitiation in penal suffering, and affirms that Christ has become through his death and resurrection the propitiation for the sins of the world.

4. The penal teaches in its only self-consistent form that Christ obeyed the divine law in man's stead, and thus satisfied justice in man's behalf, and that God, as an act of justice, regenerates and saves men.

The non-penal protests, and affirms that it is impossible for one person to obey the moral law—or to love God in the room of another, and to suffer its penalty (which is the consequence of not loving him), in the place of another; that Christ obeyed the divine law in his own place; that his personal righteousness or obedience is imparted to believers, in the act of believing, as was Adam's vitiated nat-

ure and consequent condemnation imparted to us by heredity.

5. The penal teaches that to suffer the penalty of the law is to obey the law, and to satisfy justice; that Christ thus substitutionally obeyed the law, and thus procured the pardon and salvation of all for whom he died.

The non-penal objects, and affirms that to suffer the penalty of the law is not to obey the law, or that to love God is obedience, but that to suffer the consequences of not loving is in no sense obedience; that there is no obedience in penalty, the terms being mutually exclusive one of the other; or, if there is true obedience in penalty, then Satan and his hosts are as truly obeying the divine law as are the saints in heaven. We might as well say that a murderer hanging by the neck is obeying the law. The law requires him to be a peaceable citizen, but the hanging man, instead of obeying the law, is suffering the consequence of not obeying it. Meritorious penal obedience is purely a double absurdity, for penalty is neither obedience, nor is it meritorious. Or, if it is, then of necessity gehenna is full both of merit and obedience.

6. The penal theory, in the hands of most of its advocates, teaches that Christ substitutionally obeyed the law, both actively and passively—actively in keeping its precepts and passively in enduring its penalty; and that this active and passive obedience constitutes the atonement.

The non-penal objects, and affirms that a passive obedience is a contradiction in the adjective—equiv-

alent to a *passive activity;* it also affirms that Christ's ante-crucifixion life was only such as personal obligations required it to be, and constituted no part of the obedience by which he became "the Lord our righteousness." Hence, in the Scriptures he is never represented as saving us by his ante-crucifixion life, but only by his suffering, by his blood, his cross, his post-resurrection life.

Romans v. 18, teaches not that it was through many, but "through *one act* of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justificatiion of life."

The penal theory, when even thus imperfectly contrasted with the non-penal, seems to be impossible and utterly incapable of a rational defense. It has the support neither of reason nor revelation.

SECTION II.—*The obedience of Christ—in what sense he obeyed the law.*

Christ was born of a woman, born under the law to redeem them that were under the law. The law under which he was born is the great moral law, which is conservative of the harmony and happiness of the moral world. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, . . . and thy neighbor as thyself" (Deut. vi. 5; x. 12; Matt. xxii. 37–39). The object of his incarnation was to redeem (save) them that were under the same law, not by destroying the law, but by fulfilling or obeying the law (Matt. v. 17). This he did to the last *jot and tittle.* He obeyed it unto death and in his death.

Paul says (Phil. ii. 8) Christ "being found in

fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

This teaches that Christ's death was an act of obedience to the law—the "one act of righteousness (by which) the free gift came upon all men" (Rom. v. 18), or the one act of obedience by which he becomes the Redeemer of them that are under the law, not by fulfilling the law in their stead, but by making those that trust in him partakers of his own personal obedience, or righteousness.

This text asserting Christ's obedience unto death is relied upon as authority for the doctrine of a passive, in contradistinction to an active, obedience, and also for the doctrine that his death was a penal sacrifice.

This, I am quite sure, is a misconception, both of the nature and design of that death, and leads by necessary consequence to false views as to the precise process by which men are redeemed, or saved. As we have seen, it saves men by a penal obedience, or righteousness.

A different interpretation is therefore required, and the following readily suggests itself as a better one. As before said, a passive obedience is a contradiction in terms; so is voluntary penalty an absurdity; for voluntariness and penalty are mutually exclusive. If you pay a fine imposed as punishment upon a friend for crime, you are not his substitute. Your payment of the debt is not a penalty, but a benefaction to a friend. Penalty and benefaction differ as widely as the poles.

Christ's death was voluntary obedience; therefore,

neither passive nor penal. This fact is plainly asserted by Christ himself. He says, "I come to do thy will, O God." Again:

"Therefore doth my Father love me because I lay down my life for the sheep that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me; I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again" (John x. 17, 18).

Certainly no act of his ministry was more purely voluntary than was his death, which was in the strictest sense an act of obedience—not passive, but active—and consequently meritorious, or righteous —righteous only because it was active. How a passive act, if such an act was possible, could be an act of righteousness, is inconceivable. Just as well predicate righteousness of the movements of the wind or the waves.

SECTION III.—*In what sense was Christ's death an act of obedience or righteousness?* I answer, It was preceptive obedience—the doing *purposely*, and even *joyfully* (Heb. xii. 2), just what the law required him to do. The law requires obedience exactly according to ability, or love with all the heart, etc.

Christ being sinless by nature, was, of course, capable of a deeper and purer love for God on one hand, and for humanity on the other, than even Moses displayed, when on the Mount he prayed in soul-rending agony, "If thou wilt forgive their sin; if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book." If Moses, under a higher degree of mental agony,

had died on this occasion, he would have died of love, or obedience; from loving God and his neighbor as himself—not in their stead, but on their account.

We know that the human organism is capable of only a limited amount of mental disturbance. Excessive joy and excessive grief often induce death. Christ's sinlessness probably rendered him pre-eminently capable of love or obedience unto death from mental suffering. This fact seems evident from his agony in the garden, where his sweating great drops of blood denotes the inception of death. This liability to death, he, of course, had power to overcome. But this was not his purpose. He came to lay down his life for men—to give it for men. This life was all he had to give, all he could give. This obedience unto death was just what the law required—not a *jot* more nor less.

But did the law actually require all this of him? Could it be satisfied with nothing less? I answer, the terms of the law required him to love God with all the heart, etc., and his neighbor as himself. His life was the exact measure of ability. You could give your life for his cause, or any other, if necessary, but you can give no more than this. Ability is the exact measure of the obedience required.

But does the law require such obedience of all its subjects? I answer, the law requires us to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves, but it does not require useless sacrifices. The most acceptable sacrifice possible to you or to

me is to present ourselves, soul and body, "a living sacrifice to God, holy and acceptable, which is our reasonable service."

Christ teaches (Matt. xviii. 9) when a sacrifice is necessary, the less should be sacrificed for the sake of the greater. Hence, if my soul could be saved only by the sacrifice of my animal life, fidelity to God, and to myself as well, would require the sacrifice.

But equal love to my neighbor, would, under the same circumstances, require me to make the same sacrifice for him as for myself. But mere human sacrifices can not sanctify, nor save sinners. Hence, mere men are not required to offer themselves in sacrifice in such a manner and for such a purpose.

But Christ was not a mere man, but the God-Man. This union of the human with the divine rendered him capable of redeeming humanity by the sacrifice of himself. This the law required him to do, just as it would require me to sacrifice my body for the sake of my soul, if it could be saved in no other way.

He, by virtue of the union of the human with the divine, was capable of making such a sacrifice for men as would sanctify them and render acceptable to God those united to him by faith. This sacrifice of himself the law required him to make. His doing this was his obedience unto death.

[Obedience to human law is sometimes regarded as a low and menial service—a degradation rather than an honor. But obedience to divine law—the great law of universal love—is the highest merit

and honor possible to the subjects of law in heaven and earth. Christ was not dishonored by thus obeying the law even unto the death of the cross, nor did he so deem; but "for the joy that was set before him" he endured the cross, despising the shame.]

Paul asserts this obligation of Christ to humanity when he says (Gal. iv. 4): "God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem them who were under the law."

Christ himself affirms it when he says, after his resurrection (Luke xxiv. 26):

"*Ought* not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory," and (verse 46) "Thus it is written and thus it *behooved* Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead the third day, that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations."

Heb. ii. 10, teaches the same truth. For it *became* him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many souls unto glory, to make the captain (author) of their salvation perfect through sufferings. The doctrine here plainly taught is not that Christ's sufferings in any sense save men, but by his sufferings he became what he is, namely, the author of salvation. His death (verse 14) did not destroy sin, or the devil, but through his death he became the antidote, the destroyer of sin, as was the brazen serpent the remedy, the destroyer of the works of the fiery serpents of the wilderness.

It is simply impossible to harmonize this text and

its connections with the penal theory without doing unpardonable violence to its terms.

We thus see in what sense Christ was obedient unto death. Certainly it was by keeping the law, meeting the requirements of the law, in loving his neighbor as himself, and not in suffering the penalties of a violated law. Obedience implies a law whose precepts are kept in their integrity, and not a law whose penalties are endured.

If you tell me that your child is loving and obedient, and I understand you to mean that your child is actually suffering punishment for disobedience, I certainly put upon your words an unauthorized meaning, and do both you and your child injustice; but a greater injustice is done when Christ's obedience unto death is understood and asserted to mean penal suffering.

SECTION IV.—*How is Christ's obedience made available for others?*

1. But you ask, how comes this loving obedience unto death to be an all-sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the whole brotherhood of humanity?

I answer, not because it was the act of a mere man, offering his blood or life in behalf of others; nor because it was the act of a divinely appointed priest, commissioned by God as was Aaron, but because it was the act of the God-Man, or God in man, and the grand High-Priest—a priest consecrated forever because a priest in his own right, offering his own blood or human life as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, that is to say, the divine in

Christ offering the human, or human life in Christ as a sacrifice for the sins of humanity. As God or divine he was holy, and the union or contact of the human with the divine sanctified, made holy the human, and rendered it acceptable to the divine, just as the sanctified altar, which sanctifies every thing that touches it, renders acceptable the sacrifices placed upon it (1 Cor. vii. 14).

2. Now, this sanctified human nature is offered as a sacrifice for all unsanctified humanity, and because an accepted sacrifice sanctifies that for which it is offered (Heb. ix. 13; Rom. xii. 1); all humanity is sanctified, or consecrated to God, in such a sense as to render their approach to God possible.

This is the new and living way which Christ has consecrated for us through his flesh (Heb. x. 19, 20). This opening up of the new and living way of access to God is the propitiatory work of Christ, or rather the means by which Christ becomes the propitiation for the sins of the world.

For the sake of greater distinctness, I recapitulate as follows:

1. Christ as divine is truly holy, not by divine appointment, as was Moses, nor by formal consecration, as was Aaron, the altar, etc., but because he is God, who is holy of himself.

2. Christ is as truly human as he is divine, and his humanity is sanctified by its contact or union with the divine; and precisely in this way we have the divine holiness transmitted from God to Christ's human nature, and, hence, into the sphere of humanity.

3. As a priest in his own right, he is adequate to consecrate by sacrificial offerings in a higher sense than Aaron or any other mere human priest. Aaron, by sacrifice, could impart to altars, men, etc., only a ritual and symbolical holiness or sanctification. But Christ, because he was a priest in his own right, could, by sacrifice of his humanity, impart a real holiness and his own spiritual life to those whom he sanctifies. (Heb. xii. 10; 2 Peter i. 4.)

4. Whatever is offered in sacrifice by priestly authority sanctifies that for which it is offered, so as to render it acceptable to God in either a ritual or real sense. (Hebrews ix. 13; xiii. 12; John xvii. 19.)

5. Therefore, when the great High-Priest made his soul a sacrifice for sin, he sanctified all humanity in such a sense that God can be just in justifying them that believe in Jesus. God is just in justifying such, simply because they by faith are made partakers of Christ's holiness, or nature, or spiritual life, just as the ingrafted scion partakes of the life of the stock into which it is inserted. Because of this ethical and spiritual union with him, he is the Lord, their righteousness. This is salvation by grace, and not by deeds of the law.

6. But you wish to know the authority for the assertion that Christ by his sacrificial death did sanctify, set apart, or appropriate, humanity to God in such a sense that each individual can come to God by faith in Christ and be accepted and saved through him. This authority is clear and explicit.

"Wherefore Jesus, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate." (Heb. xiii. 12.) (The expression, "own blood" is here used antithetically to the blood of sacrificial victims used in the Aaronic atonements.)

7. That this sanctification is not the personal, saving sanctification of believers is proven by the facts that it was accomplished at the time of his death, that it was irrespective of faith, and that the people—all nations indiscriminately—are the objects of it.

It was the grand antitype of the atonement made on the great day of the atonement, when the high-priest went into the holy of holies and sprinkled the blood of sacrifice upon the altar and mercy-seat to make atonement *for all the people; by virtue of which, and only by which, the individual could* daily, or as often as he pleased, during the succeeding year, bring his individual sacrifice before the altar for himself and his family as he might desire. Be it remembered that the priest could offer sacrifices for the individual only through this general atonement made in the interest of all alike, or for one person no more than another.

In like manner, as this sacrifice made on the great day of atonement sanctified all the Jewish nation, and secured to them the privilege of bringing their individual sacrifices before the altar, so this sacrifice made by Christ without the gate sanctifies all humanity, or makes propitiation for them so that every man may offer himself and his gifts to God in his own person through Christ. This, I re-

peat, is the new and living way of access to God, consecrated for sinful humanity.

SECTION V.—But this new and living way, what is it? It is not an entity or a power of itself. It has no existence apart from the living Christ himself, for he himself is the propitiation, and the way, the truth, and the life, the resurrection and the life. We do not come to God through atonement or any thing else apart from Christ, but we come to God through Christ He himself is the true and living way.

Two facts may be here noted in relation to these atonements.

First, the Aaronic sacrifices sanctified and atoned only in a ritualistic and typical sense; but the Messianic sacrifice sanctified really—it was the realization of the ideal.

Secondly, the Jew could offer his individual sacrifices only by virtue of the great atonement, as noticed above.

But the fact that this great atonement was made for the entire nation, did not compel any Jew to bring his individual offering before the altar. The great sacrificial offering was provided for him, whether he willed or not. But his individual offering was a matter of his own option. It was a duty which he could refuse—a privilege which he could decline.

So exactly is it of individuals in reference to the sacrifice made by Christ for humanity. Salvation is provided for us independently of our wishes, but whether we avail ourselves of it is not without re-

sponsibility to ourselves. It was the complaint of Christ himself to the prejudiced Jew, "Ye will not come *unto me* that ye might have life."

For further support of the foregoing view, of the sacrifice and obedience of Christ unto death, and objects of that death, see Heb. ix. 19–26; Ex. xxiv. 5–8; xix. 14.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION I.—*No penalty found in atonement, human or divine.*

1. As has been abundantly shown, there is no penalty in atonements among men. Our sins against each other are never atoned for by penalty; atonement and penalty seem quite exclusive one of the other. Penalty aggravates breaches, instead of healing them; makes men greater enemies, instead of reconciling them. Even where crimes are punished by law, the punishment reconciles nobody, changes no moral relations, repairs no damages, conciliates no bitter feeling.

2. The atonements made for the holy place, for the altar, etc., as we know, required no penal suffering on the part of the priests who made them or any one else. These atonements show beyond the possibility of doubt that penalty is not an essential factor in atonement, much less can it be the sum of an atonement as is assumed.

3. The poll-tax atonement, or the atonement made by the payment of a half shekel into the Lord's treasury, involved no penalty, because obedience to the law excludes all penalty. Atonement in this case *protects* from evil, instead of *delivering* from evil, just as obedience always excludes the penalties of disobedience.

4. *The irregular atonements made by Moses, Aaron, and Phineas*—all God's priests—all utterly exclude the idea of penalty. As far as I know, no penalist has ever attempted to prove penalty in these cases. Yet it is common to assert that punishment is the indispensable basis of atonement—no punishment no pardon is the fundamental dictum of substitutionists.

5. The Messianic atonement, it is maintained, consists partly of Christ's active, and partly of his passive obedience. But we are not informed as to what per cent. his active and passive obedience respectively contributed to it; nor why, if his active obedience contributed any part, it could not contribute all that was required.

Nor have the advocates of the theory ever thought it proper to explain how, if Christ—older than Adam—has obeyed the law preceptively for men, there could possibly be any penalty to endure. Obedience excludes penalty as inevitably as light excludes darkness. To say that a man can keep a law, and yet suffer the penalty of the law he keeps, is to confound obedience and penalty, than which no conceivable things are more different. This palpable absurdity of the theory I have seen no attempt to explain.

It seems too plain to require to be said, that if Christ as a substitute for men actively obeyed the law, then from sheer necessity there could be no penalty for him, or any one else, to endure. Hence, if Christ obeyed the law preceptively, there is no possibility of his obeying it passively or penally,

and, consequently, the atonement is in no sense penal.

This glaring absurdity, inherent in the theory itself, penalists can not avoid, except by denying either the active or passive obedience, so called.

But if they deny active obedience, then they do no more than get sinners out of gehenna; they can never get them into heaven—*a quasi limbo* is the best they can do. But if they deny passive obedience, or the endurance of penalty, they surrender the theory itself, and there is an end of the contention.

We have shown at sufficient length that a *passive obedience* is a contradiction—an impossible conceit, a pure scholastic fiction.

We have also seen that Christ's obedience unto death was in the highest sense active, or voluntary, and for this very reason not penal; for no voluntary act is penal, and to confound voluntariness and penalty is in this case literally to confound obedience with the consequences of disobedience.

Christ's death, it has been shown, was in the purest and in the highest sense an act of obedience to the divine law, supreme love to God, and love to humanity as to himself, and "love is the fulfilling of the law."

Thus far we have been able to find no penalty of any sort in any atonement relating to heaven or earth, to God or to man.

SECTION II.—*A few texts that disprove the penal theory briefly considered.*

1. If Christ's sufferings were penal—a real pun-

ishment for sin—then we are required to believe that God, who is love, delights in, takes pleasure in, inflicting penal woe upon the innocent and the good. For we are told (Eph. v. 2) that "Christ hath loved us and hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savor."

How is this? If Christ suffered the pangs of penal woe, if God poured his wrath upon him, and took pleasure in these sufferings, how can he be regarded as either just or benevolent? How can penal suffering be as a sweet-smelling odor to any being, less than satanic? Yet Christ's sacrifice to God for us was such. The sweet-smelling savor is a form of expression, manifestly suggested by the odor of burning *incense*. It was by the burning of incense that atonement was made at Bael-Poer, which turned away God's anger. This incense was prepared according to a divine recipe, was most holy, was sacred to priestly functions, and the punishment for using it otherwise was death (Ex. xxx. 22–38; xxxvii. 29).

The high-priest dare not, at the peril of his life, approach the mercy-seat, unless it was enveloped in a cloud of burning incense. Nothing in all the tabernacle service was deemed more sacred, and nothing so acceptable to God (Lev. xvi. 12). It was the divinely-appointed symbol of *prayer*, *intercession*, and *praise*, and seems to be associated with the prayers of the saints in heaven (Rev. viii. 3, 4).

As was the odor of the holy incense to God in

turning away his anger, so was the sacrifice of Christ a sweet-smelling savor unto God—was pleasing to God.

But Christ's sacrifice for us, we are told, was a penal sacrifice. Therefore, his penal sufferings were as the smell of holy incense—well pleasing to God. If penal agonies in the substitute are well pleasing to God, are they not equally so in the principal?

God himself protests against this pious blasphemy.

"As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." (Ezekiel xviii. 23; xxxiii. 11).

If God protests with an oath against having pleasure in the death of the wicked, what right have we to say that a penal sacrifice, so called, was to God a sweet-smelling savor?

God has no pleasure in the sufferings, even of the wicked. But Christ's sufferings were to him a sweet-smelling savor. Therefore, Christ's sufferings were not a substitute for those of the wicked.

The conception that God, whose nature is love, takes pleasure in the sufferings even of incorrigible sinners is repugnant to the instincts with which God has endowed us. But how much more abhorrent to our nature is the conception that God should take pleasure in pouring the wrath due to incorrigible sinners upon his obedient and sinless Son?

If, on the contrary, the sufferings of Christ were such, and only such, as come from love and fidelity

to God and to men—such as the good may experience for the unfortunate and the bad—then we can see some rational ground for the assertion that Christ's sufferings for humanity were to God as a sweet-smelling savor. This view of his sufferings does not shock nature, nor insult justice, nor contradict the facts of the Bible.

We know that the good often suffer in various ways on account of the unfortunate and the bad. Nor is it unreasonable that these sufferings should, under given conditions, be agreeable or well pleasing to the friends of those for whom they are endured.

Fathers and mothers often rejoice in the self-denying and heroic exertions (involving great suffering) of a son or daughter in the interests of the helpless, and even the undeserving, members of the family. It was very natural that Mordecai should rejoice on account of the self-denial and heroic conduct of Queen Esther, when she, at the peril of life, approached the Persian monarch in the interest of her people.

Such heroic suffering commends itself to all that is godlike in humanity—is well pleasing to all men who have the common instincts of humanity.

Knowing that such suffering does commend itself to all that is divine in men—that it is pleasing to men—we may very well believe it to be as a sweet-smelling savor to God. That it is so is demonstrated beyond all question by numerous Bible facts.

Moses' self-sacrificing spirit expressed in his brief,

pathetic prayer, "If thou wilt forgive; if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book," commends itself to men as well as to God. That it was well-pleasing to God—to him as a sweet-smelling savor—is proved by the fact that God for his sake spared the rebellious people. Moses made atonement by his fidelity to God and his people—not by enduring the penalty of the law, but by obeying the law, or because this obedience was well-pleasing to God.

All the atonements named in the Bible were made by obeying law—not by bearing its penalties. Obedience alone is pleasing to God, and it alone atones. Christ's self-sacrificing obedience to the law was acceptable to God—was pleasing to God. If punishment is pleasing to God—is a sweet-smelling savor to him—then we must believe that he is equally well pleased with the state of affairs in pandemonium and in paradise. From this conclusion, there is absolutely no escape, if the fundamental principles of the substitutionary scheme of atonement are true.

2. Every text in the Bible that represents Christ as a voluntary agent, acting in the interest of humanity, is a protest against this passive and penal obedience theory, for the sufficient reason that what is voluntary can not be either passive or penal. This has been previously seen and need be here only mentioned; for example: "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God." Christ is here represented as coming with the purpose *to do* God's will, not to suffer the penalty or consequences of not doing it. It is simply an unpardonable perversion of these

plain impressive words to make them mean that Christ did the will of God by dying as a penal substitute for mankind. But the penal theory requires us to force these words into harmony with this idea. The same absurdity is required in the explanation of all similar texts.

3. Every text in the Bible that specifies the object of Christ's mission is a protest against the penal scheme.

For example. "Jesus came into the world to save sinners." How save them? The penal theory answers, By bearing the punishment of their sins in their stead. The answer is unnatural, not to say impossible.

Christ "appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." Substitution requires this to mean that Christ came to suffer the punishment of sin as a penal sacrifice.

"For this purpose the Son of God was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil."

Substitution requires us to say that Christ destroys the works of the devil by enduring the punishment of all the sins Satan is able to instigate. This is like saying that physicians destroy disease by suffering the pains that it produces in their patients.

4. Every text that gives any insight into the character of Christ's feelings or sufferings is a protest against penality.

We know, if we know any thing of the laws of mind, that obedience and disobedience to law are productive of radically distinct states of feeling.



The obedient can not by possibility experience the feeling which is the necessary consequence of disobedience; nor can the disobedient experience the feeling which naturally comes from obedience.

We also know with equal certainty that the feeling which comes naturally from obedience is of the nature of reward, and that which comes from disobedience is of the nature of punishment.

The Bible, reason, and universal experience, all concurrently teach these facts, "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

Now, Judas and Christ both died of mental disturbance. Judas confessedly died of conscious guilt. "I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood" (Matt. xxvii. 4). Remorse is the swift avenger of his treachery. Now, was it possible for any innocent man to take Judas' place, and take either his criminality or his punishment? Was it possible for the sinless Christ, whom he had betrayed, to do this? If Christ's sufferings were penal, then they were identical in kind with those of the remorse-devoured Judas; for if they were not the same in kind, then they could not be those of a substitute, for every crime is necessarily determinative, both of the kind and degree of punishment consequent upon it.

To talk of the substitution of one kind of punishment for another in the sphere of divine law is simply to prate nonsense. Just as well sow barley and expect to reap wheat, or to talk of gathering figs of thistles. If Christ died as a substitute for sinners at all, he, of necessity, endured the same

punishment in kind with those of Judas, and millions times greater in degree.

Another ugly feature in the case is this: Christ either died for Judas in the same sense in which he died for other men, or did not so die. To say that he did not would be to make him an actual transgressor himself in not loving his neighbor as he loved himself and others, his mission being to redeem all under the law. This hypothesis makes the sinless Christ not sinless, and must, therefore, be discarded. Hence, it follows that he died for Judas in the same sense in which he died for others. But if he as a substitute suffered the punishment due to those for whom he died, then he and Judas both suffered the same penalty; the penalty was twice inflicted—once upon Christ and once upon Judas.

Now, I feel quite authorized to say that there is not a text in the Bible that identifies Christ's feelings as to kind with those of Judas, or any other criminal. Yet, if he was a substitute for men, and every sin determines its own kind and degree of punishment, then he, of course, endured all the different kinds of punishment possible to men, and also an amount equal to all that would be possible to men. But the Bible authorizes no such impossible conceits, in regard to the nature or degree of Christ's sufferings.

On the contrary, it authorizes us to say that Christ's sufferings were radically different from those of the criminal in every sense; as different in kind as those of Judas and the first martyr, the

heroic Stephen. "I have betrayed *the* innocent blood," is the bitter self-reproach of one. "Lord, lay not this sin (murder) to their charge," expresses the forgiving and self-complacent feelings of the other. Note a few texts in point:

Heb. v. 7–10: "Who in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear, though he was a son, yet learned obedience by the things which he suffered; and having been made perfect, he became unto all them that obey him the author of eternal salvation; named of God a high-priest, after the order of Melchizedek."

(1) The time here referred to when prayers, etc., were offered up was doubtless the agony and prayer in the garden.

(2) The prayer was by the humanity to God.

(3) The object for which the humanity prayed was not the prevention of natural death, but deliverance from the dominion of death, or for the resurrection of the body. (This is not in conflict with Matt. xxvi. 39, the prayer there referring to the sufferings adventitiously imposed upon him by human hands.)

(4) This prayer was answered for his godly fear or loyalty to God and fidelity to duty.

(5) Though he was a son, yet this fact did not supersede the necessity of his learning obedience or submission by actual experience in a conflict with sin.

(6) By this obedience, or conflict with sin, and

his triumph over it, he was perfected or completed as the author of salvation to them that trust in him.

(7) Because of this fitness to be the author of salvation acquired by the obedience which he learned by the things which he suffered, he is named of God a high-priest after the order of Melchizedek.

The whole passage teaches that Christ, by the obedience which he learned through what he suffered, became our great high-priest, and consequently the author of eternal salvation to them that obey him. But it is pertinent to inquire, is penal suffering—penal fire—a prerequisite to the priesthood? If it *is*, then, of course, Christ suffered it. If it is not, then Christ did not suffer it. The bare conception that Christ was named of God a priest after the order of Melchizedek, because he endured penal wrath, shocks all reason. Why might not devils become priests according to this theology.

(8) If the penalist should attempt escape from this monstrous consequence of his doctrine by saying that Christ both obeyed the law preceptively and at the same time bore its penalty; and that he by his preceptive obedience becomes our great high-priest, it is a sufficient reply to say that this is impossible; for it is simply a contradiction to say that any personality can by the same act both obey the law preceptively, and suffer the consequences of not obeying it, or endure its penalty.

Besides, this method of escape assumes that the sufferings of Christ were duplex in kind—first, such

as the innocent may experience through love or commiseration for the guilty; and, secondly, such as the guilty themselves actually experience. Or it assumes that Christ actually experienced a double death—one as a preceptive, and the other as a penal, substitute.

The theory, it seems to me, is hopelessly crushed by its own inherent contradictions.

CHAPTER VIII.

SECTION I.—*Christ's sufferings like those of Moses.*

You will not fail to observe that Christ became the author of eternal salvation by a process strictly analogous, as to mental states, to that by which Moses became the author of the temporal salvation of his people at Sinai, and on other occasions, namely: not by suffering as their substitute, but by priestly power, through prayers, supplications, and self-sacrificing love to God and men.

Before leaving this text it seems proper to say that it teaches in the most explicit manner that Christ is "the author of eternal salvation to *all them that obey him.*"

This conditions salvation upon obedience; or teaches that men are saved not by the death of Christ, which was for all, but Christ himself saves those that obey him.

But substitution exactly reverses this order, and teaches that only those obey to whom Christ is the author of eternal salvation. This conditions obedience on salvation; or teaches that men obey because they are saved or redeemed.

The Bible plan requires as its psychological complement the doctrine of moral freedom. Substitution requires the doctrine of moral necessity.

The character of Christ's suffering is unmistakably indicated by these words (Heb. xii. 2): "Who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame, and hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God."

It is here taught that Christ voluntarily and joyfully encountered death, even the ignominious death of the cross. No man ever voluntarily, much less joyfully, encountered penalty. Penalty is necessarily involuntary, for any suffering voluntarily endured in the interest of another is not penalty, but benefaction.

No joy is set before the criminal, either for himself or for others. Or, if good comes to any one through penalty endured by a substitute, of course a similar good must come from it when endured by the principal. Can Satan or any other lost soul endure spiritual death for the joy set before them?

What joy is set before Satan or other lost spirits to enable them exultingly to endure death and despise the shame of that condition?

Substitutionary suffering is in no way less cheerless, or hopeless, as we have repeatedly seen.

SECTION II.—*Infinite personality.*

We know that penalists tell us that Christ as an infinite personality could suffer an infinite penalty in finite time; that he could, therefore, endure the cross, joyfully anticipating the results of that suffering in the salvation of those for whom he endured it.

But we also know that in avoiding the rock they plunge into the whirlpool; for they make God suf-

fer the penalty of his own law; also separate effects from their causes, punish crimes before they exist, and involve themselves in other rugged inconsistencies.

The text in hand can never be fairly harmonized with the doctrine of substitution.

On the contrary, if we allow that Christ suffered in the interests of men, and not in the place of men, or as a benefactor, not as a substitute, the text is in itself sufficiently intelligible and highly significant and in exact harmony with facts of daily human experience.

Fathers, mothers, friends daily endure suffering and make sacrifices in the interest of others. This they do for the joy that is set before them—the joy that comes from benefaction—from loving others as they love themselves.

SECTION III.—*Christ's last prayer on the cross.*

Luke xxiii. 34: "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do," is irreconcilable with the assumption that he suffered penally.

If substitution is true, Christ by enduring the penalty in the place of sinners did by that act really expiate, pardon, take away the *reatus poenæ* of those for whom he suffered, and did by that expiation or pardon bring God under obligations to regenerate and save them.

Now if this is true, why this prayer? Why pray for the doing of a thing that is already done? Why ask a creditor to forgive a debt that is already paid, and which of course does not exist? The theory takes all significance and pertinence out of this

prayer which when rightly interpreted is a peerless exhibition of moral sublimity and a model for the world.

The prayer itself teaches by necessary implication that Christ's sufferings did not expiate sin in any sense and that pardon is a matter of grace and not of debt.

The theory, as you will necessarily perceive, renders all prayer a useless appendage to the plan of salvation; for if Christ's death expiates the guilt of mankind, so that justice requires God to save them, then we may rest assured that all will be saved, for the "Judge of all the earth will do right."

To say that he conditions the salvation of those for whom Christ died, upon prayer or any thing else, is to say that he makes unjust demands.

All prayer, according to the penal scheme, is simply asking God to do what justice requires him to do, and what no power less than omnipotent can prevent him from doing.

Christ's utterances after his resurrection clearly evince that his sufferings were those of a benefactor, not of a substitute.

To the two bewildered disciples he said (Luke xxiv. 26): "Behooved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory?"

His entrance into his glory was the result of his suffering what it behooved him to suffer, or what the law of fraternal love required him to suffer. Glory is the infallible consequence of duty faithfully done.

But there is absolutely no honor, no glory in

bearing penalty. Penalty endured by the principal of a crime is purely infamous, nor could it be less so in the substitute, if penal substitution was possible.

Duty done is glory won, but penalty endured is infamy itself.

Penalists can reconcile this text with their theory only by confounding substitution with benefaction, which, as has been shown, is an unpardonable abuse of terms.

Christ also says (Luke xxiv. 46, 47; see Acts xvii. 3):

"Thus it is written, that Christ should suffer and rise again from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name, beginning at Jerusalem."

This teaches that Christ's resurrection as well as his death was necessary that repentance and remission of sins might be preached in his name.

No resurrection, no repentance, no remission, no salvation. If Christ is not risen, then he is in no sense the Savior of the world. (1 Cor. xv.)

But this fact is in bold conflict with the fundamental principles of substitutionists. For it is not claimed by any that Christ's resurrection constituted any part of the substitutionary penalty which he is alleged to have suffered.

On the contrary, it is alleged that his death expiated the guilt, the *reatus poenæ*, of those for whom he suffered, and that this death, because it is a full satisfaction to justice, brings God under obligation to save them from their moral pollution, or *reatus culpæ*.

Hence, according to the theory, the salvation of those for whom Christ died is infallibly insured by the death of Christ, and quite independently of the resurrection of Christ. Or, the resurrection of Christ has only an adventitious, and not a vital connection with the plan of salvation. His death secures every thing according to the theory, and his resurrection and intercession nothing not actually secured by his death. Hence, a dead, unrisen Christ would have been just as truly a Savior as is the risen, living, interceding Christ. I repeat with emphasis that the substitutionary theory requires *no risen or living interceding Christ.* It is not the living Christ that saves, but Christ's death that insures salvation.

If sin is a debt, and Christ has paid the debt, then the payment of itself saves the debtor from his indebtedness, whether Christ is risen or not.

If sin is a crime, and Christ has expiated it by his death, then the act of expiation saves the criminal, whether Christ is risen or not risen.

If I owe a debt in bank, and my friend pays the debt, that act of itself saves me from all liabilities to the bank, though that friend may die instantly. His survival of the act of payment is not necessary to my release from obligation to the creditor. I am equally exempt, whether he survives or not.

So it would be if a friend could suffer a penalty in my place. My discharge is in no sense conditioned upon his survival of the act, but exclusively upon his enduring the penalty.

These plain facts show that substitution when

held firmly to its fundamental postulates requires no risen Christ, for Christ would be as truly a Savior if dead and unrisen as he is now in his risen and living state.

Of course substitutionists do not formally deny the necessity of Christ's resurrection; but the charge against them is that they allege principles which make his resurrection an unnecessary factor in the plan of salvation.

The Bible, on the contrary, conditions the whole scheme of salvation on his resurrection. Christ himself makes it the condition precedent to repentance and remission of sins. Paul asserts (Acts xvii. 3) the necessity of his resurrection, and tells us (1 Cor. xv. 17) that "if Christ hath not been raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins."

According to substitutionists, Christ's death satisfied justice, expiated human guilt, and infallibly insured the salvation of all for whom he died.

According to the Bible, Christ, by the sacrifice of himself in loving obedience to the law of filial love, and by his resurrection, become the propitiation for the sins of humanity, and the actual Savior of all that believe in him.

CHAPTER IX.

THE TABERNACLE ATONEMENTS—PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS.

1. I have now examined, with some care, and at considerable length, various irregular atonements mentioned in the Bible, merely alluding to the tabernacle atonements; also considered what is commonly, but somewhat loosely, called the atoning work of Christ; particularly the facts relating to the nature, or character of his sufferings, or death; also indicated some objections to the penal theory.

All this I have done for the purpose of enabling us to ascertain, as nearly as possible, just what it is that constitutes the great atonement; or, rather, how Christ himself becomes the propitiation for the sins of the world.

2. We thus far have no instance in which atonement was made by bearing the penalty, either by the principal offender, or by a substitute. We have found no case of substitution with its double imputation—no change of places between the innocent and the guilty.

3. On the contrary, in every instance in which atonement is said to be made in the interest of sinful men, the atoner acted the part of a benefactor, not of a substitute.

The atoner in no case suffered the penalty of a

broken law, but suffered as the good can and do suffer for the bad, the just for the unjust, in obedience to the preceptive side of the law, which requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves.

4. In no case did atonement affect, or in any way change, the legal or moral state of those for whom it was made.

SECTION I.—*No penalty in tabernacle atonements.*

But penalists claim that the regular atonements of the tabernacle service both illustrate and prove that all atonement rests on penalty, or that there is no pardon without punishment.

But, if I have not greatly deceived myself, the facts connected with these tabernacle atonements are strongly adverse to the notion of penality. They may be enumerated as follows:

1. The sacrificial victim must be perfect of its kind—without fault or blemish.

2. In sacrifices for individuals, the worshiper must bring the victim to the altar.

3. The hands of the worshiper must be laid upon the head of this victim.

4. The victim must be killed by the officiating priest.

5. Its blood must be sprinkled upon the altar, which sanctified it and made it acceptable to God, or propitiatory in the interest of the worshiper. On the great day of atonement, when the sacrifice was made for all the people indiscriminately, the blood must be sprinkled by the high-priest upon

the ark of the covenant, or mercy-seat in the holy of holies (see Lev. xvi.).

These are the facts. How are they to be explained?

In this manner, according to the penal theory:

1. The faultless victim is a type of Christ, and is also the ideal substitute for the sinful worshiper who brings it to the altar.

2. The sinner, in laying his hands upon its head, has his sins and guilt transferred to the victim, which thereby becomes putatively guilty, and a fit subject for a penal death, or for gehenna.

3. The victim, thus substitutionally guilty, is now delivered to the officiating priest, who kills it. In its *death agonies*, it is in gehenna, or is suffering the punishment due to the sins of the offerer.

4. The priest sprinkles its blood upon the altar, which sanctifies whatever touches it.

5. Justice having received plenary satisfaction by this penal death, God is propitiated—atonement is made, and the worshiper's sins are expiated, or pardoned—pardoned, because first punished substitutionally in the victim.

I think no penalist can object to this analytical statement of his theory. If we content ourselves with *reading* it without *thinking*, we may be satisfied with it and blindly accept it as true. But if we dare to think, its absurdities soon unsettle our confidence in it. A rational faith requires something more reliable as its foundation than mere dogmatic assertion.

SECTION II.—*Objections to the penal explanation.*

I reject this explanation of the tabernacle atonement for many reasons.

1. It makes the sacrificial kid represent two contradictory things at the same time, viz.: the holiness and innocence of Christ, and the unholiness and guilt of the sinful worshiper.

The victim is the type of the highest purity possible; and yet, marvelous to tell, it is a fit subject of penal wrath—made so by the magic power of substitution, or double imputation.

Of course this guilt and its punishment were real, and not merely ideal; that is, the innocent became actually guilty by the transfer to it of the sins of the worshiper; for its death, or punishment, was real, and of necessity its guilt, which was the cause of death, was real; or, real effects imply real causes. Or, if we say that the death, the punishment, was real, but the guilt was only ideal, then we have a real effect with only an ideal cause, or rather, a genuine effect without a cause.

Of course the penalist will not admit that the guilt of the kid was real—this would be too severe a shock to common sense; but let him explain, if he can, how there can be a real penal death without a crime to be punished.

But if substitution is competent to furnish real punishments without real sins to be punished, can it not furnish sins wholly exempt from punishment? If it can separate causes and effects, and make them independent of each other so as to give us real ef-

fects without causes, it certainly can give us causes without effects; and by this means banish all penal suffering from the moral world.

2. Though the sacrificial kid was a symbol of the sinless Christ, yet, if it "bore the sin of the offerer and died in his stead," as Dr. Hodge affirms (p. 506), then, of course, there is no causal connection between sin and punishment, and the doctrine of moral retribution admits of no rational or scientific statement or defense.

If the moral government is sufficiently pliable to allow a kid, incapable of guilt in any sense, to bear the sin of the offerer and to die in his stead, then we have a penal death without sin; and why might we not have sin without a penal death? The penalist, I think, can not answer.

Such are some of the logical consequences of making the death of the kid substitutionary, or penal.

(As a matter of fact, the momentary sufferings of the kid, so far from representing the penal anguish of lost souls, was of itself not of the slightest significance in the ritual service. Not the *suffering* of the kid, but its *blood—its life*—was what was required. If its blood—its life—could have been taken without any pain at all, it would have been just as effective as if it had endured a thousand-fold more suffering than it really did.)

3. The bare idea that the momentary sufferings of the slaughtered kid symbolizes eternal death would be scouted as ridiculous, if it had not been

made respectable by the patronage of illustrious names.

If we drop the type, and give attention to the antitype, we find it as hard to believe that Christ was a penal substitute for sinners as to believe that the sacrificial kid was such a substitute.

We can find no penality in the sacrificial victim, and if we find none in the type, we are not authorized to assume any in the antitype.

Moreover, the very thought of penal substitution is so repugnant to reason and to the noblest instincts of our nature that it is never admitted in human law.

Christ could not suffer the punishment due to sin and guilt unless he himself first became guilty. This is conceded by penalists themselves. God, they admit, could not punish the innocent, because it would be unjust. But he can impute guilt to the innocent, and then punish him for this fictitious imputed guilt. Christ thus, by this marvelous fiction, becomes guilty, and is justly punished for millions of sins that he never committed.

Dr. Hodge says (p. 504): "To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin." "He bore the guilt of our sins and endured the penalty in our stead."

Omnipotence himself could not inflict penal wrath upon him without first converting him into an actual rebel and filling his heart with hatred to God, or else by reversing the respective consequences of obedience and disobedience, which he himself has established. It is too obvious to need

elaboration, that it is simply impossible for the innocent, for any cause, or by any means, to take, or be made to take, the guilt and punishment of the disobedient, and the guilty to take the innocence and the felicity of the obedient.

If the theory of substitution, with its double imputation, is true, then there is no guaranty that heaven and hell will not change places without the knowledge or consent of either.

If true, there is properly *no plan* of salvation at all, but a capricious salvation without any plan outside of the secret purposes of the Creator; or, if there is a *revealed plan*, still it is obviously true that it is wholly irrespective of the laws of the human mind, having no pertinency or adaptation to man's nature as a free moral being, who has as little power over his own destiny as he had over his own creation. But this unrevealed purpose of God in regard to the individual, is no plan to him at all. All the individual can do is to act out the secret purpose of God, and bide his predetermined destiny. If Christ took his guilt and suffered its penalty, then he should esteem himself fortunate, not virtuous; but if Christ happens not to be his substitute, then he should consider himself unfortunate, not criminal; for necessity, which is an indispensable correlate of substitution, excludes the possibility, both of virtue and of vice.

Such are some of the consequences which come logically out of the assumption that the sufferings of the sacrificial kid symbolize the horrors of endless death

SECTION III.—*The priest becomes an executioner before he acts the part of Mediator.*

Another reason for rejecting the substitutionist's explanation of tabernacle atonement is that it makes the officiating priest an executioner, rather than a mediator.

(1) The priest, according to the theory, receives the victim, all covered with substitutionary guilt, at the hands of the offerer, and proceeds to kill it—that is, to inflict upon it the penalty due to the offerer. This act of the priest puts the victim symbolically into gehenna or into the same spiritual death due to the offerer.

Thus the priest, by inflicting the penalty, satisfies justice, to satisfy which, we are told, is to satisfy God.

To do this is certainly all that can be reasonably required in order to salvation—angels, I suppose, can do no more than satisfy justice and God.

It is thus as clear as noonday, that if substitution is true, no priestly functions are required; they are, in fact, quite supererogatory; there is no place for them; an executioner is all—absolutely all—the theory requires.

I persistently urge this fact, if substitution is true, then all priestly or mediatorial offices are a useless appendage to the plan of salvation.

If a debt is fully paid, that fact of itself releases the debtor. No mediator or intervener is neccessary to complete the release; for there is really no obligation from which to be released.

Or, if an executioner has inflicted upon a crim-

inal the full penalty authorized by law, that fact releases the criminal from all further liability for the offense. To condition his release upon other offices than those of the executioner by whom the penalty has been inflicted would be a crime against the criminal himself.

I repeat, the theory requires no priest. An executioner is the only functionary it requires. This is logically avowed in its fundamental postulate: *No punishment, no pardon.*

But penalists know full well that Christ is declared to be a priest forever, and that salvation is ascribed to him because of his priestly power. It therefore becomes necessary in order to avoid a palpable incongruity between the doctrine of substitution and the priestly offices of Christ, to call his sacrifice of himself for the sins of the world a "penal sacrifice." *A penal sacrifice?* A monstrosity I venture to say the world never saw, and never will; because it is a contradiction in the adjective, and a thing in itself impossible.

All sacrifices are acts of religious worship. No acts of religious worship are or can be penal. No penalties are or can be acts of religious worship. All acts of worship are voluntary. No penalties are or can be voluntary, as has been shown. Sacrifice is an act expressive of obedience, reverence, love to God. Penalty is an expression of God's displeasure against the disobedient. *A penal sacrifice!!* Think of it, and explain it, if you can. Shall we say it is an act of religious worship, which has the effect of a penalty? Then, the less wor-

ship, the less penalty. Or, shall we say it is a penalty which has the effect of religious worship? Then Satan and his hosts fare about as well as the worshiping angels.

If penalists can bridge the chasm between their theory and the priestly offices of Christ only by alleging the doctrine of penal sacrifices, it seems to me better not to attempt to bridge the chasm at all, for two errors are more difficult of plausible defense than one. Nor does it seem to me possible for human ingenuity to show that the penal theory requires or admits any other functionary than an executioner. Nor does the character of the executioner seem to be a vital factor in the transaction. Punishment is what is imperatively required. It does not matter upon whom it falls, whether upon principal or substitute, and we hence infer that it could not matter by whom it is inflicted.

(2) The priest having discharged the duties of an executioner, and put the victim into torment, then sprinkles its blood upon the altar, which sanctifies whatever touches it, and renders it acceptable to God, and the offender whose sins have been punished in the sufferings of the substitute is pardoned and saved. But why this sprinkling of the blood upon the altar? Of what advantage can it or any other priestly performance be to God, or justice, or the worshiper, or his substitute? Justice has received all it claims, and is satisfied with the sufferings inflicted upon the substitute. God is satisfied because justice is satisfied, and is, of course, propitiated; the worshiper having transferred his

guilt to his substitute is pardoned and saved; and the poor substitute is hopelessly lost, unless a substitute is provided that can relieve it of its imputed guilt and its punishment.

All the parties, except the substitute, are put into this satisfactory condition by the penal sufferings of the substitute, and prior to the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar. It is sun clear that the sprinkling of the blood of the substitute can contribute nothing to justice, which, according to the theory, has received all its demands; nor to God, who is already propitiated, and who can not be more than propitiated; nor to the worshiper, who is already pardoned and saved, and who can not be more than saved.

Just at this point, substitutionists are hopelessly confused. They can never give any satisfactory account of this sprinkling of the blood upon the altar; or any account at all that is in harmony with their fundamental postulate, no pardon without prior punishment.

Perhaps the shrewdest thing they can do is to say something about "penal sacrifices."

But even if such nondescript things were possible (and we know they are not) they bring no relief; for the atoning, or saving power, according to the theory, is exclusively in the suffering of the substitute, and not in the blood at all.

We have seen that substitution is a very agreeable thing to all concerned, except the substituted victim. This it puts symbolically into eternal spiritual death, with no provision for its release.

(3) Now drop the type, and turn your attention for a moment to the antitype.

The theory imputes to the sinless Christ the guilt of all for whom he died, and requires him to endure all the punishment due to this measureless guilt, but provides no rational method of escape from that state of guilt and spiritual death.

I say no rational mode of escape. It is true the theory assumes that he freed himself from this terrible state by penal suffering, just as a criminal sent up for ten years frees himself from punishment by remaining within prison walls till the time expires.

In this, however, substitutionists deceive themselves by assuming an analogy between human and divine law, which does not exist.

The penalties of human law may be limited by time, but the penalties of divine law are never thus limited. Their duration is always determined by the duration of the rebellious state. To disobey is to be put under penalty, or to be deprived of the good that comes from obedience. To return to obedience is to be freed from the penalty that comes from disobedience.

But let me emphasize this immutable truth:

The penalty can never remove the disobedience or guilt of which it is the consequence.

It has absolutely no power over its source. The effect can not remove, or in any way modify, its cause. Christ's imputed guilt (which, as we have seen, is according to the theory, not ideal, but real) and his sufferings were related as cause and effect.

How, then, was it possible for his penal suffering to remove his guilt and release him from the pangs of spiritual death?

Note.—If penal sufferings can offset guilt and restore the criminal to favor, then of necessity the penal sufferings of Satan and all other lost spirits must offset their guilt and restore them to favor.

They fully pay as they go—always sinning, but always cancelling their guilt by their penal and expiatory sufferings. Their debts and credits always form an exact equation; otherwise, justice would be hopelessly defrauded of its dues. For the sinner's capacity to suffer never exceeds the measure of his obligation to obedience, in default of which he suffers. Supererogatory obedience and supererogatory suffering are equally impossible. Hence, if the sinner's suffering to-day falls short of satisfying justice, he can never make up the deficit. The conclusion seems fair that if Satan's penal sufferings can not free him from guilt, so as to bring him out of condemnation, neither can Christ's penal substitutionary sufferings release him from substitutionary condemnation. There is, I think, no escape from this conclusion. Hence, it follows that if Christ was put into a state of guilt and penal suffering by becoming a substitute for sinful men, then he is either there yet, or Satan and all other sinners, for whom Christ is not a substitute, have their guilt removed by their individual sufferings.

SECTION IV.—*Penal righteousness.*

Another offensive feature of this method of removing guilt is that it requires us to believe that

men are saved by a *penal righteousness*, if we can conceive of such a monstrosity.

If Christ satisfies justice or law by enduring the penalty of law, then, of course, the righteousness of this act is nothing more than a *penal* righteousness.

Note.—Such righteousness has the criminal, who has served his term of punishment in the State prison; or, such righteousness has Satan, and all other sinners, who suffer the penalty of the law on their own account.

Of course, if Christ satisfied the law by enduring its penalty, this act secures to him only penal righteousness. Now, if this penal righteousnesss is imputed or imparted to us, and we are saved by it, then we are saved by penal righteousness.

(But if penal righteousness can save, when the penalty is endured by a substitute, of course it must save when the penalty is endured by the principal, as Satan and all others whose penalties have not been endured by a substitute.)

According to the theory justice must have its demands, but seems to be as fully satisfied with penal as it is with preceptive righteousness and by its consequences blots out the distinction between the righteousness of the redeemed and that of the unredeemed.

Of course even the most rigid penalists do not admit these gross absurdities; nor do I charge them with believing them. But the question is, Do they not inhere in their doctrine of substitution? If they do not, then all reasoning, it seems to me, is

an illusion, and theories should not be made answerable for their consequences.

SECTION V.—*Manual imposition.*

The imposition of hands is, I think, egregiously misinterpreted in the penalist's account of these tabernacle atonements.

The theory, in the hands of one of its most astute and zealous defenders, says (Hodge, Vol. II., p. 503):

"The hands of the offender were to be laid on the head of the victim to express the ideas of substitution, and of the transfer of guilt. The sin of the offerer was laid upon the head of the victim."

The penal theory imperatively requires this or an equivalent explanation of the imposition of hands in relation to these tabernacle atonements. It harmonizes admirably with the explanations given of other parts of these tabernacle services. But the calamity is these explanations, as we have just seen, involve consequences too extravagant to be true. This fact throws grave suspicion upon this explanation of manual imposition in these atonements.

The theory assumes that the moral qualities of individuals may be interchanged, and asserts that the imposition of hands expresses the transfer of guilt from one party to the other. No proof is attempted. The fact that the explanation harmonizes with the scheme of substitution is deemed proof sufficient—that is, one assumption is harmonized with another. That the explanation is

not true will sufficiently appear from the following facts.

1. I have previously shown that a transfer of guilt from one party to another by substitution is a psychological impossibility. Whatever else another may do for me, he can never take my conscience or mental states and make them his own and give me his conscience and mental states in return. As easily could he impart to me his own personality and take mine. "The soul that sinneth it shall die." "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

2. If manual imposition in this case expresses "the ideas of substitution and of transfer of guilt," then the same rite is used to express two irreconcilable things, which is simply incredible.

The same word may be taken in different senses, but that the same religious rite should be used in the Bible to express two incompatible things would make the Bible a riddle rather than a revelation. What other religious rite sanctioned by Bible usage can be taken to express contradictory things?

The generic import of the rite as used in the Old and in the New Testament is *benediction*. Jacob long before the tabernacle ritual existed used it for this purpose, and I hesitate not to say that there is not the slightest evidence that it was ever used for any other and contrary purpose.

The imposition of hands is a prayer in gesture, or the accompaniment of prayer for a blessing, and is in fact generally attended with audible prayer or benediction.

Imposition of hands and lifting up of hands in prayer seem to be substantially the same thing, or are expressive of the same mental states. The difference is formal rather than real. When the worshiper prays with uplifted hands, his hands are ideally imposed upon the object for which he prays. When hands are literally imposed, heart and hands have the same object, whether words are uttered or not.

Mere digital contact, unaccompanied with prayer in word or thought receives nothing, imparts nothing, does nothing. If a shock divine is given or received, it comes through the prayer, and not through manipulation. Never is it used for purposes of imprecation, or the transfer of evil from the bad to the good, but always for purposes of good to somebody.

Look into your Bibles and you will readily see that in every instance of its use benediction is its object.

In view of these facts, what authority have we from the Bible to believe that the Jew when he brought his kid before the altar, and piously put his hands upon its innocent head did, by that act, imprecate the wrath of God upon it, transferring to it in thought or intention, as his substitute, his guilt? I answer, none whatever.

The fact that this sacrificial victim was required to be perfect, without any manner of defect, protests against the idea that it must become the object of penal wrath.

Again, the penal explanation of this sacrificial

rite implies malevolence in God as his motive for punishment. We are told (see Num. xv.) that these sacrifices were "a sweet savor unto the Lord."

If the suffering of the innocent victim represented the suffering of lost souls, how could they be "a sweet savor unto the Lord," who "doth not afflict willingly," and who hath "no pleasure in the death of the wicked."

I do not know that Satan rejoices in the sufferings of his victims. The wolf is selfish rather than malicious. So the seducer. The pleasure does not come from the infliction of pain upon others, but from the gratification of selfish desires.

The bare suggestion that penal suffering is as "a sweet savor unto the Lord," is repugnant alike to the teachings of the Bible and to the instincts of humanity. It seems to me nothing less than an impeachment of the divine goodness.

On the contrary, it is in perfect harmony with the divine goodness to suppose these sacrifices to be a sweet savor to the Lord, not because they involved suffering, but because they were the appointed expressions of the spirit of loving obedience to God, just as any other act of religious worship put forth according to divine command. It is the obedience, and not the penal suffering consequent upon the disobedience, that is "a sweet savor unto the Lord."

This view enables us to see why the sacrificial kid should be faultless, without spot or blemish, as all acts of worship should be pure in intention, and well pleasing to God as such.

Remember, too, that these faultless victims were the divinely-appointed types of the sinless Christ, "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world."

No Jew, I feel safe in saying, when he brought his victim to the altar, and put his hands upon its head ever intended thereby "to express the ideas of substitution, and of transfer of guilt;" or that his sin was transferred to the victim to be punished "in his stead." He rather intended his surrender of the victim to the priest as an act of obedience—an act of religious worship—and the laying of his hands upon its head was a ritual prayer that the sacrifice might be acceptable and propitiatory. This will be subsequently more fully explained.

Note.—Dr. Hodge represents that the Jews held the penal theory of atonement. He says (Vol. II., p. 500):

"Outram quotes from Jewish authorities forms of confession connected with the imposition of hands on the victim. One is to the following effect: 'I beseech thee, O Lord, I have sinned, I have done perversely, I have rebelled, I have done (specifying the offense); but now I repent, let this victim be my expiation.' The design of the imposition of hands was to signify, say these authorities, the removal of sin from the offender to the animal."

Certainly the Jew did believe that his sacrifices did in some way expiate or atone for his sins. If he did not believe this, why should he offer them?

But to believe this was not necessarily to believe, that his guilt and punishment were literally transferred to the kid.

If he did not look beyond the type to the antitype, his common sense would not permit him to believe that the momentary sufferings of the dying kid were "an exact equivalent" of the endless suffering of the lost soul. His common sense, moreover, could not fail to teach him that there is no equivalency between mere animal suffering and spiritual suffering—between animal death and spiritual death.

The Jew could not believe that the kid atoned for his sins by suffering as his substitute the equivalent of an endless spiritual death. Such a belief is impossible to a sane mind. The Jew, therefore, expected his kid to remove his guilt in some other way than by "equivalent penalty."

But, if he looked beyond the type to the antitype, as his religion required him to do, then he could not believe that the kid typically atoned in one way, and that Christ really atoned in a radically different way; for this would destroy all typal relation, or make the type and antitype contradictory one of the other.

Further, the quotation from Outram furnishes not a particle of proof that the Jews believed the penal theory of atonement, but actually proves the contrary.

The only word in the quotation that can be made to favor the theory is the word *expiation*, and this can be done only by a perversion of the word from its etymological and original meaning.

No old Latin writer, I think, ever used the word *expiatio* to signify pardon by substitution, with

double imputation. (The word is elsewhere sufficiently noticed.)

As we have seen, the word expiation does not occur in King James' Bible at all. Nor is there in the Bible a solitary instance of atonement with double imputation. *Mark this fact.*

You will also observe that Outram does not say "let this victim be my" *substitute*, but my "expiation." The Jew by such a prayer evidently meant, let this be my propitiation. This puts the prayer in harmony with the Bible, which uses the word atonement, as we have seen, in the sense of propitiation.

I wish you now to note the fact that all the other significant words of this quotation by their general import exclude the idea of pardon by penalty. "I beseech . . . I have sinned . . . have done perversely . . . have rebelled. . . . Now I repent, . . . let this victim be my expiation"—*my atonement.*

The offering of the victim is accompanied with confession, prayer, repentance, and the Bible teaches us that these are the indispensable conditions of pardon. But confession, prayer, and repentance according to the penal theory are quite out of place and worthless. If pardon is conditioned upon punishment, then, as we have seen, confession, supplication, and repentance are useless appendages to the plan of salvation.

Pardon being the exact legal equivalent of punishment, of course justice can demand nothing more without becoming itself unjust. Such is the

theory. But the Jew, according to Outram, deemed confession, prayer, and repentance necessary to pardon. The Jew, therefore, was not a substitutionist, Dr. Hodge's allegation to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Dr. Hodge is not less distinguished for his polemic skill than for his learning. We have a right, therefore, to infer that this quotation is the strongest proof that he has been able to find in all Jewish literature in support of his position. This, as we have seen, is positively against the theory.

CHAPTER X.

SECTION I.—*The scape-goat considered.*

Lev. xvi. 21, 22 is often appealed to by penalists in proof of their explanation of manual imposition. This discussion would consequently be radically defective if I should give no attention to this text.

"Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness. And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities into a land not inhabited [separation] and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness." (Midbar, desert, pasture-land.)

Dr. Hodge, whose eagle eye seizes every thing that seems to favor his cause, claims this text as absolute confirmation of his theory of substitution, and of imposition of hands.

He says (Vol. II., p. 504):

"This renders it plain that the design of the imposition of hands was to signify the transfer of the guilt of the offender to the victim. . . . To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin."

All the commentaries consulted by me agree substantially with Dr. Hodge.

It may seem presumption or even madness in me

to set myself against such high authority. Be it so. But fidelity to my convictions of truth and duty compel me to dissent, and when I have given my reasons for this dissent, you must decide for yourselves. Note the following facts.

1. This ceremony was a part of the ritual service of the great day of atonement—the great annual atonement, when propitiation was made for the whole nation. The salient points only will be noticed.

(1) Two kids of the people were selected. They did not represent sacrificially one person more than another. (Partial atonement was born later.) Lots were cast to determine which should be the sacrificial and which the scape-goat (azazel).

The goat on which the lot fell for the Lord—that is, the sacrificial goat, was killed in due form and its blood sprinkled upon the mercy-seat in the holy of holies, which at the time must be filled with the odor of burning incense, which was the divinely-appointed symbol of prayer, without which the attempt to sprinkle the blood upon the mercy-seat would have cost the high-priest his life. Thus an atonement was made for all the people. According to the popular theory it was the *sufferings* of this sacrificial kid that made atonement for the whole nation—it was *punished* as their substitute and they were pardoned. The priestly functions, after the act of killing the goat, such as the sprinkling of its blood upon the mercy-seat, and the burning of incense in the most holy place, were mere unessential appendages; for, if the theory is true, the

atonement was completely made and the sins of the people fully expiated when the kid experienced its last death pang. You can not fail to see the discrepancy between the theory and the Bible account of the facts.

(2) The sacrificial kid having been thus disposed of, and propitiation made for the whole nation, Aaron then laid both his hands upon the head of the scape-goat which Dr. Hodge and others say "was to signify the transfer of the guilt of the offender to the victim."

Now, you will observe that the same sins are twice transferred from the people to the goats, first to the sacrificial goat, and then to the scape-goat, and each transaction is expressly called an atonement. But we are told there is no atonement, no pardon, without punishment. Hence, the same sins are twice punished. Justice has twice received plenary satisfaction for the same sins. Thus the penal explanation flatly contradicts itself. Or, to avoid this contradiction, will it be said that the punishment was divided between the goats? But how can you divide the guilt or the punishment, since we are expressly told that all the sins of the people shall be borne by azazel; and of course by the sacrificial goat also?

Dr. Hodge sees this difficulty, but as usual, with one bold dash of his facile pen, brushes it out of his way. He says (p. 504):

"The two (kids) constitututed one sacrifice, as it was impossible that one could signify all that was intended to be taught."

If the two kids constituted one sacrifice, why were the same sins transferred to both kids? or twice punished? But, as we shall see, there was in fact but one kid sacrificed.

Dr. Hodge, or rather the penal theory, utterly fails to give any intelligible and self-consistent account of this double sacrifice, as it is improperly considered.

2. Other inseparable difficulties inhere in this explanation.

(1) Imputed guilt and punishment, according to the doctrine, are inseparable, one always involving the other. But the scape-goat was not punished by death, or in any other manner. Therefore, the scape-goat was not in any sense guilty. But priestly hands were laid upon it. Therefore, manual imposition does not express the transfer of guilt from the worshiper to the victim.

There is, I think, no possible escape from this argument. As the point is a vital one, you will allow me to re-state it in a briefer form. Thus, all guilt involves punishment. The scape-goat was not punished. Therefore, it was not guilty in any sense. But priestly hands were imposed upon it. Therefore, imposition of hands does not express a transfer of guilt. Or, the simple fact that the scape-goat was not killed disproves the penal theory of manual imposition.

(2) The theory asserts that atonement always includes both propitiation and reconciliation. Hence, it can never give any intelligible account of these

two atonements, made one by the sacrificial and the other by the scape-goat.

(3) Nor can it ever reconcile the atonement made with the scape-goat, with the statement (Lev. xvii. 11; Heb. ix. 23) that the atonement is in the blood, and "that without the shedding of blood there can be no remission."

(4) The theory says, "To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin." But the scape-goat did bear all the sins of the Jewish nation. But it did not bear either the guilt or punishment of these sins. Therefore, to bear sins is not necessarily to bear the guilt and punishment of sin, as we shall more fully see. Here, again, the theory flatly contradicts the plainest Bible facts, which assures us that the scape-goat was not killed—was not punished—its blood was not shed, nor have we any authority for believing it was in any way injured or dishonored. Yet it did bear the sins of the whole nation.

It is, hence, as clear as language can put it, that the scape-goat did actually bear a nation's sins in some sense, and equally clear that it was not killed nor punished in any sense.

It is equally clear that the nation's sins were in some sense taken away or pardoned, and equally clear that they were not punished in any sense or any form.

These incontestable Bible facts disprove the fundamental dicta upon which the whole penal theory reposes—that is, they prove that sin may be pardoned, taken away, or destroyed without being

punished; also prove that a priest may bear sin without bearing its guilt or punishment.

These facts, so destructive to the substitutionary scheme, will be much strengthened and actually exemplified by additional facts in the course of the discussion.

SECTION II.—*An adverse view of the offices of the sacrificial and the scape-goat.*

The Bible clearly teaches, and it is generally admitted, that two things are indispensable to salvation, viz.: first, atonement in the sense of propitiation; and secondly, atonement in the sense of reconciliation. The first pertains exclusively to God; the second to men. God is never reconciled, but is propitiated. Men are never propitiated, but are reconciled. Such is the uniform usage of these terms in the New Testament.

(I have previously noted the confusion in which the penal theory is involved in the use of these terms, sometimes confounding them, and sometimes discriminating them.)

These atonements are intimately related, but not related as cause and effect, but as condition and event; or, reconciliation is conditioned upon propitiation. Hence, there may be propitiation without reconciliation, but no reconciliation without prior propitiation. Atonement by the scape-goat was conditioned upon atonement by the sacrificial goat. The latter propitiates; the former reconciles. In like manner, Christ, as a sacrificial offering, or by the shedding of his blood, or the surrender of

his life, was made a propitiation for the sins of the world (Rom. iii. 25; 1 John iv. 10).

Christ in the garden and on the cross is the atoner in the sense of propitiator as typified by the sacrificial goat, on the great day of atonement. But this propitiation of itself takes away no sin. The sacrificial goat did not bear or take away sin. Hence, no sin was imputed to it or put upon it by the imposition of hands. This is evident from the fact that all the sins of the nation were put upon the scape-goat, and by it borne, or carried away, and of course the same sins could not be twice taken away.

Mark this fact, that it was not the sacrificial goat, but the scape-goat that bore, or carried away sin. The sacrificial goat propitiates, and thereby renders reconciliation, or the taking away of sin possible, but of itself takes away no sin—has no effect upon the legal or moral states of the people.

In exact analogy with this Christ, by the sacrifice of himself, made propitiation for the sins of the world. But this sacrifice of itself takes away no sin—in no sense changes man's moral or legal condition. Man is as truly morally corrupt and legally condemned as he would be without this propitiatory sacrifice. What this sacrifice does for men is this: It renders their reconciliation—a change of their moral and legal states—*possible*, not *inevitable*, as substitutionists wrongfully assert. As it was not the *dead* but the *living* kid that bore, or took away the sins of the nation, so it is not the *dead* or *the unrisen* Christ that becomes the sin-

bearer, or sin-destroyer, but the resurrection, or *living* Christ that bears sin, takes away sin, destroys sin, blots out sin, etc.

This doctrine pervades the New Testament from beginning to end. It *is the living* Christ, not the dead, that *justifies*, that *saves*. Hundreds of texts might be cited proving this fact. It is sufficient to refer to the following: Rom. iii. 25; iv. 25; 2 Cor. v. 17,18; Isa. xliii. 25; Gal. vi. 14.

On the contrary, there are no texts that refer our salvation directly to what Christ, as a sacrifice for sin, did or suffered. What he did and suffered is referred to only as the essential conditions by which he became what he really is—a living, personal Savior, who justifies and saves by imparting his own nature to those *united* to him by faith.

Every reasonable view of the subject seems to require us to attribute salvation to the agency of a living, personal Christ, and not to something that he has done or suffered in the remote past.

If, when he offered himself as a sacrifice, he took away the sins of the world, then, of course, he does not *now* take away those sins. If he, as a present living agent *now* takes away my sins, then he did not in the remote past take away my sins. Substitution requires us to believe that he took away and expiated sin when he gave himself a sacrifice for sin. This, as we have seen, seems to supersede the necessity of his resurrection, and of any living personal Christ. It also requires us to believe the absurd proposition that he took away sins before they were committed, or even before those that

commit them had any existence. The utmost that he could do in this regard would be to take away, not non-existent sin, but the possibility of sin. But this, we know by painful experience, he did not do.

The facts force us to the conclusion, not that Christ actually put away sin, destroyed sin, blotted out sin, when he made himself a sacrifice for sin, but the object of his mission into the world was to put away, condemn sin, destroy sin, save from sin, and that for this mission, he was prepared by the sacrifice of himself (Heb. ix. 26).

He is the Lamb of God, not which *took*, or *hath taken* away the sin of the world eighteen centuries ago; or, from the foundation of the world, but which now beareth away or taketh away the sin of the world (John i. 29; Matt. viii. 17).

This distinction between the office of the sacrificial goat and that of the scape-goat—or between the office of Christ as propitiator and that of reconciler is clearly indicated by Paul (Rom. iv. 25) when he says Christ "was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification."

Christ, we are here taught, was delivered up to death on account of our offenses, but this offering up did not justify, or save us. Hence, to do this he must rise from the dead.

Now, mark the important fact that it was not his death, nor merely the act of rising from the dead that justifies or saves us; but the object of his resurrection in relation to men was to justify and save them from their sins, not *before*, but *after* they are committed, and when they are repented of.

If we were justified by the act of his resurrection, then we would be saved from actual sins before we have committed them, which is absurd.

I repeat, it was not the sacrificial, but the scape-goat that bore the sins of the people.

It was not the *dead* Christ that took away sins, but the resurrection, *living* Christ that bears them away into oblivion.

Both goats, it is conceded, typify Christ. But it is one of the fatal blunders of the penal theory that it makes both represent the same official relation, confounds propitiation and reconciliation, or makes them inseparable, and involves itself in inexplicable confusion, as we have seen.

In the light of these facts, we are able to see the relation between the atonement made with the sacrificial and that made with the scape-goat; just the relation between propitiation and reconciliation —the first the completed work of the self-sacrificing Christ, the second the uncompleted, but continuous work of the risen living Christ.

CHAPTER XI.

SECTION I.—*Bible terms and phrases which are assumed to teach the penality of Christ's death. The relation of Christ's suffering to his propitiation.*

The Bible sometimes refers Christ's propitiatory work to his sufferings, and sometimes to his death. When the word suffering is used, it should, I think, be always understood in a metonymical sense; or, as the cause put for the effect, and is equivalent to death, which is the natural effect of suffering. Human beings can bear only a limited amount of suffering, and when the maximum of this capacity is transcended, death is the natural result. When the Bible, therefore, speaks of the sufferings of Christ as the ground of his propitiation, his actual death is intended.

This fact, rightly apprehended, throws much light upon the much-mooted question as to the amount of suffering Christ actually endured for men.

What the great moral law, under which Christ was born, required him to do, was to give himself —his life—a sacrifice for the sins of the world; or, to be obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. This was the highest and most perfect obedience possible. Besides life, he had nothing to give.

Had his capacity for suffering been a thousand times greater than it actually was, the endurance of all this suffering, apart from his death, would have constituted no propitiation, because it would not have met the full requirements of the law—would not have been obedience unto death, or all that he could give.

On the contrary, any amount which was purely consequent upon obedience unto death, was sufficient, because it was all that was possible.

I will further say that had it been possible for Christ to experience a sacrificial death without suffering at all, either bodily or mentally, the propitiatory sacrifice would have been accepted, because it would have been obedience unto death.

This, however, was of course, impossible; and I make the statement only to emphasize the important fact that obedience—perfect obedience unto death—was what the law required, and not suffering or pain as such, and apart from the death to which it was accessory. The sacrifice and the consequent propitiation consisted in the obedience unto death, and not in the *amount* of suffering involved.

It was the death—the surrender of the victim's blood, or life—that the ritual required, and not any definite amount of pain as such. The obedience of Christ unto death was what the law of love required, and not any amount of suffering exactly equated to the sufferings involved in spiritual and eternal death.

If this view of the sufferings of Christ is even substantially true, then we can see that salvation is

truly by grace, and not by *penal fire*, or its equivalent as the penal theory requires us to believe.

We can also see how Christ could become a propitiation for the sins of the whole world without enduring suffering equal in degree, if not also in kind, to the endless death of all mankind.

It relieves us from the necessity of believing that the blessings that come from benefaction can never exceed the evils endured by the benefactor; or that good and evil, blessing and cursing, form an exact equation—no pardon without prior and equivalent punishment!

The above statements will enable us the more correctly to understand some forms of expressions used in reference to Christ's sacrifice of himself for the sins of humanity.

SECTION II.—*Bible texts examined.*

We have both in the Old and in the New Testament various forms of expression, which are assumed to prove that Christ actually bore the guilt and punishment due to the sins of those for whom he died.

1. From the Old Testament we have the following (Isa. liii.):

"He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows—was wounded for our transgressions—bruised for our iniquities—the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all—for the transgression of my people was he stricken. It pleased the Lord to bruise him—he hath put him to grief; when thou shalt make his soul an offering

for sin he shall see his seed—shall see the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied. By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities—he hath poured out his soul unto death—he was numbered with the transgressors and he bare the sin of many and made intercession for the transgressors."

2. The New Testament furnishes the following corresponding texts:

"Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." (1 Peter ii. 24.)

"Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." (Gal. iii. 13.)

These are the principal and the strongest texts relied upon to prove that "To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin."

Remarks.—However strong these citations from Isaiah liii. may appear, the entire contents of the chapter can never be harmonized with the penal theory. We consequently are under the necessity of making the prophet contradict either himself or the penal theory.

This might be shown from a comparison of many expressions in the chapter; but it is sufficient to direct attention to the following:

(1) "When thou shalt make his soul [life] an offering for sin." His death was sacrificial and therefore not penal, for, as we have seen, a penal sacrifice is a contradiction in the adjective.

(2) "He shall see his seed"—see those to whom

his own nature is imparted, or who are born of God. If he died a penal death, then he imparts penal righteousness to men, and saints and Satan are clothed in the same garments, as we have previously seen.

(3) "Shall see the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied." How can the fruits of penalty be a source of satisfaction to the penalty bearer? Penalty, as we have seen, can not satisfy God, for he is angry with the wicked (the only penalty bearers) every day; nor satisfy justice, which is defrauded by all penalty bearers of its claims to their loving obedience; least of all, how can penalty satisfy the penalty bearer, for, having no power to remove its cause, it is neither a satisfaction in itself nor the means of subsequent satisfaction.

On the contrary, if Christ's travail was such as comes from loving fidelity, then we can very readily see how he can be satisfied with the fruits of that travail. It is like the satisfaction that comes to the generous benefactor, or to the self-sacrificing mother, who contemplates with ineffable pleasure the restoration of a sick child which her travail of soul has instrumentally saved from death.

(4) "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many." If this text read: By his penal sufferings my unrighteous enemy shall justify many, then it would be in harmony with penal substitution. But reading as it does, all the exegetes and casuists in Christendom can not harmonize it with the penal scheme. This nothing but the most defiant dogmatism can do.

The terms *knowledge*, *righteous*, *servant*, and *justify*, each of itself excludes penality.

If Christ justifies men by substitutionary suffering, then he does not justify them by his knowledge. If he is a penal substitute for sinners, then he is confessedly guilty or unrighteous, and if he is guilty, then he is not a servant in the sense in which Christ is recognized as such; and if he is not preceptively righteous, then he can not be righteous or justify others, except with the penal righteousness, with which Satan himself is justified.

We may not know precisely how Christ by his knowledge justifies many, but we know the fact. We know the fact that the physician by his knowledge restores the patient; that the wise man may impart his wisdom to others without being able fully to comprehend the processes. So of Christ's knowledge in justifying many. We know that he "learned obedience by the things which he suffered, [thus] being made perfect he became the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him." (Heb. v. 8, 9.)

By the knowledge thus "learned" he is able to justify or make righteous those that obey him by making them partakers of his own righteousness, etc. (Heb. x. 12; 2 Peter i. 4.)

(5) "Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong." For his services God "hath highly exalted him and given him a name which is above every name." (Phil. ii. 9–11.)

How could God so honor one for the righteous-

ness that consists in bearing a penalty? The idea seems preposterous in the extreme.

(6) "And made intercession for transgressors." This finds one striking verification in the prayer on the cross: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." (Luke xxiii. 34.)

I have had frequent occasion to say that if the penal theory is true—if pardon is based upon punishment and comes necessarily out of it, as all consistent penalists hold, then prayer, intercession, and every other means are worthless. If God has made punishment the condition of pardon, then to intercede or pray for pardon is a reflection upon the divine integrity.

Yet Christ prayed for his persecutors. If that has any pertinency or significance in it, and we know it has, then it proves beyond all reasonable question that his sufferings did not offset the guilt and infallibly insure the salvation of all for whom he died, as substitutionists teach.

These quotations, taken from the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah can not be harmonized with the doctrine of substitution. They, by their logical consequences, contradict it. Hence, it follows, if that doctrine is true, the prophet contradicts himself. Or, if he does not contradict himself, he squarely contradicts that doctrine, and penalists egregiously misinterpret the prophet. His language can not mean what they assume it to mean. Let us see what the facts require us to believe.

SECTION III.—*To bear sin explained.*

I suppose that it will be readily conceded that these texts all teach by varied forms of expression the same doctrine; also conceded that if one teaches the penal theory, then they all teach it, and that if all do not teach it, then no one teaches it.

It would be a more tedious than difficult task, I think, to take these texts, one by one, and show that none of them give any support to the penal scheme.

If the penal theory was an established fact, it would be possible, I suppose, to harmonize the most of them with that theory, but not possible to harmonize them with those conflicting texts of the same chapter above noticed.

But the question is not whether they can be harmonized with it, but whether they are *intended to teach* it and consequently can be harmonized with no other view.

Let us take the words "he bare the sin of many." I fix on this expression because Dr. Hodge cites it as affording strong and unquestionable proof of penality. Dr. Hodge boldly asserts without qualification or any sort of limitation, that "To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin." From this I dissent, and affirm that the Hebrew word *nasa*, here rendered "bare," is used in many different senses in the Bible. Among other things, it sometimes means to suffer, or endure punishment on account of sin. This is the sense attached to it by Dr. Hodge and penalists generally.

But the word is often used in the sense of to re-

move, to take away or destroy sin without suffering the penalty of it. I also affirm that the word always has this latter meaning, when it is used of the priesthood, when priests are said to bear the sins of the people, etc. It also sometimes means to suffer on account of others.

Fix this statement distinctly in your minds. It is a vital issue. If I fail to establish its truth, then I fail to disprove the penal theory. But, if this statement can be proved, then the penal theory receives a crushing blow.

1. Dr. Hodge makes these words, "He bare the sin of many," the key to his explanation of the scape-goat atonement, and holds that the scape-goat was somehow punished representatively in the death of the sacrificial kid, both goats constituting one sacrifice.

It certainly is more logical and safer to interpret Isaiah by the light of the scape-goat atonement, for the prophet certainly knew in what sense the scape-goat bears sin, and would naturally use the same expression in the same sense when speaking of Christ.

We have previously seen that the scape-goat did bear symbolically the sin of all the people; but it was not guilty, nor punished. Isaiah, knowing that the scape-goat was not killed, nor otherwise punished, and knowing it to be a type of Christ, could not set the type and antitype in array against each other.

Knowing that the goat bore the sins of the people, but was neither guilty nor punished, he could

not mean to say that Christ, when he bears sin, is both guilty and punished.

Hence, it is unreasonable to suppose that Moses, in the Ritual, uses the words, "bear sin," in the sense of taking away sin without punishment, and that Isaiah should use the same formula in the sense of bearing the punishment of sin. If the same words, when used of the type, means one thing; and when applied to the antitype means a wholly different thing, then the Bible is an incomprehensible riddle.

2. I have said the Hebrew word *nasa* is translated *bear* in the sense of to be afflicted or suffer on account of the sins of others, but not *substitutionally.* A remarkable instance of this kind is recorded of the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. iv. 4–6).

According to this account, this good man and prophet of God did in some sense *bear* the iniquities of his nation for many years. Not because he, himself, had egregiously sinned, but because his nation had so sinned, this good man was made to endure in common with others the evils that God judicially visited upon the rebellious people.

You will observe that there was no imputation of the nation's sins to the prophet. He was not in any sense their substitute. His sufferings on their account did not relieve them in any sense, for they bore their own sins and were "consumed away for their (own) iniquity" (v. 17).

In what sense, then, did this good man *bear* the iniquities of others? Manifestly thus: He was afflicted, troubled, grieved by the wickedness of

his people, and made to suffer the temporal evils or calamities common to his people, just as good men generally are made to suffer in mind and in temporal affairs by the iniquities of their families, communities, and nations.

It is also observable that when national calamities come upon a people, because of their iniquities, or for any cause, the righteous suffer temporal evils with the wicked, as did Ezekiel.

But why did Ezekiel's sufferings not turn away God's displeasure, and bring pardon to his people? The same word, *nasa*, is here used that is used by Isaiah. The obvious reason is that he bore their iniquities, as any good man bears the iniquities of others, and not as an accredited priest. *Note this fact:* His sufferings, possibly, were as great as were those of Moses at Sinai, when he made atonement for his people in the affair of the golden calf. But he was not like Moses, a priest or mediator between God and his people.

We see in this case how a good man, even a prophet, may *bear* the iniquities of others without being their substitute, or releasing them from their criminality and punishment.

It is proper also to observe that Ezekiel suffered evils visited upon his people by special providence alone. He did not *bear* the natural retributions of their sins. He did not take their mental states and transmit his mental states to them.

This case is of special value, because it teaches us in a practical way the peculiar and wonderful power of the priesthood. Ezekiel was not a priest,

and therefore could not *bear* the sins of others, either in the sense of taking them away or by removing them by suffering the punishment due to them, or in any other way.

Dr. Hodge refers to Ezekiel's case as an exemplification of his dictum:

"To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin. He says, The expression ('bearing sin') occurs some forty times in the Bible, and always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin" (p. 506).

According to this bold statement, Ezekiel, the scape-goat, and Christ all bore the sins of others exactly in the same sense—that is, all bore the guilt and punishments of others' sins. You will remember that Ezekiel bore the sins of the house of Israel, and yet the people were consumed by their own iniquity. Hence, according to Dr. Hodge, the same sins were twice punished; first, in Ezekiel, the substitute; and secondly, in the people themselves. This fact of itself refutes his rash statement. That his assumption is not true will be made sufficiently plain by other facts.

3. The vital question in hand is, In what sense does the accredited priest *bear* the sins of others? We know the sense in which the unrepentant and unpardoned sinner bears his sins; also, know in what sense Ezekiel and other good men bore the iniquities of their people. But we are now concerned to know the precise sense in which the divinely-appointed priests *did bear* the sins of others.

The settlement of this vital question will necessarily settle every important issue between substitutionary and non-substitutionary theories of atonement; for Ezekiel, the scape-goat, and Christ did all in some sense *bear* the sins of others. Hence, if to bear sin is used "always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin," then, of course, Ezekiel, the scape-goat, and Christ bore the guilt and punishment of others' sins; and the substitutionary theory is unquestionably established.

CHAPTER XII.

SECTION I.—*The question tested by the Bible facts.*

1. We have just seen that Ezekiel *bore* the iniquities of his people; yet his people bore the same iniquities. This fact flatly contradicts substitution.

2. We have previously seen that the scape-goat bore all the sins of all the people, and yet was not killed, or punished in any way. This fact contradicts the dictum, that, "To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin."

3. In Exodus (x. 16, 17) we have the word *nasa* translated "*forgive.*" Pharaoh said to Moses:

"I have sinned against the Lord your God, and against you. Now, therefore, *forgive*, I pray thee, my sin only this once, and entreat the Lord your God that he may take away from me this death only."

Moses entreated the Lord, and the locusts were taken away and cast into the sea.

Here we have sin bearing in the exact sense of sin forgiven, sin taken away, sin blotted out, sin destroyed, but not punished in principal or any substitute.

Let it not be forgotten that we have the same word here that Moses uses when he prays, "if thou

wilt *forgive their sin*, if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book." Also the same word used of the scape-goat, when it *bears* or takes away sin; also the same word used by Isaiah when he says of Christ that "he *bear* the sin of many," also when he says, "he *hath borne* our griefs."

Now, it certainly displays more courage than discretion to say that, "To bear sin (in all these cases, or even in any of them) is to *bear* the guilt or punishment of sin." Sin was actually borne, or taken away in all these cases, yet there was absolutely no punishment in any of them, unless the case of Christ is an exception, which is contrary to every probability.

It is worthy of note that Isaiah, when he says of Christ (v. 11), "he shall bear their iniquities," does not use the word *nasa*, as in verse 12, when he says, "he bare the sin of many," but uses the word *sabal*, the ordinary meaning of which is to "bear, or carry away."

4. It may be a matter of some surprise to you in the face of the *dictum*, that "to bear sin is always to bear its punishment," to be told that the word *nasa* is often translated *forgive*.

You can satisfy yourselves by referring to the following texts, in all of which the same word, *nasa*, is rendered forgive: Gen. l. 17; Ex. x. 17; xxxii. 32; Num. xiv. 19; Josh. xxiv. 19; 1 Sam. xxv. 28; Psa. xxv. 18; xxxii. 5; lxxxv. 2; xcix. 8; Isa. ii. 9.

In all these cases the very word used of Christ by Isaiah liii. 4, 12, is used in the sense of pardon

without punishment. Dare we then to say that "to bear sin is always to bear the guilt or punishment of sin?"

5. Moses is commanded (Ex. xxviii. 38) to make a plate of pure gold, and engrave upon it the words, "Holiness to the Lord." This was attached to the helmet, and worn by Aaron upon his forehead; that "Aaron may *bear* the iniquity of the holy things which the children of Israel shall hallow of all their holy things, and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord."

Remarks.—(1) We are here taught that nothing rational or irrational is holy or acceptable to God in and of itself, or without consecration to him.

(2) That its iniquity can be borne or taken away only by priestly power.

(3) The priest, in removing its iniquity or uncleanness is said *to bear* its iniquity.

(4) *That for a priest to bear iniquity is not to suffer the penalty of sin, but to take it away—blot it out—destroy it.*

(5) That whatever is sanctified by an accredited priest, has its iniquity or uncleanness taken away, and is for this reason acceptable to God, and nothing else is acceptable. [Hence, the necessity for atonement, or consecration for the holy place, the altar, etc. (Lev. xvi.), for Jewish worshipers (Heb. ix. 13), and for Christian worshipers (Rom. xii. 1).]

What becomes of the *dictum* in the face of these sturdy and indubitable Bible facts? It is simply crushed.



6. It is well-nigh superfluous to say the word is used often to express the simple idea of removal without the remotest reference to suffering of any kind.

Moses uses it to express the removal of the locusts by the wind (Ex. x. 19); also in denying that he had taken from the Hebrews any thing improperly (Num. xvi. 15). In Daniel (xi. 12), and in Amos (iv. 2), it is correctly translated "take away."

These facts, it seems to me, utterly disprove the assumptions of penalists that there can be no forgiveness without prior punishment, and that "to bear sin is always to bear the guilt and punishment of sin." They establish, in opposition to these assumptions, the fundamental truth that for God's priests to *bear sin* or make atonement is to take away sin, remove sin, and make it, as to its guilt, or as to its punishment, as if it had never been. Every example in the Bible bearing on the issue sustains this position. Penalists can not produce a solitary instance to the contrary.

Christ was a priest—the priest of priests—a priest forever in his own right. The Aaronic priests bore or took away sin in a certain sense; so the scapegoat, the type of the living Christ, but did not bear its guilt or punishment. The very same words used in relation to them are used in relation to Christ. What right have we then to say that Christ bore our sins by taking their guilt and punishment upon himself?

Dr. Hodge was not unobservant of the fact that to bear sin does not always *clearly* mean to bear its

guilt and punishment. He disposes of the difficulty, however, in his usual cavalier style.

He says (p. 506):

"The expression occurs some forty times in the Bible, and always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin. It is hardly an exception to this remark that there are a few cases in which to bear sin means to pardon, as in Ex. x. 17; xxxii. 32; xxxiv. 7; Ps. xxxii. 5; (lxxxv. 3;) for pardon is not the removal of sin morally, but the lifting up or removal of its guilt.

This being the fact, it determines the nature of the sin-offerings under the law. The victim bore the sins of the offerer, and died in his stead. An expiation was thereby effected by the suffering of a vicarious punishment. This also determines the nature of the work of Christ. If he was an offering for sin, if he saves us from the penalty of the law of God, in the same way in which the sin-offering saved the Israelites from the law of Moses, then he bore the guilt of our sins and endured the penalty in our stead."

Remarks.—Dr. Hodge here displays his usual adroitness in disposing of a formidable difficulty; but in doing so certainly involves himself in numerous perplexities.

1. He says "bearing sin is used always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin." Yet he says there are "a few cases" (why did he not say many?) in which to bear sin "means to pardon," as in Ex. x. 17; but this "is hardly an exception."

Here we have what seems to be a palpable contradiction. "Always" admits of no exceptions—it does not mean in some instances, but in every in-

stance. Still he specifies five exceptions, and might have specified five times as many.

But we are told that these instances where to bear sin means to pardon are "hardly an exception—" hence, of no consequence. This reminds me that the righteous are scarcely—"hardly"—saved. (1 Peter iv. 18.) Still they are saved, and there is an immense difference between being scarcely saved and being not saved at all: it is just the difference between heaven and hell. So what Dr. Hodge says "is hardly an exception" is just the fundamental difference between the penal theory of the atonement and that of the Bible. For the "few cases" referred to by Dr. Hodge and many others like them in which to bear sin means to pardon are clearly decisive of the exact sense in which God's priests *bear* sin. It was not convenient for Dr. Hodge to recognize this fact—it would be fatal to his theory to do this. Hence, the summary manner in which he sets these cases aside.

2. In putting these "scarcely" exceptional cases out of his way, he says, "for pardon is not the removal of sin morally, but the lifting up or removal of its guilt."

As an isolated proposition this is true in relation to civil crimes, also in relation to judicial penalties in the sphere of divine law, but in relation to the ordinary or natural penalties of sin, it is not true; for, as we have elsewhere seen, it involves the absurd ideas of punishing sin before it exists, of separating effects from their causes, and of saving men in their sins and not from their sins.

Men may be pardoned or released from judicial punishment through priestly interposition, as was often done among the Hebrews, without moral renovation, or the removal of sin morally; but this is deliverance from temporal evils only, and in no sense deliverance from the natural retributions of sin. To pardon sin, in such a sense as to save the soul, is not to release it from punishment without moral renovation, but to renew—regenerate, new create—the soul itself. This done, the penalty ceases as pain subsides when the disease which causes it is removed.

3. Dr. Hodge admits that "there are a few cases in which to bear sin means to pardon" without punishment; but knowing this admission to be fatal to his theory, says, "they are hardly exceptions" to his *dictum* that to bear sin is always used "in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin," and proceeds in his argument on the assumption that these few exceptions are in fact not exceptions to his universal *dictum*.

The only reason he is pleased to give for thus setting aside these cases is in the words, "for pardon is not the removal of sin morally, but the lifting up or removal of its guilt." This statement, if it has any pertinence at all, is pertinent only to extraordinary temporal punishments, and not the ordinary and natural punishments of sin, which we have just seen can be pardoned or removed only by the removal of their causes.

If we are at liberty to deal thus with the Bible, setting aside what does not suit us, then we are at

liberty to set it all aside and believe whatever may happen to gratify our whims.

You should not forget that in all these exceptional cases, so cavalierly set aside by Dr. Hodge, and in all cases in which priests are said to *bear* sin, there was absolutely no guilt and no punishment endured by them.

4. Dr. Hodge, having dashed away with a stroke of his pen these Bible texts which literally crush the whole penal theory, very easily reaches the conclusion that Christ "bore the guilt of our sins and endured the penalty in our stead."

The dictum that to bear sin is used always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin once accepted as true, then it follows of necessity that those exceptions are apparent and not real; that Moses was in some way punished for the sin of Israel in the affair of the golden calf; in the taking away of the locusts; that all priests in bearing the sins of others were actually guilty and punished as substitutes; that the scape-goat was actually punished; that Christ was actually guilty by substitution, and "bore the guilt of our sins, and endured the penalty in our stead."

The dictum granted, no sane man dare deny the conclusion. But in accepting the dictum, we reject by necessary consequence the teaching of every text in the Bible that sheds any light on the nature of priestly atonements.

I hope you will not condemn this statement as rash or arrogant until you can produce at least one instance in which atonement was made by one

party taking the guilt and punishment of another party.

But the dictum, as has been shown, from many considerations is not true. It is a gratuitous figment, impossible in the nature and order of things which God has established.

5. Now, it may be safely assumed that Isaiah, an intelligent and pious Jew, understood the terminology of the Hebrew Scriptures; knew the exact sense in which Pharaoh's sin was taken away, or forgiven through the priestly prayer of Moses; in what sense atonement was made for Israel at Sinai; in what sense Aaron bore or took away the iniquities of the holy things offered to the Lord; in what sense the scape-goat bore or carried the sins of the nation; in fine, the prophet certainly knew the exact sense in which God's priests always *bear* or take away the sins of others.

How then could he, with all these and many other accordant facts before him, with not a solitary adverse case in the Bible, teach, or mean to teach, that Christ, a priest forever in his own right, literally bore or took away the sins of the world by taking the guilt and actually bearing the pains and penalties of these sins? That he intended so to teach simply defies the possibility of rational faith.

Moses and Aaron were both priests and acknowledged types of Christ. They could bear or take away sin through intercessory prayers by virtue of their priestly power. But the God-Man, a priest forever, could take it away only by taking its guilt and enduring its penalty? This, the theory re-

quires us to believe, but Bible facts compel me to dissent.

SECTION II.—*Further proof that to bear sin is not to take its guilt.*

Additional proof that Isaiah does not mean to teach that Christ, in bearing sin, actually took upon himself the guilt of the world, and suffered all the punishment this guilt was capable of producing, seems to be supererogatory.

But, as old and popular prejudices are hard to overcome, and long-cherished opinions difficult to replace with new ones, it will not be out of place to lay before you additional proof.

1. The Old and the New Testament are mutually interpretative, one of the other. Many things in the Old are made more easy of comprehension by the New, and many things in the New would be simply unintelligible without the Old. In fact, very much of the terminology of the New was manifestly suggested by that of the Old. This is especially true of the terms relating to the mediation of Christ, his priesthood, his sacrificial death, etc.

If the Old Testament teaches the doctrine of substitution, we should reasonably expect the New to teach it with equal or greater clearness. If the Old does not authorize us to believe that for God's accredited priests "to bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin," then we have no right to believe that the New teaches any such doctrine.

We have just seen that the Old does not teach it. Now, let us see what the New requires us to believe.

2. Matthew is presumed to understand the teaching of Isaiah, as Isaiah is presumed to understand Moses and the tabernacle service.

This New Testament writer, when he saw Christ, the *great sin bearer*, taking away the ills of humanity—the sins and diseases of the people—was reminded of what Isaiah had said.

He says (Matt. viii. 14–17):

"And when Jesus was come into Peter's house, he saw his wife's mother laid and sick of a fever, and he touched her hand and the fever left her, and she arose and ministered unto them. And when evening was come, they brought unto him many possessed with devils, and he cast out the spirits with his word, and healed all that were sick, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah, the prophet, saying himself took our infirmities (*asthenia*), and bore our diseases, sickness (*nosos*)."

This text furnishes us with an infallible clew as to how Christ fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah in bearing or taking away human infirmities—diseases and sins. Matthew, with his own eyes, saw him *bear*, or take away human diseases and iniquities by a power inherent in himself, and not by a power which he had acquired by satisfying abstract justice as the penal substitute of those whose iniquities he bore away. There is no substitution with its invariable double imputation. He gave the sufferers health, but he did not take their diseases. He relieved them of the devils, but he did not receive them into himself. What he did for them was not by an interchange of equated suffering, but by his

word, a mere expression of his will, just as he quieted the raging winds and waves.

3. Certainly there was no substitution here; no *bearing* of penalty for others, no transfer of guilt from one party to another, and yet, Matthew being judge, it was an actual, literal fulfillment and exemplification of the prophecy of Isaiah when he says "he bore the sin of many."

Matthew being judge, Christ *bears* sin, not by taking its guilt or punishment, but by *taking it away.* Physical evils are removed by physical power, and moral evils by moral power. But Christ has equal power over both. But he takes away neither by suffering their pains and penalties, but by a power inherent in himself.

But suppose it should be granted that he took, bore away in his ante-mortem ministry only physical evils, this brings no relief to the theory.

It is, doubtless, true that a very large per cent. of the patients whose maladies Christ took away brought these diseases upon themselves by their sins.

When Jesus healed the man who had an infirmity thirty and eight years, he said, "Behold, thou art made whole; sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee."

This clearly teaches us that his affliction was the natural outgrowth of his sin, and the sin and its resultant disease were both taken away at the same time and by the same power. Many other examples might be given from the New Testament.

The moral and the physical, though distinct, are

so intimately related that I can not conceive of two wholly different modes of removal—one by a plenary satisfaction of justice, and one by a word, an act of will.

Now, I feel quite sure that even the most zealous advocate of substitution would not be willing to say that Christ, the great *sin bearer*, did actually take into his own body all the diseases of which he relieved the afflicted that came to him. Yet Isaiah, Matthew, and others expressly say that he did literally *bear* them. Then it is clear as noon that he did not bear them by taking their punishment upon himself, but by destroying them.

Certainly we have no more authority from the word of God to say that Christ did really take our sins and guilt into his own consciousness, and did accordingly endure the punishment of them, than we have to say that he actually took into his own body the pains consequent upon physical maladies.

Isaiah, Matthew, and others of equal authority being judges, he did *bear* them both—the physical and the moral—and *bàre* them both exactly in the same sense.

Hence, if he took away one by a "penal satisfaction," he in like manner took away the other. If he took away one by his word—a simple act of will, as he cast out devils, calmed the winds and waves, raised the dead, etc.—then in like manner did he take away the other.

The former is simply preposterous and impossible.

The latter is feasible and possible, and is without doubt the true method.

It was announced in Eden that Christ should bruise the serpent's head (Gen. iii. 15). It is also said, "The God of peace shall bruise (or tread) Satan under your feet" (Rom. xvi. 20). It is also said that Christ was incarnated, "that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil" (Heb. ii. 14), and, "For this purpose was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil" (1 John iii. 8).

Of course the serpent, Satan, and the devil all denote the same power, whose works Christ came to destroy. Satan, it is allowed, instigates all human sin. That he had the power of death is demonstrated by the fact that he beguiled Eve into rebellion and spiritual death.

Then sin and spiritual death are the works of the devil, which Christ came *to bear, take away, destroy.*

The vital question at issue is, How does he destroy sin, or the works of the devil?

1. Does he do it as would a surety destroy the indebtedness of his principal, simply by paying it? or as one man would relieve another from legal punishment by bearing the punishment himself, if any law tolerated such a thing? Is taking away sin by such methods to destroy sin, or to honor, magnify, and exalt it? If the physician removes disease from his patient by transferring it to himself and suffering all its consequences, does he in any proper sense destroy the disease? He, it might be said, saves the patient, but it can not be said

that he destroys sin, for sin destroys him; or, Satan actually gets all he desires. If Satan instigates sin for his own gratification, it is not presumed that he is any more scrupulous as to who suffers the consequences of it than is *abstract "justice,"* which the penal theory requires us to believe is just as well pleased with suffering in a substitute as in a principal. It is also presumable that Satan is just as well satisfied with equivalent penalty as is justice.

Hence, it is clear as noon that if Christ endured the penalty of sin *in our stead*, then sin is not destroyed at all, but transferred from one party to another. The creditor does not lose his money when it is paid by a surety; nor Satan his pleasure in sin when its penalty is endured by a substitute. Satan and justice, it seems, are equally well pleased with this method of destroying the works of the devil.

2. Again, the absurdity of destroying sin by enduring its penalty, is further apparent from this logical consequence, viz.: If to endure the penalty of sin is to destroy sin, then, of necessity, to enjoy the reward of virtue is to destroy virtue. No man of any logical acumen can deny this conclusion. If one proposition is true, then the other is necessarily so. For penalty sustains to sin exactly the same relation that reward does to virtue.

Hence, we see that the very *principle* by which substitution proposes to destroy sin, vice, moral evil, also destroys virtue, and moral good; or the principle, universally applied, would destroy all vice and all virtue, and blot both heaven and hell out of existence. Hence, if there is no other

method of destroying sin than by suffering its penalties, then the destruction of sin is simply an impossibility. But Christ "was manifested that he might destroy (sin) the works of the devil," and this we know he did not do by his passion on the cross, or elsewhere; for sin fearfully abounds to-day, and sinners are suffering its penalties for themselves.

But Christ, true to his mission, is to-day destroying it, delivering men from its love and dominion. This he does by a power in him as a *living, quickening spirit*, and thus brings men from a state of spiritual death to spiritual life (Eph. ii. 1–6). He destroys it, not by taking its penalties on himself, but by destroying sin itself, or by freeing men from sin, as disease is destroyed when the patient is freed from it (Rom. vi. 1–7, 18; 1 Cor. vii. 22; John viii. 36, and parallels).

This view of the subject brings us down from the dreamy heights of scholastic conjecture and *à priori* conclusions into the sphere of intelligibility, releases us from the necessity of saying that sin was destroyed before it was committed—of saying that Christ took the punishment of the sins of men who, we see, are suffering the punishment of their own sins every day—a fearful fact which can never be explained in harmony with the penal theory. This view of the subject puts the plan of salvation in beautiful harmony with universal nature.

As we look to God, as a living power in nature, for food, and raiment, and shelter, which are given to us largely through our own activity, so we look

to the same beneficent God in Christ for spiritual food and deliverance from sin.

On the contrary, if the penal theory in its only consistent form is true, then what should we do?

The only answer the substitutionist can consistently return to this question is, *Nothing*. But why this answer? Simply because if Christ has borne the penalty of our sins in our place, then we can not but be saved. Nothing pertaining to our spiritual state and destiny is conditioned. If we will to be saved, it is only because we can not but will it. Our destiny is in no sense conditioned upon what we do, but what we do is conditioned upon and determined by our predetermined destiny.

CHAPTER XIII.

SECTION I.—*Christians bearing one another's burden.*

"Bear ye one another's burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ." (Gal. vi. 2.)

If you examine this text in the Greek, you find the verb *bear* to be the same used by Matt. viii. 17. These burdens which we are here commanded to *bear* are such as are common to Christians, through temptation, mental infirmities, poverty, persecutions, and faults, or sins. (See context.)

Now, in what sense can Christians *bear* these burdens for one another? You can not take my temptations, my infirmities and faults, and make them your own—my remorse of conscience or whatever pains or penalties may come on me from them. You can not by possibility take my place in law and as my substitute *bear* my burdens while I am set free and released from them. Nor can the Almighty himself do this without changing personalities. The utmost you can do is to give me your moral support, your sympathy, your love, your counsel, and your prayers.

One friend might sacrifice ease and comfort, and even die of sympathetic love for another, but can not take his place or suffer in his stead. To *bear* one another's burdens, then, is not to bear them

substitutionally, or one in the place of another, but in the interest of another.

Now I wish you to make special note of the fact, that by bearing one another's burdens in this, the only possible method, we, Paul being judge, do fulfill the law of Christ. "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so (in this way) fulfill the law of Christ." Now, what is this law of Christ which Christians are required to fulfill?

I can conceive of no law of Christ that Christians can fulfill, except his example of self-sacrificing love.

He says: "This is my commandment, that ye love another as I have loved you." (John xv. 12.) And Paul says: "Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the church and gave himself for it." (Eph. v. 25.)

Observe that the comparison in these texts is one of kind, and not of degree. Now, husbands may suffer deeply through love in the interest of their wives; but never can suffer in the room or place of their wives.

These texts certainly destroy the supposed penal significance of the word bear.

SECTION II.—*Another text relied upon by penalists.*

1 Peter ii. 24 is considered, perhaps, the most favorable to substitution of any text in the New Testament. It, therefore, requires attention. It reads thus:

"Who his own self bare our sins in his body

upon the tree, that we, having died unto sin, might live unto righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed."

Remarks.—1. If we may interpret this text in the light of those previously considered, then we know that Christ did not *bear* our sins as our substitute, or by enduring the penalty of them in our stead. For the Bible must be allowed to be consistent with itself, and of course does not teach contradictory doctrines concerning the manner in which Christ bears sin.

But suppose we are not at liberty thus to explain scripture by scripture, and are required to test every text bearing on the subject by the force of its own terminology—in the light of its own context; still, I am quite sure that this text, under these restrictions even, can never be made by any fair exposition to sustain the penal theory.

2. Let us first consider it in the light of its context. No text having a logical connection with its context, can be safely interpreted except in accordance with that context; otherwise we may stultify the author.

The text itself is an illustration, and an enforcement of the duty of patience, which is urged by Peter upon Christian bond-servants. In verse 18, Peter says: "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward."

Here the duty of reverent and patient subjection is distinctly enjoined. The following verses give the reasons for this patience:

"For this is thank-worthy, if a man, for conscience toward God, endure grief, suffering wrongfully. For what glory is it, if, when ye be buffetted for your faults, ye take it patiently? but if when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God."

Peter here antithesizes *deserved* and *undeserved* punishment, and teaches with utmost distinctness:

1. That there is no merit—nothing praise-worthy, nothing acceptable to God—in suffering for ill-doing, or in enduring penalty.

2. But that to suffer for well-doing is meritorious or acceptable with God.

It is scarcely necessary to say that to suffer for wrong-doing is to suffer penalty, and to suffer for right-doing is not to suffer penalty, but for righteousness' sake; and that these two kinds of suffering are in their mental aspects as diverse as it is possible for the human mind to experience.

Let this vital truth be emphasized, viz.: that *penal suffering*, Peter being judge, is void of *all merit*, is not *acceptable* with God, and is in no sense the ground of his complacent love or favor.

On the contrary, the divine blessing is unsparingly pronounced upon those that suffer for well-doing—that is, suffering which is involved in *well-doing*. (Matt. v. 11, 12.)

It deserves to be indellibly impressed upon your minds, that the Bible from beginning to end, and in various forms, identifies as to kind the mental sufferings of Christ, and the mental suffering of

his followers. They differ in degree and merit, but not in kind.

But no good man ever suffered penally or *vicariously* for another. These well-attested facts can not be reconciled with the substitutionary scheme of atonement. Let me repeat them briefly:

1. There is, Peter being judge, absolutely no merit in penal suffering; but suffering for well-doing is meritorious or acceptable to God. If these statements are true in reference to the principals, they must be so of their substitutes, if they have any.

But there was merit in the suffering of Christ, or rather in the sufferer. His death was to God as a sweet-smelling savor. Therefore, his sufferings were neither substitutionary nor penal.

2. The mental suffering of Christ and of his followers are *identical* in kind. But no man ever suffered substitutionally for another. Therefore, Christ never so suffered for sinners.

In verse 21, Peter informs those servants that they were called to suffer for Christ's sake, "because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example that ye should follow his steps."

Here we are taught that Christ suffered for us, and that we must suffer for his sake. If he suffered substitutionally for us, then we are taught that our sufferings for his sake are also substitutionary; otherwise, we do not follow his steps as we are required to do. To follow his steps in suffering is to suffer in kind with him, but if his sufferings were vicarious, then for us to follow in his steps in this re-

spect is simply impossible, for no man ever did or can thus suffer.

But if Christ's suffering for us was such as comes from love and not from penalty, and our suffering for him such, and only such, as comes from love to him, then we can see clearly enough how we in this respect may follow in his footsteps as we are required to do.

Again, the sufferings which Christ endured for us were purely voluntary, as previously stated. But no voluntary suffering is penal, for the bare idea of voluntariness excludes the possibility of penalty.

Whatever suffering one man may voluntarily undergo in the interest of another, is not penalty but pure benefaction. If one man should, at his own request, be hung in the place of another, it would not be penalty, but pure benefaction. No voluntary suffering is penal. Christ's suffering was voluntary, hence, not penal.

Such are the teachings of the contexts with some of its logical correlates. Let us now consider the text itself, and see what it requires us to believe.

1. The terms of the text, as well as does the context, excludes the idea of substitution.

The word which chiefly determines the nature of Christ's suffering is *anaphero*, here properly enough translated bear; "who his own self bare our sins in his body on the tree," or cross.

This word is used ten times in the New Testament, but never in the sense of bearing punishment of any kind, either by a principal or a substitute.

In Matthew xvii. 1, it is rendered "*bringeth*"—"*bringeth* them up into a high mountain"

In Mark ix. 2, it is rendered "*leadeth up*"—"leadeth them up into a high mountain."

In Luke xxiv. 51, it is rendered "*carried up*"—"carried up into heaven." No substitution, no penalty here.

In every other instance it is used of priestly functions, or to express the offering up of sacrifice.

In Hebrews vii. 27, it is rendered "*offered up*"—when he offered up himself;" also, "*to offer up*" sacrifice.

In Hebrews ix. 28, it is rendered "*to bear*"—"to bare the sins of many."

In Hebrews xiii. 15, it is rendered "*let us offer*"—"let us offer the sacrifice of praise."

In James ii. 21, it is rendered "*when had offered*"—"when he had offered Isaac, his son."

In 1 Peter ii. 5, it is rendered "*to offer up*"—"to offer up spiritual sacrifices."

In the text, 1 Peter ii. 24, it is rendered "*bear*"—"bear our sins in his body on the tree."

In the light of these facts, the obvious meaning of the text is that Christ offered himself—his life—when his body was on the cross, a sacrifice for the sins of the world. Or, that he bore our sins in the only sense in which priests can *bear* the sins of others—by making propitiation for them and rendering their actual removal possible.

We have just as much Bible authority to say that Isaac was offered as "a penal sacrifice" as to say that Christ was offered as such a sacrifice; or, to

say that Christians offer penal satisfaction to justice when they "offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God, by Jesus Christ;" or, to say that all religious worship in heaven and on earth is penal.

2. Other terms of the text taken in their logical connection are irreconcilable with the penal theory.

The words "that we being dead unto sin might live unto righteousness," express not a necessary, but a possible result of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice; or, they express the actual result of his suffering to believers, and to no others.

Penalists teach that the death of Christ actually makes all for whom he suffered dead to the *reatus poenæ* of sin, thousands of years, it may be, before the sins are committed; but they are compelled to admit that the elect are not made dead to this *reatus culpæ* until sin is actually committed. Consequently, that those for whom Christ died are both dead to the penal consequences of their sins, and at the same time alive to sin as to their love, practice, and guilt of sin. The elect, therefore, according to this scholastic scheme, though actually dead to sin as to its consequences, yet actually live unto unrighteousness, or in the love, practice, and guilt of sin.

Such is substantially the only explanation the theory can give of the words, "that being dead unto sin we might live unto righteousness."

As we have previously said, this reverses the order of nature, separates cause and effect, and reduces the plan of salvation into a jumble of hard incongruities.

Peter, however, teaches us that "we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness," or that, living unto righteousness is the natural and sure consequence of being dead to sins; and Paul (Rom. vi. 2, 7) regards it as an impossible thing to be dead to sin, and yet to live in sin. "How shall we that are dead to sin live any longer therein?" "For he that is dead (to sin) is freed from sin." Paul did not believe it possible to be dead to sin and yet live in sin.

The doctrine of the text obviously is that Christ having died for our sins as a sacrificial offering, and having arisen from the dead, became a quickening spirit, who imparts his own death unto sin (Rom. vi. 1–11), and becomes "the author of eternal salvation to them that obey him."

3. "By whose stripes ye were healed."

We can not get substitution with its invariable double imputation out of these words. Try it, if you wish, to your own satisfaction. Christ did not become even for a moment what sinners are, for whom he was wounded; nor did they "*ipso facto*" instantly become in law or in morals what he was.

Rejecting the idea of substitutionary suffering, the text presents no difficulty.

The words, "by whose stripes ye were healed," are used metonymically—what the dying Christ suffered is put for what the risen Christ actually does —viz.: heals us, or saves us. This is a figure of speech frequently used in reference to Christ as the author of salvation, and which finds its reason or

justification in the obvious facts that if he had not suffered he could not have died; if he had not died, he could not have risen from the dead; if he had not risen from the dead, he could not have become a quickening, life-giving spirit; if he had not become such a spirit, he could not impart his spiritual life, his holiness, or righteousness, to others.

Hence, why it is that salvation in the Bible is variously attributed to his suffering, to his blood, to his death, to his resurrection, to his holiness, to his righteousness, to his post-resurrection life, to his intercession, etc. Any one of these terms, when it expresses the source of salvation, implies all the others.

They are related very much as that group of terms used by the Scriptures to express the various states experienced by the human mind in its transitions from death unto life, such as repentance, faith, sanctification, regeneration, justification, adoption, a sealing unto the day of redemption and salvation. Any one of these terms implies the whole.

Hence, it may be pertinently said that by his stripes all that are spiritually united to him were healed.

SECTION III.—*Christ a ransom for many.*

I suppose this review of texts, relied upon to support substitution, would be considered radically defective if I should fail to notice Matthew xx. 28, and Mark x. 45, which are identical in form, and which assert that Christ "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and *to give his life a ransom for many.*"

The last part of the text, which I have underscored, is the part in which penalists claim to find the proof of their doctrine. The Greek is, *kai dounai ten psukin auton lutron anti polton.* The decisive word is *lutron*, a ransom supplemented by *anti.* In view of what has been said, but little is here required.

This word *lutron* is used but twice in the New Testament, and is appropriately translated. The corresponding verb, *luo*, is used over forty times, but is never translated to ransom, or to deliver by the payment of an equivalent. An examination of the word will satisfy you that it is never used to express the idea of deliverance or salvation by enduring a penalty of any sort. In fact, the engrossing idea of *ransom* is deliverance, and the word itself is indifferent to the means by which the deliverance is made. It may be by almost any means whatever except by "penal satisfaction," which, of course, were it possible, would not be ransom, or deliverance from the evil, but the endurance of the evil by a substitute.

Again, the word *for* (*anti*), it is suggested, requires us to believe that there is a commercial value between the so-called penal sufferings of Christ and the souls of the "many."

To this I reply that there is no known standard of valuation between penal suffering and the souls of men. The penal explanation of the text involves two assumptions which render it worthless—first, that the death was penal and substitutionary; and secondly, that penal suffering actually ransoms,

or saves. If these gratuitous assumptions are true, then of course gehenna is, or will become, "a land uninhabited."

On the contrary, if we reject the idea of a penal ransom, then we readily see how Christ, by giving his life in the interest of humanity, becomes the ransomer of all that obey him, as previously explained.

SECTION IV.—*Christ redeems us by his blood, etc.*

Penalists rely with much confidence upon those texts in which the words redeem and redemption occur, such as:

1. (Rev. v. 9) "For thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood."

2. (Gal. iii. 13) "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, 'cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.' "

3. (Titus ii. 14) "Who gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity."

4. (1 Peter i. 18, 19) "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, . . . but with the precious blood of Christ as a lamb without blemish and without spot."

These texts are all claimed as supporting the commercial and the penal theory of the atonement. I feel free to say, however, that they teach neither commerciality nor criminality in the death of Christ. I need not examine these texts *seriatim*. A few general statements will serve the interests of truth as well.

1. Three different words, all translated "*redeem*," are used in these texts. (1) The first, *agorazo*, is generally used in a commercial sense, but to this there are many exceptions (see 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; 2 Peter ii. 1; Rev. iii. 18; xiv. 3, 4).

In all these instances the word is used in a non-commercial sense, or means to procure or secure without commercial value, and of course without penal suffering.

The second word, *exagorazo*, is used but four times, and never in a commercial sense. It is twice used of time (Eph. v. 16; Col. iv. 5)—"redeeming the time."

The other instances of its use (Gal. iii. 13; iv. 5) have been sufficiently noticed.

The third is *lutroo*, which is used but three times (Titus ii. 14; 1 Peter i. 18; Luke xxiv. 21), and never in a commercial sense, or a penal sense.

(Luke xxiv. 21) "But we hoped that it was he which should redeem Israel."

The Jews, of course, understood their own tongue. Did they expect Christ to redeem Israel commercially, or by other means than the literal payment of a price? The Jews expected their Messiah to redeem them temporally without money and without price. And in like manner Paul (Titus ii. 14) teaches us that Christ "gave himself that he might redeem us from all iniquity," and Peter (1 Peter i. 18) "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things as silver and gold, . . . but with the precious blood of Christ."

Query.—How could the blood of Christ be prop-

erly accounted precious if it was the blood of a criminal by imputation; for, according to the theory, imputed guilt is not less odious or less real in the substitute than in the principal, for Adam's guilt, it is held, makes us as truly guilty as was Adam? Is the blood of a criminal precious to God?

My next general statement is that these words, when applied to Christ or to God as the redeemer, always exclude the idea of commerciality, of equivalent value, and of "penal satisfaction." The bare notion that God, the Father of Mercies, can be "compensated" by penal suffering, or by any other means possible to men or angels, good or bad, would be regarded as a blind superstition if it did not have the support of the good and great.

You should never cease to remember that when God or Christ, is the redeemer, deliverance comes, not by equivalent value or "penal satisfaction," but by some other means more honorable to God and better adapted to the nature and needs of men. I might, but need not, cite you to scores of texts in attestation of this proposition. With concordance in hand you can easily satisfy yourselves.

Perhaps you may desire some further explanation of Gal. iii. 13:

"Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree."

1. In what sense did Christ become a curse for us? The Greek here is *katara*, and means literally

"a prayer against," an execration, and, hence, comes to mean punishment, or the endurance of suffering or death.

Every one that hung or died upon a tree for any cause whatever was called accursed. (Deut. xxi. 23.) Christ died for us upon the cross, and, therefore, it is said he became a curse for us. His death was by his persecutors intended as a punishment for blasphemy; but by himself it was intended as a propitiatory sacrifice for sin, and was accepted as such.

2. But how does Christ, having been a curse for us in this sense, redeem us from the curse of the law?

(1) The curse of the law is the curse or evil of disobedience in not loving God with all the heart, etc., which no fallen creature is able to do.

(2) Christ having perfectly obeyed this law—even unto death—and being raised from the dead, "dieth no more," so that "death hath no more dominion over him." He thus becomes a quickening spirit, (1 Cor. xv. 45) who quickens into newness of life all that are united to him by faith. "And you *did he quicken* when you were dead in your trespasses and sins." (Eph. ii. 1.)

"But God, . . . when we were dead through our trespasses, quickened us (gave to us spiritual life) together with Christ (or in Christ); (by grace are ye saved), and raised us up (from spiritual death) with him and made us to sit with him in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, . . . for by grace have you been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, *it is* the gift of God."

Thus by faith in Christ we are unified with Christ—are made partakers of his death unto sin—die unto sin with him, rather in him. (Rom. vi. 8, 11.) But to be dead in Christ unto sin is to be alive unto God in him. (Rom. vi. 11; Gal. ii. 19.) Thus it is that by union with him, or by being made partakers of his righteousness, Christ redeems (delivers) us from the curse of the law, or from our state of spiritual death under the law. "Ye also are made dead to the law through the body of Christ." (Rom. vii. 4; Gal. ii. 19. This is "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which makes (all united to Christ by faith) free from the law of sin and death." (Rom. viii. 2.)

This is a sufficient answer to the question as to *how* Christ redeems—delivers—us from the curse of the law, "having become a curse for us." You can not fail to see the utter insufficiency of the substitutionary method of freeing us from the curse of the law. The subject will be further considered in another connection.

SECTION V.—*The prepositional argument.*

Prepositions are not very substantial things upon which to found an argument. Certainly they do not make good corner-stones for massive superstructures. They are often too equivocal, too ambiguous, too indefinite, to be implicitly relied upon for the solution of intricate aud complex questions.

Still they have their exegetical and logical value in determining propositions.

Substitutionists sometimes invoke aid from this

source, and so manipulate them as to claim support from them.

I think they lose rather than gain by their endeavors. Let us see whether this is not so.

There are several prepositions used to express the relation of Christ's death to us or our sins, etc.; as *anti*, *dià*, *huper*.

Of these, *anti* is thought to be most favorable to substitution, because it is often used in a commercial sense; or to express equivalence of value. It is assumed that when *dia* and *huper* are used, that they should be taken as synonyms of *anti*. The argument though somewhat specious, is essentially spurious.

1. *Anti* is used about twenty times, and in only three instances does it have reference to Christ's death: Matt. xx. 25; Mark x. 45 (which have been previously noticed); and Heb. xii. 2—"Who for (*anti*) the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame," etc.

In this text, as you can not fail to see, *anti* expresses Christ's motive in enduring the cross, and not any equivalency between the value of his suffering and the glory set before him.

We have above seen that both the other instances of its use exclude the idea of redemption from sin by an equivalent value of penal suffering.

2. The argument is improbable from its very extravagance. The word *dia* is used in reference to the objects of Christ's death but few times. (Rom. iv. 25; 1 Cor. viii. 11.)

Huper is the preposition which is used generally

for the purpose in question. It is so used near forty times.

Now, observe that this word *huper* is not used to express the idea of equivalency of value, or commerciality. Though it is used over one hundred and fifty times, I call to mind no instance of its use in this sense.

With these facts before us, does it not seem an extravagant assumption to say that *huper*, when it refers to Christ's passion, must be taken as a synonym of *anti* in its commercial sense? Whether is it more reasonable to suppose that *huper*, out of one hundred and fifty instances of its use, should be taken forty times out of its usual non-commercial sense; or that *anti*, out of the twenty instances of its use, should be three times taken in its non-commercial sense? The only excuse for such improbable assumptions is that the exigencies of the theory require them.

But, after all, the word *anti*, is utterly unable to serve the ends for which it is invoked. It may express equality of position or equivalency of value, but can never give us substitution with its invariable double imputation.

Take Matt. ii. 22: "Archelaus did reign in Judea *in the room of* (*anti*) his father, Herod." The son succeeds the father on the throne, but they did not change places or conditions. "An eye for (*anti*) an eye." This is retaliation, not substitution. To take your neighbor's eye is not to give him yours; there is no exchange of conditions as substitution requires.

Taken in a strictly commercial sense, the word still fails to support the theory. If you give a dollar for a book, there is presumed to be an exchange of equivalent values, but no interchange of qualities, either between the book and the dollar, or between you and the salesman. In fact, it is because there is no such *exchange of qualities* that you buy the book—you get what suits you better.

Substitution, without double imputation is of no value; but double imputation is a conception impossible of realization in the sphere, either of matter or mind—in physical, commercial, or moral law.

Having indicated many of the radical defects of the penal theory of atonement, and having presented the fundamental principles of a different scheme and answered the objections to which it may be adjudged obnoxious, I propose now to consider such questions as experience in the class-room has taught me are likely to arise in the minds of students who are more or less embarrassed by their previously formed opinions and prejudices in favor of substitution.

This plan of procedure will involve some repetition. But this repetition, while it may be considered a defect, simply because it is a repetition will, nevertheless, be more than compensated by the advantages of having the subject presented in different forms, and with more fullness of detail.

CHAPTER XIV.

SECTION I.—*Some special questions concerning atonement.*

It is often asked, Do atonements have any *influence* upon the divine mind?

1. It is asserted by many that what is called the great atonement has no influence upon God or the relations of men to him; that it expends its force upon the human mind in the way of example, Christ being only an exemplar—yet perfect exemplar—whom all men should follow.

This, I hesitate not to say, is an unscriptural view of the subject. Christ's exemplary life, though perfect in itself, is no atonement for men in any intelligible sense; nor does it constitute any part of atonement.

2. We know that human atonements, made by confession of faults, reparations of injuries, do have an effect upon the minds of aggrieved parties. In fact, the propitiation consists in this effect; if this effect is not produced, no propitiation, no atonement is made.

3. We also know that all the atonements to which I have referred, even those made for the "holy place and the altar," and "the holy things offered to the Lord" had some sort of influence—produced

some change—in the relations of the things for which they were made.

4. Those atonements made by Moses, Aaron, and Phineas, as also those ritual atonements, regularly made by the Aaronic priesthood, are distinctly represented as turning away the wrath of God. To say that these atonements had no influence upon the divine mind would be to say that the Bible is a book of shams, rather than of realities.

SECTION II.—If atonements imply an influence upon the divine mind, it is asked, What is the nature of that influence?

1. The Bible says, "God is love." But we know by experience that love and anger, indignation, displeasure, etc., are not incompatible things.

Love is an essential attribute of God—persistent, immutable. But indignation, anger, pleasure, and displeasure as applied to the deity are not attributes, but states of the divine mind, which may vary according to the conduct of men. Hence, God is said to be angry with the wicked, yet so loved them, as to give his only begotten Son to save them.

2. No atonement changes the attributes or nature of God. All atonements made by merely human priests for immaterial things, as the altar, etc., only formally changed his relation to them; those made for men in accordance with the tabernacle service symbolically changed his relation to those for whom they were made; those made on extraordinary occasions, as by Moses, Aaron, and Phineas, changed his emotional relations so as to abate his just indig-

nation, and induce him to spare the seditious offenders whom he might justly have destroyed.

3. You should distinctly observe that in these cases God did not spare the offenders because of repentance, or any other proper conduct on their part, but purely and exclusively *for the sake* of the fidelity—the loving fidelity and zeal of his accredited priests.

4. You should also remember these atonements saved the rebels only from extraordinary and temporal evil—a judicial and exemplary death—and not from the natural retributions of their sins.

5. In this respect these atonements differ essentially from the propitiation made by Christ, which relates to all sin and its natural retributions.

By the former, the offenders were not released from their sins, but only from the judicial and temporal consequences of their seditions. But by the latter, men are not *necessarily released*, but may be *released from their sins themselves*, which, of course, releases them from the natural retributions of their sins. This deliverance from sin itself is effected, as we have seen, by the impartation of Christ's holy nature—his spiritual life—to those united to him by faith, and who are consequently saved by him, and *for his sake*. The spiritual life that they now live, they live by faith in him (Gal. ii. 20), or they live because Christ lives (John xiv. 19).

6. God, therefore, recognizes those that believe in Jesus as righteous, simply because they are made partakers of Christ's righteousness—not imputed,

but imparted to them. Christ is literally the Lord, our righteousness (Jer. xxiii. 6; xxxiii. 26).

7. The effect of the sacrificial death upon God is different from that of other atonements mentioned in the Bible, yet, like all others, it propitiates in some sense, so that God can be merciful without being unjust—can pardon without punishment, so that salvation is purely a matter of grace, and not of penalty.

8. The sacrificial death of Christ seems to propitiate, because it was an act of perfect obedience—obedience unto death—which, as a sacrifice, was to God a sweet-smelling savor, and which furnishes an expedient by which justice and mercy fully concur in the salvation of believers and all the prerogatives of God as universal Father and Governor are fully honored—that is, we are saved by grace, not by law, nor in violation of law, but in accordance with law.

SECTION III.—But how can atonement produce such effects? This question is often put.

1. The form of the question betrays some misapprehension. Atonement is itself an effect produced upon the divine mind by the acts, or rather the mental states, of which the external acts are only the sensible expression.

(This last named fact explains how the Son of God, though crucified less than two thousand years ago, was the great atoner from the foundation of the world.)

The real point intended by the question is, How

can the acts or mental states of one mind produce such propitiatory effects upon another.

Omniscience alone, I suppose, could answer the question. To know a fact, and to understand why it is a fact, are essentially different things.

If you were asked, Why the confession of an offense tends to take away the indignation of the offended party, you probably would reply that you do not know, or that God has so constituted the human mind as to make confession the natural and, therefore, the sufficient reason for pardoning an offense.

What God has made an indigenous law of the human mind and a rule of human conduct is, perhaps, a characteristic of his own mind, and a rule of his own administration.

If He who knows all things was pleased to accept the sacrificial death of Christ and make it a prerequisite to the pardon of human sin, by imparting his righteousness to those that believe on him, we need not object, because we can not comprehend how one mind acts upon another. (John iii. 8.)

SECTION IV.—It has been asked, whether Christ's propitiatory work has any influence upon the human mind?

I should say it has no effect upon the mind itself—does not affect either its legal or moral states. This fact will be made sufficiently plain.

But as Christ was "delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25), it is presumed that what he did had an important effect upon man's relations to God—mak-

ing him a prisoner of hope and procuring for him a salvable state. This, I think, is what the Bible teaches.

Substitutionists, you know, would dissent from this, and affirm that Christ's death of itself, and of necessity, did actually change the legal state of all for whom he suffered, releasing them from all liability to punishment, and makes it a matter of sheer justice that God shall (at his own pleasure) change their moral state by taking away their moral corruption.

These positions have been shown to be both unreasonable and unscriptural. It seems to be sufficient here to say:

(1) That the death of Christ did not change the moral condition of men—did not destroy their enmity to God, or cause them to love him supremely, and their neighbor as themselves. This moral change, though possible only through the death of Christ, is not the necessary legal effect of that death. God is not bound by infinite justice to save all or any for whom Christ died; else he would not condition their salvation upon spiritual union with Christ, or upon faith, or any thing else.

(2) Nor does the death of Christ "*ipso facto*" release from punishment those for whom he died; for "he that believeth not is condemned already" (John iii. 18, 36), and he that is condemned is not exempt from punishment.

Nor is the salvation of any man assured by the simple fact that Christ died for him. (Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11.)

Hence, it is certainly true, the Bible being the test, that the unbeliever is as truly corrupt and as truly condemned, though Christ died for him, as he could be if Christ had never died for him.

Having seen what the death of Christ does not do for men, let us see what it does actually secure to men.

1. It secures all needed illumination, as to God and to himself, so as to enable him to repent of his sins (Luke xxiv. 46) and come boldly to the throne of grace, obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need. (Heb. iv. 16.)

2. The mediation of Christ furnishes objective ground, and the only objective ground of faith that God will avouch to us—a gracious pardon of our sins. These two points are of vital importance, and will receive further notice in the next section.

SECTION V.—The question is often put with great emphasis and earnestness, If the Bible imperatively requires confession or repentance, as a condition precedent to pardon, and God is faithful and just to forgive all that repent (1 John i. 9), then, why is any atonement necessary at all? Confession or repentance, it is alleged, is a sufficient ground for forgiveness among men, and God requires us to forgive one another on this ground alone. Then, why is not repentance of itself a sufficient ground of forgiveness of sins against God?

This is one of the most important and, withal, one of the most difficult questions connected with the whole subject of atonement.

Looking at the subject in the light of this objection, thousands of honest men have rejected the doctrine of atonement as unreasonable and supererogatory. In my own experience with classes, I have found it exceedingly difficult to satisfy some students that any propitiation at all is necessary.

The question, therefore, seems to demand some careful attention.

1. It does not follow that because repentance is a sufficient ground of forgiveness between man and man, that it is therefore a sufficient ground of forgiveness between man and God.

Between man and man there is equality of nature. Hence, their disagreements or enmities are incidental, not constitutional and necessary. Hence, no change of their nature is necessary to their reconciliation, but only a change of an adventitious state of mind. Hence, bare confession of a fault is a sufficient ground of forgiveness. This forgiveness requires only a change of feeling, and not a change of inborn characteristics of mind.

2. On the contrary, what is required in order to deliverance from sin against God is not a mere change of an accidental state of the passions, but a change of the heart from an inborn constitutional bias to evil—a natal enmity to God and insubordination to his will. This change involved in forgiveness of sin is represented as a regeneration, a renewal by the Holy Spirit, a new creation, a being born from above, or of God.

3. No repentance is sufficient ground for so radi-

cal a change. In fact, repentance is no part of its ground at all, but only its condition.

The objection assumes that repentance is possible without the mediation of Christ, or that men could repent of sin as effectually without this mediation as with it. This, however, is a fatal error; for it is this mediation that renders repentance itself possible. (Luke xxiv. 46, 47; Phil. ii. 6–11.)

Repentance is the grant of Christ, the *quickening spirit*, without whose influence repentance unto life is impossible. (Acts xi. 18.)

All divine and saving influence is avouched to men by the mediation of the risen Christ. (John xvi. 7–11; 1 Cor. xii. 1–13.)

4. But even if repentance, independent of this divine influence, was possible, it could not be accepted as a ground of forgiveness; for nothing—absolutely nothing—is acceptable to God, which is not sanctified or separated unto him. But, whatever is sanctified or appropriated unto him is acceptable to him. (Rom. xii. 1; Heb. ix. 13.) Nor can any other than a divinely-consecrated priest sanctify or offer acceptable sacrifices.

This fact is fearfully exemplified by Saul's attempt to offer sacrifices without priestly authority, which cost him his kingdom. (1 Sam. xiii. 9–14.) Also by the attempt of Korah, and the two hundred and fifty men of renown to burn incense, which was a function of the priesthood alone. You will observe that the burning of incense by these men not consecrated to the priestly office, provoked God's anger and cost them their lives;

but the same act performed by Aaron, the high-priest, turned away God's anger and saved the nation. (Num. xxv.)

Why this difference? Because, and only because, Aaron had been consecrated to the priesthood, but Korah had not.

Nor does God accept even what is sanctified from unsanctified hands. This fact is strikingly illustrated by his indignant rejection of the incense offering made by Korah and those allied with him. The incense, and the censers in which it was burned were sanctified, yet Korah's act was regarded and punished as sacrilege.

The reason of this rejection of whatever is unsanctified, and the acceptance of whatever is sanctified seems to be simply the fact that there is no congruity, nothing in common, no fellowship between the *holy* and the *unholy*. What communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? (1 Cor. vi. 14–18.)

God is holy, but the sinner is unholy—is of himself out of fellowship with God, because not sanctified or consecrated to God.

If he could, by an act of will, put himself into a state of thorough consecratedness, then he would be his own sanctifier, atoner, and savior. But even *to will* to thus consecrate himself to God is impossible without divine aid, as we have seen. God works in him (not the will) but "*to will.*" (Phil. ii. 12.)

This divine aid comes only through the mediation of Christ, the quickening spirit.

The sinner can not, therefore, sanctify himself, for none but the sanctified can sanctify—none but the holy can make holy. To require a man unsanctified to sanctify himself is to require an impossibility. We might as well expect the Ethiopian to change his skin or the leopard its spots.

Hence, the unsanctified sinner could never sanctify himself, or make propitiation for himself, or repent, or do any thing acceptable to God, even if he could know just what is necessary to his reconciliation to God.

The sanctuary, the holy place, the altar, the holy things offered in religious worship among the Jews, all required propitiation to be made for them by priestly consecrations.

If these things, without moral qualities, required to be consecrated, in order to be acceptable to God, we can very readily see why sinful humanity needs to be sanctified or consecrated to God before he could accept them or any acts of worship at their hands.

Hence, the absolute necessity of the sanctification of humanity by a priest in his own right, who gave "himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savor."

We are accordingly expressly told (Heb. xiii. 10–12) that "Jesus, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate."

This sanctification of all humanity (Jews and Gentiles) is indicated by his suffering without the gate.

By virtue of this one sacrificial offering all humanity is so sanctified that every man may bring

his offerings before the mercy-seat, or to Christ, his great high-priest, and find acceptance. This is the new and living way.

You should note the important fact that this sanctification of all humanity by this sacrificial offering does not affect the moral or the legal condition of men. The atonement made for the altar did not affect the altar itself, but only its relation to God. The great atonement for humanity was as truly made independently of human volition as was the atonement for the altar made independently of the altar. But as the atonement made for the altar rendered it acceptable to God, so every human being is rendered so far acceptable to God that he may consecrate himself to God through Christ, "who is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

Hence, the sinner's confession, repentance, etc., do not constitute the grounds of his acceptance with God at all. Hence, he is not accepted for the sake of his prayers, repentance, or any thing else possible to him, but for Christ's sake alone.

This method of coming to God through Christ is beautifully illustrated by the tabernacle service. The atonement made by the high-priest on the "great day of atonement" was made with victims taken from among the people and for all the people —for one no more and no less than another. By virtue of this great propitiation, each individual could bring for himself his own sacrificial victim to the tabernacle, and having put his hands upon its head in benediction, that it might be accepted,

turned it over to the priest, by whom its blood—its life—was put upon the holy altar, which sanctified it and rendered it acceptable, as an act of worship, through the great atonement made by the high-priest. These individual sacrifices, which were accepted through the great atonement, were intended as ritual supplications for divine favor, and were absolutely so regarded by the Jews. Saul actually identifies them with "supplication," and Abraham as worship (1 Sam. xiii. 12; Gen. xxii. 5.) The whole service symbolized the worshiper's consecration to God, through Christ, who is the propitiation for sin.

Let it be distinctly noted that these and all other individual sacrifices were made allowable and effective only by virtue of the great atonement made by the high-priest. This atonement was the true symbol of the mediation of the crucified and risen Christ the life-giving spirit.

Hence, the individual sacrifices among the Jews sustained to the great atonement exactly the same relation that our religious worship—prayers, thanksgiving, and offerings of all kinds, public and private—sustain to Jesus Christ, our atoning sacrifice and priest. He is our altar (Heb. xiii. 10–15) upon which we lay ourselves and our offering, and which sanctifies every thing that touches it and renders it acceptable to God (Rom. xii. 1.).

Faith, which implies repentance, confession, and supplication, is the hand by which we lay ourselves upon this altar; but only that which is laid upon it is consecrated and accepted.

By this contact through faith with Christ, his nature is imparted as the altar imparts its holiness to whatever touches it, and he thus becomes "the Lord our righteousness," or "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

In the face of these facts we see clearly enough that what is called atonement of Christ is essentially more than a mere exemplification of the highest human virtue, the bare following of which some suppose is sufficient to save humanity. It is Christ himself that saves, and not his mere example.

We also clearly see the insufficiency of repentance as a ground of acceptance with God, even if it was possible to us without the mediation of Christ and the influence that comes from him.

All needed influence to enable us to come to Christ is avouched to us through this gracious mediation.

I have previously said that an atonement is necessary as an objective ground of faith, hope, etc. We know both from experience and observation that the human mind needs some object outside of itself in which to trust for deliverance from evils, both subjective and objective.

Every man, whatever may be his creed, is sensible of his dependence on some thing above and mightier than himself—is sensible of his responsibilities to such a power, and feels the need of propitiating that power. If he has not put out his eyes with his sophistries, and seared his conscience with his vices, he has a sense of his sin and condemnation, from which he can not free himself. He feels that

he has offended against a power upon whom he is dependent, and whom he ought to propitiate.

If I offend you willingly, I instinctively feel that I ought to make reparation—that I really have no right to expect your forgiveness and favor unless I make confession. This confession then becomes an objective ground of faith that you will forgive me. But when we believe that we have sinned against a righteous and omnipotent God, who abhors all sin, we feel that something must be done to secure his favor. But we can not persuade ourselves that a bare confession of our sins is of itself a sufficient ground for believing that he will forgive.

We may confess our sins with the deepest contrition, and yet have the impression that something more is needed. Hence, we often put ourselves upon a sort of penance-work to propitiate God. Realizing so deeply a sense of our unworthiness, we feel as if it would scarcely be less than sacrilege and presumption to expect him to save us in our present state.

Seekers may remain in this distressing state of mind for years; nor can they be relieved from it, until they come to recognize Christ as the all-sufficient ground of pardon and acceptance with God. They then rejoice in the freeness and fullness of his gracious salvation, regarding their own works as worthless.

CHAPTER XV.

SECTION I.—*Was Christ, as to his humanity, bound by the same divine law that binds all other men to love God with all the heart, and their neighbors as themselves; and did he literally fulfill all the requirements of that law?*

I answer that Christ came under this law just as all others come under it. He was "born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5). As God, he was not under law at all. Who can impose law upon God? That Christ, as God, came under some sort of compact or covenant stipulations to redeem *a part of mankind* by penal substitution, is a pure theological figment, which is as unscriptural as it is unreasonable. Christ as divine was the author of law, and not a subject. As human, he came under law as do all other men—was born under the law.

Being without sin, he was able to fulfill this law which no other man, born of woman, could do.

Note.—How Christ, born of a *sinful* woman, could be without sin, is a question which has received various and conflicting answers. I have seen none that were free from objections.

The true solution, I think, is found in the perfect passivity of the Virgin Mother. There can be no

sinfulness without voluntariness, and no propagation of a sinful nature when there is no volition connected with the conception. In these respects the virgin was as passive as the dust of which Adam was made. Hence Christ, though born of a sinful woman, was himself without sin.

He came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it; not to abrogate, relax, or in any way to modify it, but literally to meet all its requirements. He was "obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." More than this, the law could not require, and less than this could not meet its demands. Hence, he did exactly what the law required.

SECTION II.—*Did Christ, it is often asked, obey the law in the place of those for whom he died?*

I answer with the utmost decision, No. The *terms* of the law *of themselves* exclude the possibility of such an obedience. To this question, however, many of our most learned theologians return an affirmative answer. One of the most adroit defenders of substitution says (Hodge, Vol. II., p. 494):

"The work of Christ was, therefore, of the nature of a satisfaction to the demands of the law. By his obedience and suffering, by his whole righteousness, active and passive. He, as our representative and substitute, did and endured all that the law demands.

Those, who by faith receive this righteousness and trust upon it for justification, are saved; and receive the renewing of their whole nature into the image of God. Those who refuse to submit to this righteousness of God, and go about to

establish their own righteousness, are left under the demands of the law; they are required to be free from all sin, or having sinned, to bear the penalty."

I will not here attempt to refute all the errors contained in this quotation; will only briefly note a few of its incongruities.

1. If Christ obeyed the law actively for himself, then of course there was no penalty to endure on his own account. For obedience of necessity excludes penalty. A man who obeys the law is not liable to its penalty.

2. If Christ did actively obey the law, as *our substitute*, then of necessity there could be no penalty to endure on *our account;* for active or preceptive obedience inevitably excludes penalty. Hence, to assert that Christ obeyed the law in our stead, and at the same time, or at any time, endured the penalty in our stead, is to assert a palpable impossibility, because it makes him obey the law, and yet suffer the consequences or penalty of not obeying it. Just as well say a man eats, and yet suffers the consequences of not eating; or, that a man does right, and yet suffers the consequences of doing wrong.

3. If Christ rendered an active obedience to the law in our stead, and also rendered a passive obedience in our stead, then he rendered a double obedience in our stead. If justice requires all this, it requires more than its due, and what, as we have just seen, is impossible.

4. If Christ has twice obeyed the law for us—

actively and passively—how happens it that any for whom he has rendered this double obedience "are left under the demands of the law . . . to bear the penalty for themselves?"

According to our author, a two-fold obedience is rendered for all that are saved, and a three-fold obedience is rendered in reference to those not saved (if Christ died for all); first, by Christ's active obedience; secondly, by his passive obedience; and thirdly, by the passive obedience (so called) of the sinner himself. These are only a part of the incongruities contained in this quotation.

Now, in opposition to this and much other high authority, I affirm that Christ obeyed the law for himself—simply did what it required him to do, not as a substitute, but as an individual subject. This obedience, of course, relates both to God and to all humanity; or, it consisted in love to God and to his neighbor, so that God is honored and his neighbor is benefited by it. If I do my whole duty to my neighbor needing help, I thereby honor God and become a benefactor to my neighbor, but I in no sense become his substitute. I do not obey the law in his stead, but do my duty to him. Consider the following facts:

1. The terms of the law utterly exclude the possibility of vicarious obedience. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with *all* thy heart . . . and thy neighbor as thyself (Luke x. 27).

Love is what is required; love is the fulfilling of the law (Rom. xiii. 10); love to the full extent of ability—*with all the heart.*

If the law required a specific amount of obedience —a "half shekel" of silver—then we could conceive it possible for one man to pay for himself, and also for a poor neighbor. But in this case the rich man would not be a substitute, but a benefactor.

But this is manifestly not the nature of the obedience required. Obedience *according to ability* is what is demanded.

This simple fact makes it impossible for one to obey in the place of another. This obvious fact excludes the possibility of any supererogative obedience on the part of Christ—or of obedience in excess of his individual obligation—which can be set to the credit of the disobedient. No redundance or overflowing surplus in the case is possible. According to ability is the demand.

Thus it is as clear as light itself that if Christ's ability to love God and men was a thousand-fold greater than that of all other beings combined, it can not exceed the demands of the law.

This fact cuts up by the root the whole doctrine of supererogatory or redundant obedience and the scheme of substitution falls with it.

It brings no relief to say that Christ was an infinite personality, and as such could yield "an infinite suffering" in a finite time; for if this absurd notion was true, still it remains true that his love, obedience, suffering, or whatever the law requires, can never exceed the requirements of the law, which is according to ability. Even infinite ability can not exceed the law's demands.

And because the law requires perpetual as well as full obedience, he must render this infinite obedience strictly on his own account at every instant through infinite duration. Hence, we can not fail to see that supererogatory and vicarious obedience is an impossible thing.

2. The nature of this obedience required excludes the idea of substitution. The law explicitly requires love, of which external obedience is the appropriate expression. "This is the love of God that ye keep his commandments" (John v. 3).

While mind remains mind, it will be true that one mind can not love or obey in the place of another. Even if a change of personalities was possible, still one could not love in the place of another; for in every possible condition each personality would have its own state, called love.

3. Nor would it be of any conceivable advantage to have a substitute to love or obey in our stead; or to do our loving for us. On the contrary, if such was possible, it would be a grievous calamity instead of a favor; for God has purposely so constituted the human mind, and all created minds, as to make their crowning excellence and highest blessedness *consist in loving*. Not to love is to be miserable. This is an admitted psychological truth. I suppose the chief difference between heaven and hell is that the former is full of love, the latter of hate. You may love my friends as much or more than I do, but I am glad you can not love them in my place. If you should happen to do so strange a thing, you would wrong me grievously by depriv-

ing me of the pleasure that comes from loving them myself.

If any good or pleasure comes from thinking, or from loving my neighbors, or from loving or obeying my precious Savior, I certainly do not wish any substitute to take these pleasures from me.

I ought to be profoundly grateful to the blessed, loving Christ, not for doing what he did not do, nor for doing what he could not do, nor for doing what, if done, would be the greatest of all calamities to me, but for obeying the law in his own place—even unto death, and being raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, and thus made a quickening spirit, who can impart to me his own death unto sin and life unto God, and thus enable me to love God and my neighbor for myself.

His mission was not to love God in the place of rebellious and miserable sinners, and also endure the penal wrath of God in their stead, but to enable helpless sinners to love God for themselves, and thus avoid the consequences of disobedience by a return to obedience as a patient is released from pain by restoration to health.

4. If Christ as a substitute by his active obedience fulfilled the law for humanity, and if the atonement is older than Adam, as it avowedly is, how was it possible for sin to affect humanity or enter our world at all?

Christ, having from the foundation of the world, fully met by his active obedience all the claims of law in the place of humanity, the possibility of sin seems to be effectively excluded; for obedience

and disobedience are mutually exclusive one of the other.

But sin actually exists. It can not, therefore, be true that Christ did by his active obedience fulfill the law in the place of all humanity; or even any part of it, for all men are sinners. Or, Christ having perfectly obeyed the law for all, the law has never been disobeyed at all, and hence, sin does not exist. This exposes the weakness of the theory.

5. Again, if Christ suffered the penalty in the place of all men, then by what principle of law can any be required to suffer the penalty for themselves? I know it is sometimes said that they are punished for not accepting Christ.

But this is contradictory; for if Christ atoned for all the sins of humanity, then he, of course, atoned for the sin of rejecting Christ as really as for any other.

Now, I desire you to examine for yourselves whether these and all similar perplexities are not effectually avoided by allowing that Christ fulfilled the law only in his own place; and by his sacrificial death and resurrection became a quickening spirit, who saves all that obey him.

This view of the subject enables us to understand how it is that the sinner is strictly under law and as truly condemned as he could be, if no atonement had been made for him; how it is that his justification is conditioned upon faith, though ample atonement has been made for him; also, how it is that there is no possibility of a double obedience to the law, and no double penalty; no payments of

debts partly by penalty and partly by dignity; no commutation of one kind of penalty for another; no need for a rule by which to equate the value of penal suffering with the holy obedience required by the law—or between penal fire and reverential love; no necessity for the relaxation of law claims, or acceptillation of any sort; no need for asserting the unscriptural and absurd doctrine of penal sacrifices, or of saving merit in a penal death, or the strange figment of *passive and penal righteousness.*

SECTION III.—*The question is often put by theologues, How are we saved by the mediation of Christ?*

I will first answer according to the penal theory, and then give a different method.

1. Adam's sin or guilt is imputed to his posterity, and thus becomes the sin of humanity.

2. This common sin of humanity is in some way imputed to Christ, and becomes really his sin or guilt.

3. Christ endured the punishment of this sin and all the sins of the elect, and thus satisfies punitive justice, and by this means creates a fund of righteousness — penal righteousness it would seem— which takes away all liability to punishment from those for whom he suffered—keeps them out of gehenna, but does not give a qualification for heaven.

4. Christ obeyed the law preceptively, or by active obedience, and this gives a legal title to heaven, but no qualification, but insures such qualification before or at death.

5. This complex righteousness is imputed, according to some, to all for whom Christ died; according to others, to all that believe in Christ.

6. According to most limitarians, all for whom Christ suffered the penalty of the law are unconditionally regenerated, faith and repentance being the natural and necessary consequence of this regeneration. Hence, all such are justified by the imputed righteousness of Christ.

According to libertarians, all that believe in Christ are justified by this imputation unto them, and being thus justified are regenerated and saved.

A briefer statement is as follows: The sin of Adam is imputed to humanity; the sin of humanity is imputed to Christ; the righteousness of Christ is imputed to those for whom he died.

This seems plausible, because of its simplicity. This plausibility, however, arises in part out of ambiguity of terms, rather than out of a real harmony of the facts involved.

1. The word impute is ambiguous and deceptive. It sometimes means to attribute to a person what is real, as to attribute goodness to God; sometimes to attribute what is not real, as the Jews attributed to Christ a devil. Now the word impute is used in both these radically different senses in the above given plausible statement. The imputation of Adam's sin to humanity, and that of humanity to Christ are held to be intensely real, and not in any sense ideal; but the imputation of Christ's righteousness to men is held to be not real but ideal—that is, Christ's righteousness does not make those

to whom it is imputed really, but only putatively righteous. Hence, God deals with them not as really righteous, but "*as if they were so.*"

This reduces the righteousness or justification of those to whom the imputation is made to a pure legal fiction, having no necessary corresponding moral state of the mind or heart.

This, I think, is not the Bible view of the subject.

2. This subordinates the moral to the legal, the greater to the less. It proceeds on the assumption that man is corrupt because he is condemned, and not condemned because he is corrupt, which is alike contrary to the Bible and to the order of nature.

According to the theory, the work of reconciling men to God begins in the sphere of law, and works from the outer to the inner—or from forensic justification to regeneration. The reverse process is true. (Rom. viii. 28–30.)

It seems proper here to say, that in this method of applying the atonement to the individual, as it is expressed, the penal theory is consistent with itself. In fact this method of saving the individual seems to be a necessary theological correlate of the theory itself.

3. This method of justifying and saving the individual deals with pure abstractions as if they were veritable realities. It conceives of the righteousness of Christ as if it was something achieved, or wrought out by Christ, and, hence, as an entitive product, distinct from Christ as is a piece of cloth

distinct from the cloth maker, with which one may be clothed, or as a sum of money which may be set by one party to the credit of another. This is unadulterated *realism.*

We often deceive ourselves by the use of abstract terms, such as virtue, vice, sin, righteousness, etc., assuming them to be some kind of entities, and not the mere attributes or qualities of things.

But, we should remember that righteousness, like sin, is an abstract term, which we use to express our conception of a quality of a moral agent, and not of something having existence independent of such agent.

Hence, there can be no such thing as sin, apart from a sinful mind. So it is of the righteousness or merit of Christ. It has no such existence as a piece of cloth or bank deposit. It exists only as a quality or attribute of Christ. If Christ were to cease to be, his righteousness would also cease to be, for a quality can not exist independently of the entity of which it is a quality.

When we justify the individual, therefore, by imputing to him the righteousness of Christ, as something different from Christ, we justify him by a pure abstraction to which there is no corresponding reality.

The very first thing necessary in order to establish this mode of justification is to prove beyond the possibility of doubt that realism is true, or that righteousness, sin, etc., do exist as entities apart from the agents which originate them.

It may, or may not, surprise you when I affirm without qualification that there is absolutely no such thing as the righteousness of Christ, or merit or holiness of Christ, apart from the living Christ himself.

Such expressions mean only the righteous, the meritorious, the holy Christ. The righteousness of Christ and the righteous Christ are equivalent expressions—mean precisely the same thing—the first being the abstract, and the second the concrete form of the same idea.

The righteousness then which justifies is not something wrought out or fabricated by Christ which, apart from Christ, is imputed to us, or set to our credit, because of which we are treated as if we were righteous, while, in fact we are not.

The plan of salvation does not rest upon realism; nor does it deal in shams or legal fictions. Nor is it an immense commercial institution, having as its basis an infinite fund of righteousness or merit, purchased by the penal death of an infinite personality, which has been on deposit, in some inconceivable part of the moral government, from the foundation of the world, to be set to the credit of a select portion of mankind of all nations and all ages, whose salvation is infallibly insured by this deposit made in their individual and special interest.

On the contrary, Christianity or the gospel is a divine power—God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. Hence, it is not what he did eighteen hundred years ago, or from the foundation of

the world, that saves men, but what the living Christ does now that saves men. The bare *making* of the brazen serpent healed none, but made the healing possible to all, inevitable to none, but sure to every one that looked upon it.

What you are now doing does not persuade sinners to come to Christ, but will enable *you* to persuade them to come to him. Preparation to do a thing and the doing of it, are certainly different things.

So, while Christ's death and resurrection of themselves save none nor render the salvation of any necessary, they make him the Savior of all men, especially of those that believe. (1 Tim. iv. 10.)

Hence, we are never commanded to trust in Christ's sufferings, or in his blood, or in his death, but *in Christ himself.*

Paul says: "We both labor and suffer reproach because we trust *in the living God*, who is the Savior of all men, especially of those that believe."

Paul did not say to the jailer, "Believe in what Christ has done and suffered;" but, "Believe in the *Lord Jesus Christ* and thou *shalt be saved.*"

On the contrary, the substitutionary scheme requires us to believe that the death of Christ was a "penal satisfaction to justice," and that it necessitates the salvation of all for whom Christ suffered; or, that it is his death that satisfies justice and expiates guilt, and insures salvation. Hence, a *dead* or unrisen Christ would be as truly a Savior as a

risen Christ. We know that a title deed is as valid after the death of the author as before that death.

The validity of a legal obligation depends in no sense upon the survival of either party. If the death of Christ expiates human guilt, by satisfying justice, and brings God under obligation to regenerate and save, then the resurrection of Christ can have no effect upon the question of the sinner's salvation.

According to the theory, justice is satisfied, the sinner's guilt expiated, and his salvation assured, whether Christ is risen from the dead or not.

Christ, it would seem, rose from the dead on his own account, and in no respect in the interest of the sinner's justification and regeneration. Not even for their resurrection from the dead are the elect indebted to a risen Christ, for there is to be a resurrection of the unjust, or reprobate, as truly as of the just or elect. Of course the substitutionist would not be willing to admit these conclusions, nor do I charge him with believing them. But they seem to be logically involved in the fundamental principles of his theory.

But, according to the Bible, the death and the resurrection of Christ of themselves save none, but were the indispensable means by which he became the Savior of those that believe.

Had he not risen from the dead, he would be no Savior at all. Hence, the immense importance that the Bible attaches to his resurrection. Paul sets this fact in a very strong light. He says:

(Rom. iv. 25): "He was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification."

(1 Cor. xv. 14–17): If "Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain, and ye are yet in your sins."

Hence, a living Christ alone can save.

This fact that it is Christ and not his death that saves sinners, cuts the whole substitutionary scheme out of root.

Having indicated what are to me formidable objections to the common method of bringing the sinner into a state of justification, I will now briefly outline a different method, which I think is more in accordance with the Bible, human reason, and Christian experience.

(1) Adam, having corrupted his moral nature by his disobedience, transmitted this corrupted nature by natural heredity to his posterity.

His sinful *act* is not in any proper sense imputed to us, but his vitiated moral nature is transmitted to us by a natural process, as is his animal and intellectual nature. This natal depravity is spiritual death, and creates the necessity for the special mediation of the God-Man, who, by his obedience unto death, and his resurrection, becomes a quickening spirit, who imparts his own holy nature and righteousness to those that trust in him for salvation.

Hence, we are expressly informed (Jer. xxiii. 6) that he should be "called the Lord our righteousness." We can not, without very largely supplementing this text, get out of it the idea of substi-

tution with double imputation, etc. The natural inference seems to be that the Lord is just simply our righteousness, and this is what I assert. We have a similar statement (1 Cor. i. 30):

"But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption."

All these things are related to us and come to us in the same way. Hence, if righteousness is imputed to us, sanctification and redemption are also imputed to us, and if we are only accounted and treated as righteous, while we are not really so, then it follows that we are not really sanctified and redeemed or saved, but only treated as *if we* were so.

It is also said (2 Cor. v. 21):

"Him who knew no sin, he made *to be* sin (a sin-offering) on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in him."

In what sense or how are we made the righteousness of God? The word righteousness is an abstract word, and the expression, "made the righteousness of God in him," is equivalent to being made partakers of God's righteousness by virtue of our union with Christ, or because we are "in him."

Three lessons are distinctly taught:

(1) That Christ knew no sin, personal or imputed.

(2) That he was made or became a sin-offering—then, of course, not a penal sacrifice.

(3) That those in him become partakers of "the righteousness (of God) which is of faith." (Rom. iii. 22; ix. 30; x. 6.)

Hence, it is clear that we are justified, made righteous, and saved by having the righteousness of God, received by faith, or by being *in Christ.*

The uniform teaching of the Bible is that we are made righteous by partaking of Christ's righteousness, or by being in him who is our righteousness.

If this is true, then justification or righteousness is not something imposed upon us from without by imputation, but is the divinely-appointed sequence of ethical union with Christ, or being made one with Christ.

If this is true, then the righteousness of the believer is not ideal, but real. Certainly it is not a self-originated, but a derived righteousness, but none the less real on this account. The magnetism of the mariner's compass is not primal, but derived from the natural magnet, but is real, nevertheless. The life of the ingrafted branch *is real*, though derived from the stock with which it is united, and the life of one is the life of the other. This will more fully appear from what follows.

SECTION IV.—*But it is asked, how is this unification with Christ brought about, or secured?*

This is a vital question, and merits some special attention. I answer, it is brought about "through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."

Note.—I do not use the word sanctification in the sense of moral purity or sinlessness, but in the strict

Bible sense, viz.: separateness from worldliness and appropriation to God and sacred uses.

Sanctification on the human side is the voluntary element of saving faith. By this mental act we take hold on Christ, or give ourselves to him, or lay ourselves upon him as our altar, or mercy-seat. But this act on our part is not the real sanctification of the Spirit, or what is imparted by the quickening spirit, but is only the means, or antecedent, upon which this sanctification is conditioned. The conditioning act is in a sense ours; the divinely-ordained sequent of this act is the sanctification that comes from Christ, our altar, or mercy-seat, which sanctifies whatever touches it, and renders it acceptable to God. The divinely-ordained order, as we have seen, is sacrifice, sanctification, and acceptance with God (Rom. xii. 1; Heb. ix. 13).

The process is suitably illustrated by the tabernacle service.

An important difference between the old and the "*New and living way*," which Christ has opened up for us, is that in the latter no mediating human priest is required.

Christ, having suffered without the gate, that he might sanctify the people (all humanity) with his blood, every man becomes his own priest in such a sense that he may lay himself and all his offerings upon Christ, his mercy-seat, by whom he is sanctified and made partaker of Christ's holiness (Heb. xii. 10; 1 Cor. ix. 10); is made partaker of Christ, or with Christ (Heb. iii. 14); is made partaker of the divine nature (2 Peter i. 4).

In these texts we are expressly told that those who give themselves to Christ, or trust in Christ, are made partakers of the altar that sanctifies all that touches it; or are made partakers of Christ's sanctification; partakers of the divine nature—of Christ himself.

Now, in this impartation of Christ's holiness, Christ's righteousness, Christ's nature, and of Christ himself to those who consecrate themselves trustingly to him, we can scarcely fail to see how we become partakers of Christ's holiness, and how Christ becomes the "Lord our righteousness," and "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth" (Rom. x. 4), how believers become dead to sin and have their lives hid with Christ in God (Col. iii. 3), how "ye are not under the law, but under grace" (Rom. vi. 14), and in fine, how Christ becomes the "author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him" (Heb. v. 9).

This sanctification, insured by faith, or spiritual contact with Christ, is illustrated by the marital relation in which twain are made one.

Paul teaches (1 Cor. vii. 14) that the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the (believing) wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband; else were your children unclean, but now are they holy." (This, of course, is ritual sanctification.) Unification by the marital relation, in which two become one, is a favorite mode of illustration by the sacred writers. Christ is represented as the Bridegroom and the Church—believers—as the bride, and they are ethically and in law recognized as one

and identical. Christ recognizes this union when he says, "because I live ye shall live also" (John xiv. 19).

Paul pronounces this union between Christ and believers a great mystery. Nevertheless, he affirms it to be real, and the ground of salvation (Eph. v. 22–33).

In this vital union, the spiritual life of the believer is represented as coming wholly from Christ, as illustrated by the dependence of the branch upon the vine whence it derives its life.

Also, by the life and sustenance of the body upon the nutritious material upon which it feeds. "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life" (John vi. 53, 54). The scion lives by partaking of the flesh and blood, so to speak, of the stock into which it is ingrafted.

In the light of Scripture facts, we readily see how believers are put into Christ and sanctified by that relation, or made partakers of his holiness.

Now, I wish you to make a special note of the fact that sanctification and righteousness, though essentially distinct, are, nevertheless, absolutely inseparable. They are, in fact, simply different aspects of the same event.

Paul so connects them (1 Cor. i. 30):

"Of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."

Hence, to affirm one of these things, as the result of being in Christ, is by consequence to affirm all. Hence, it is plain that the sinner, in being united to Christ by faith, is made partaker of Christ's sanctification and righteousness.

If Christ obeyed the law in his own place, and not in the place of others, how could this perfect personal obedience avail for the salvation of others?

The persistency with which this question is put betrays the impression that somehow the obedience of Christ constituted an immense fund of merit apart and distinct from Christ himself, which is set to the credit of individuals as occasion requires. The following seems to be a sufficient answer:

Suppose it should be asked: If Adam disobeyed the law on his own account, how could his personal disobedience or unrighteousness involve others in unrighteousness? Did his act of disobedience create an immense fund of unrighteousness, a definite portion of which is charged up against each one of his posterity?

This is an intensely realistic view of the subject. It assumes the existence of sin or unrighteousness as possible, independent of a sinful mind, and which somehow becomes a possession of the infant mind independently of the law of heredity. Hence, that a corrupt nature is communicated to such a mind, both by a natural and a supernatural providence or process.

A more simple, a more rational, and, withal, a more scriptural view is, that the first Adam did, by

disobedience, corrupt his moral nature, and did impart that corrupted nature to his posterity by the divinely-established law of heredity, just as he transmitted his other natural characteristics.

Now, if the first Adam did actually transmit his personally unrighteous nature or spiritual death by natural generation only, then are we not required by the typal relation between the first and the second Adam to believe that the latter does by regeneration actually transmit his own personal righteousness to all that believe in him?

If the spiritual death of the first Adam, who is of the earth earthy, or natural, could be actually transmitted by generation, why should not the spiritual life of the second Adam, who is the Lord from heaven, and the "life-giving spirit," be imparted to those who obey him? This is possible, reasonable, and biblical.

CHAPTER XVI.

SECTION I.—*Sufficiency and redundancy of merit in Christ.*

Is there a bare sufficiency, or a redundancy of merit in Christ?

This question has been much debated by substitutionists, but no definite answer has been reached. To those holding the theory, the question seems pertinent and important. To those rejecting the theory it is about equivalent to asking whether God has too much or too little power to govern the world.

The prevailing notion seems to be that Christ's sufferings were infinite, and, therefore, more than an offset to the demerit of humanity, which is less than infinite. Still his merit is not available to all because not intended for all.

It seems proper to say, that if there is any merit in penal suffering, then of course the degree of penal suffering ought to exactly equal the sufferings due to those for whom he suffered—no more, no less.

But why should Christ endure infinite suffering to neutralize a finite measure of guilt? Why suffer more than a bare sufficiency? By enduring infinite suffering he rendered to justice more than what was due; and the excess was equal to the difference be-

tween finity and infinity. Is it not as grievous an injustice to receive too much as too little?

The difference between finity and infinity is, I should say, itself infinite. Now, would it not be a less wrong for justice to remit a finite degree of demerit, than to receive an infinite amount of suffering?

This would save all the world with less injustice than is done in rendering to justice an infinite degree of suffering for finite demerit.

Again, it is manifestly impossible for Christ, even if he suffered as an *infinite* personality, to endure *infinite* suffering "in *finite* time." This he could not do, unless his sufferings were absolutely without beginning and without end. Suffering may be without end, but is not infinite unless it also is without beginning. It is no relief to say that suffering may be limited as to time, but infinite in degree; for the infinite admits of no limitations.

This view of the sufferings of Christ puts the divine nature under the penalty of the divine law which assumes that God punished himself. Penalists are driven into these and a host of other absurdities by the unscriptural assumption that propitiation consists in *suffering* as such, and not in *obedience* unto death.

To support this egregious error, the text, "without shedding of blood there is no remission" (Heb. ix. 22), is often quoted. To use this text for this purpose is a palpable perversion of its terms, which sets it in array against its context. The text does not say nor imply that without penal suffering

there is no remission, as penalists understand it. The text means just what it says. The life is in the blood. To shed the blood is to give the life, or consecrate it to God, without which there is absolutely no remission of sin. The context and the terms of the text itself attribute no efficacy to suffering as such, but attribute all efficacy to the blood, or the surrender of the life to God.

There is, therefore, no pertinency in questions concerning the degree of Christ's sufferings, as to whether they were finite or infinite, for, as I have often said, there is absolutely no merit in penalty of any kind.

We might just as pertinently perplex ourselves with the impracticable question as to how much suffering a physician must endure to give him the right to cure his patient; or how much suffering a father must experience to give him the right to reform and save a fallen child.

It is not a question of right acquired by substitutionary suffering but a question of power to adapt means to given ends.

There is, therefore, no limit to the saving power of Christ, or of God in Christ, any more than there is a limit to divine power in nature. Though this saving power or righteousness may be imparted to millions upon millions, it can never become less.

If humanity continues to be propagated for millions of centuries, Adamic depravity will continue to involve all in sinfulness; for it is not an entity in itself capable of exhaustion, but a quality in humanity which is necessarily coeval with humanity.

So it is of the saving righteousness of Christ. It is not a fund of merit, finite or infinite, nor the equivalent of penal sufferings, finite or infinite, which can be increased or diminished, but is simply a divine power which is capable neither of increase nor decrease.

We have just as much authority for limiting God's creative power in the physical world as we have for limiting his *saving* power in Christ. Instead of being like an immense banking fund, to be put to the credit of certain individuals, and which of course may be diminished, it is rather like knowledge which may be imparted to others without any decrease.

If you impart to others a knowledge of a given fact, known only to yourself, this impartation does not take away nor diminish your knowledge of it; nor is the *quantum* of knowledge increased in the slightest degree by the impartation of it to others. The only change produced by the impartation is, that it becomes the property of a greater number. The same knowledge, you will perceive serves equally well all those to whom it is imparted.

Exactly so is it of the sanctification or saving power of Christ. This sanctification and righteousness by impartation become the property of all that believe in Christ—an innumerable multitude. But if this righteousness was imparted to every human being, it would save all without diminishing his own righteousness.

This righteousness, etc., imparted to believers, makes them righteous exactly in the same sense in

which Christ is righteous. It is of course available for their acceptance with God in the same sense in which Christ's sanctified humanity is accepted of God. They being in him are accepted because he is accepted, are righteous because he is righteous.

He is not their substitute in any proper sense. Or, if he is, then may we say the parent, whose nature is imparted to his child, is a substitute for his child, or a tree the substitute for the fruit it bears.

Hence, the sinner is not saved as a bankrupt is saved, by having the amount of his indebtedness set to his credit, as substitution assumes. This plan does not impart holiness, but only transfers it, as the money of the surety is actually taken from him and set to the credit of his defaulting principal.

This assumes that Christ's saving power is a commodity—something apart from himself—just as the surety's money is a commodity, apart from the surety himself, and has the same commercial value whether the surety lives or dies.

Hence, according to substitution, an *unrisen* Christ is just as adequate to save those for whom he died as a risen Christ.

According to the theory, every sinner saved diminishes this fund of saving righteousness as surely as the abstraction of a dollar from a bank diminishes the sum on deposit.

(It is a scholastic conceit that the number redeemed is exactly equal to the number of the fallen angels. A later authority affirms that the number is definitely fixed beyond the possibility of increase

or diminution, and that provision is made for these and no others.)

This is consistency. Hence, the penal sufferings of Christ are adequate for this number; no more and no less. For, if there is less, then, of course, some elected to salvation will fail of realizing it; if more, then there will remain a surplus in the treasury after the last draft has been honored. This is commendable for its consistency, but censurable on other grounds.

But what those penalists who make a grand flourish about the "infinite sufferings" of Christ propose to do with this infinite surplus merit, I have not learned, nor can I imagine. A vast fund of *penal righteousness* locked up in the treasury vaults of the moral world, which, however much needed by reprobates, can never be put to any use, is a realistic conception that borders on insanity.

SECTION II.—*The typal relation between Adam and Christ.*

(Rom. v. 12–20.) Adam; who is called a type of Christ, possessed in himself entire human nature, and imparted that nature in its completeness to each of his posterity, without any divarication or diminution of his own complete humanity. Having by disobedience corrupted his moral nature, and become spiritually dead, he imparted that spiritual death, along with all other characteristics of his nature, to his posterity.

Mark, he did not impart what he *did*—the act of sinning—but the sinful nature acquired by sinning.

This sinful nature—spiritual death—he transmitted by natural generation, just as he transmitted his other human characteristics.

In like manner Christ, the second Adam, having through obedience unto death, and being raised to newness of life, became a life-giving spirit, or source of spiritual life, imparts his spiritual life without any divarication or diminution of his own life to all that believe on him.

As it was not Adam's *act* of disobedience that imparted his spiritual death to others, but the impartation of his own corrupt nature by generation; so it is not Christ's obedience unto death that, of itself, brings spiritual life unto others, but the impartation of his own holy nature in regeneration, or spiritual birth.

Hence, as the first Adam, by disobedience, became spiritually dead, and imparted that death by generation to his posterity; so the second Adam, by obedience unto death, becomes a life-giving spirit, who imparts in regeneration his own spiritual life to those that trust in him. Or, as all men are spiritually dead, because they are partakers of the fallen nature of the first Adam; so, all believers are made spiritually alive, or relieved from spiritual death, by becoming partakers of the spiritual life of the second Adam.

But you may quite pertinently inquire whether this imparted righteousness of Christ is adequate to meet the claims of the divine justice or law. I answer, It is.

This personal righteousness of Christ imparted

to men fulfills the law in their behalf to the very letter; for Christ is literally the end (fulfillment) of the law for righteousness to every one that believes. (Rom. x. 4.)

There is absolutely no abrogation, relaxation, or modification of the law. It is literally fulfilled in every "jot and tittle." For if the law *could* and *did* actually sanction the impartation of Adam's corrupt nature, out of which condemnation comes to all men, then of sheer necessity it *can* and *does* permit and sanction the actual—not fictitious—impartation of Christ's righteousness to every one that believes. This is exactly the sense in which Adam is a type of Christ. (Rom. v. 12–20.)

Note the analogy, and also the contrast between them.

1. By Adam sin and spiritual death entered the world; so by Christ spiritual life is brought to light in the gospel.

2. If by the trespass of the one the many died, much more did the grace of God, and the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, abound unto the many.

3. The judgment came of *one* (offense) *to condemnation* (of all); but the free gift came of many *trespasses unto justification.*

4. If by the trespass of *one* (man) death reigned by one, much more shall they that receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness, reign in life through *one, even Jesus Christ.*

5. As through *one trespass* condemnation came unto all men; even so through *one act* of righteous-

ness (Christ's obedience unto death) the free gift came unto all men to justification of life.

6. As through the *one man's disobedience the many* were made *sinners;* even so through the *obedience of the one shall* the many be made *righteous.*

In these statements we have the analogy between the first and the last Adam. It shows with sufficient precision the method by which condemnation comes upon all men through one act of disobedience by the first Adam; and the method by which justification (righteousness) comes to believers through the obedience—not penal, but preceptive—of the second Adam.

The two processes are absolutely identical in kind, but reverse in order; the first being from *disobedience* unto spiritual death and condemnation; and the second from *obedience* unto spiritual life and justification.

If one process is in the most rigid accord with justice and law, so is the other. If one violates justice, or law, or propriety, so does the other. If one is true, so is the other. If one is capable of defense on scientific grounds, so is the other.

This is Paul's plan of salvation as nearly in a nut-shell as I can put it.

We may now see exactly what is meant in the Bible by the remission or pardon of sin. It is not abrogation or relaxation of law, nor the waiving of penalty, nor the substitution "of Christ's sufferings and death for the penalty due to the sinner." nor treating as righteous those that are not

really so; much less is it releasing the guilty by inflicting penalty upon an innocent substitute.

On the contrary, it is simply deliverance from penalty by deliverance from guilt; just as deliverance from physical suffering is secured by the removal of its cause.

To remove the cause is to destroy the effect. To take away sin is to pardon it.

Sin is as truly a malady of the soul as palsy, plague, or fever is of the body. Of this soul-malady Christ is the only healer. Hence, he is represented as the great physician, who heals both soul and body (Mark ii. 17).

SECTION III.—*Relation of believers to the law.*

Let it be *deeply fixed* in mind that salvation is exclusively of grace.

"By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, *it* is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath foreordained that we should walk in them" (Eph. ii. 8–10).

Paul in this text sharply distinguishes between *grace*, *faith*, and *works*. These, though intimately related, are specifically different. Grace saves, faith conditions salvation, and good works are the appropriate fruit. Saving grace is the righteousness of Christ imparted to every believer who "is created in Christ unto good works." Good works, then, are the fruit of this creation in Christ Jesus. Of course the fruit does not change the character of the tree that bears it.

But you ask, is not the Christian's salvation conditioned upon his fidelity or good works?

I think not. His fidelity is rather conditioned upon unification with Christ. "If a man love me he will keep my word" (John xiv. 23). As the tree is, so the fruit.

But does not the Bible say, "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life?"

Certainly the crown, or reward, is conditioned upon fidelity. But life and *a crown* of life are not identical. Spiritual life is the gift of God. The crown comes through fidelity, or good works. We are *saved by grace*, but *rewarded* according to our works (2 Cor. v. 10; Rev. xxii. 12).

Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. Hence, those in Christ are not under the law as a rule of judgment, but under grace (Rom. vi. 14).

Personal righteousness, on the contrary, is radically defective; is "as filthy rags;" has no power to justify or save. It does not condition salvation at all; has no power over the righteousness of Christ, either to increase or diminish it. If it had such power, then it would supplement the righteousness of Christ.

Good works, on the contrary, simply condition the rewards of the believer; have power over the states of the heart, and determine the measure of enjoyment here and hereafter.

We are saved by grace, but rewarded according to our works.

SECTION IV.—The question is often asked, if Adam's state of spiritual death, consequent upon his disobedience, is imparted to all men, why are all not delivered from that death by the obedience of Christ? To this I reply:

1. If deliverance from spiritual death was as irrespective of our voluntary action as is our natural birth, then we should expect all men to be delivered from spiritual death by the obedience of Christ.

But such a method of deliverance would blot out all distinction between necessity and freedom, and destroy even the possibility of morality and religion.

2. If Adam had rendered a perfect obedience, this obedience would have saved none but himself; for one mind can not possibly obey or love God in the place of another mind, and only those that obey are blessed.

Hence, though we are born in a state of spiritual death without our consent, yet, from the necessary character of a moral government, we can not be delivered from spiritual death without our consent. Hence, only those that trust in Christ are saved.

3. To be born in a state of fitness for heaven is impossible, because it presupposes a concreated righteousness, which is a contradiction. Adam was not created in such a state, but only with the possibility of attaining it.

To be born incapable of sin is impossible, because it denies to us all freedom, and consequently all accountability.

4. In view of our relations to the second Adam, it is no injustice to be born in a state of spiritual death on account of the disobedience of the first Adam.

Indeed, it is far better to be born in a state of spiritual death, with effectual deliverance at our option, than to be born, not in a state of spiritual death, but liable to it at every moment, with no possible deliverance, if it should be incurred.

5. None ever could have been saved by Adam's obedience, even if it had been perfect and perpetual. On the contrary, none ever were, or will be lost on account of his disobedience; for the reason of our condemnation is not that we are born in a state of spiritual death, but our voluntary rejection of spiritual life in Christ (John iii. 19). Millions more of human souls, I doubt not, will be saved through the gracious mediation of Christ, than would have been saved, if every man was required to stand upon his personal obedience.

This seems a sufficient answer to the question.

Christ himself the atonement:

Christ, through obedience unto death and his resurrection, becomes the propitiation, or medium, through whom God, or the Holy Spirit, operates upon men, and through whom men have access to God. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the whole world" (1 John ii. 2; iv. 10).

His propitiation has its inception in his obedient and sacrificial death, and its completeness, or life-giving power in his ministrations as the living Christ.

"I am (literally) the way, and the truth, and the life; no one cometh unto the Father but by me" (John xiv. 6), "the new and living way which he hath consecrated for us through . . . his flesh" (Heb. x. 20).

This mediation of Christ conditions and insures all needed influence of the Holy Spirit, a manifestation of which is given to every man to profit withal (1 Cor. xii. 7); or to guide us into all truth (John xvi. 13–16).

SECTION V.—*The Scriptures teach a non-penal scheme of salvation, and condemn substitution.*

Paul's plan of salvation, as outlined above, is in full accord with the Scriptures. Many texts, as we have seen, teach it. Not one condemns it. It harmonizes with every other correlated doctrine of the Bible. If this is so, it must be true; for this is as near demonstration as is possible in the case.

In these respects it stands in bold contrast with the substitutional theory. No text teaches this scheme, nor can be made to teach it without supplementation, or perversion. Moreover, it stands in irreconcilable conflict with hundreds of plain Bible texts. Many of these have been noticed—to name all would be a needless labor. To classify them will answer as well.

It is well known by all that have carefully considered the subject, that substitution, including double imputation (and nothing else is substitution in a theological sense), involves the doctrines either of universalism or partial atonement, also of a partial influence of the Holy Spirit, of "irresistible

grace," of unconditionality in the plan of salvation; also, of moral necessity. These doctrines all stand or fall together. If substitution in its only true or real sense is true, then of necessity all these doctrines are true. If these are not true, then substitution is not true.

1. Thus, if Christ, as a substitute, bore the penalty of the law in the place of all, then all must be saved; otherwise, the penalty is twice inflicted in reference to those not saved—once upon the substitute, and once upon the principal. Hence, universalism must be true. But if universalism is not true, it is only because Christ did not die for all, for substitution infallibly saves all for whom Christ died. Hence, a partial atonement.

2. Again, if penal atonement saves all for whom it is made, then the doctrine of irresistible grace must be true; otherwise, some for whom Christ died might not be saved, and the decree of election would consequently fail.

3. Again, if substitutionary atonement infallibly saves all for whom it is made, then salvation is necessarily *unconditioned* upon faith, or any thing else possible to men. Their salvation is conditioned exclusively upon the death of Christ, as their substitute. If they repent or believe, it is only because "irresistible grace" compels them.

4. Again, if any or all of these doctrines are true, then the doctrine of moral necessity must be true—that is, men are free to do as they do, but not otherwise, or free just as the heart is free to beat, but not free not to beat.

Hence, any text in the Bible that condemns universalism, or partial atonement, or the doctrine of "irresistible grace," or unconditional salvation, or moral necessity, does of necessity condemn substitutionary atonement. To affirm any one of these doctrines, and to deny any one of them, is to affirm a proposition, and yet deny its necessary implications or affiliated doctrines. It consequently follows:

1. That all texts that deny universalism, or deny that Christ died for a part only, do by necessary consequence disprove substitutionary atonement.

2. That all the texts that deny the doctrine of "irresistible grace," do by necessary consequence disprove substitution.

3. That all those texts that teach that salvation is conditioned upon faith, or any thing else, disprove substitution.

4. That all the texts that teach the doctrine of human freedom with an alternative, disprove substitution.

We know that the Bible teaches that men for whom Christ died may be lost—this is explicitly taught (Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11) and implied in numerous other texts—then penal substitution can not be true.

We know the Bible teaches that men may resist the Holy Spirit, then penal substitution can not be true.

We know the Bible conditions salvation upon faith; then penal substitution can not be true.

We know the Bible lays imperatives upon the human will, and holds men accountable for their conduct; then substitution can not be true.

CHAPTER XVII.

SECTION I.—*Libertarian substitution.*

I know there are many who call themselves substitutionists that reject utterly universalism, limited atonement, unconditionality, and moral necessity. All such are involved in serious trouble.

The plain facts of the Bible can no more be made to quadrate with substitution in any form than can the facts of astronomy be made to harmonize with the Ptolemaic theory. If we admit that Christ as our substitute fulfilled the law in any sense by active or passive obedience (so called), then it follows irresistibly that the law, in whatever aspect he fulfilled it, can have no further claims upon us, and universalism follows.

1. I know it is said that, though Christ fulfilled the law in our place, yet God leaves us free to accept or reject his obedience, and that if we by faith receive it, we will be saved, but if we reject it, we must be lost.

Then it follows that the penalties of the law are twice inflicted in relation to all that are not saved —once upon the substitute and once upon the principal. Hence, if penalty "compensates" justice or law, then it is twice compensated in the case of all the lost.

If sin is a debt, and a surety pays it, the creditor

has no right to demand repayment of the principal. If sin is a crime, and the penalty has been fully endured, it can not be again inflicted upon substitute or principal. There is no escape from these plain, hard facts.

2. Again, I have heard it said that Christ obeyed the law in our stead, and now holds us under obligations to himself, and proposes to pardon us on condition of faith in him. This is sometimes made quite plausible; but the calamity is that Christ, according to this view, is a substitute for God, and not for man. So the lawyers will tell you.

This is not substitution at all, in a theological sense. But this method obviates no difficulty, for the penalty is first endured by Christ, and then re-inflicted upon all unbelievers.

3. Others, calling themselves substitutionists, hold that the atonement is governmental, and not strictly retributive—that Christ suffered to satisfy rectoral justice, not retributive justice, or suffered in the interest of the moral government, and not to satisfy divine justice. According to this theory, the necessity of the atonement is founded in the exigencies of the moral government, and not in the divine nature. Christ's death, consequently, is purely exemplary, and not expiatory of guilt. Christ suffered to show God's abhorrence of sin, or his respect for his law. His sufferings were in the interests of the moral government, much as the punishment of a criminal by civil law is intended by its example to protect and benefit the public,

and not to gratify the governor, or actually repair the injuries the criminal has done.

This theory is not upon its face incompatible with a general atonement, human freedom, etc., but is incumbered with other fatal objections, among the more obvious of which are the following:

1. Why should exemplary punishment be inflicted upon the innocent, and not upon the guilty? If some person must suffer as an expression of God's hatred of sin, and as an example to evil-doers, why should not the guilty, rather than the innocent, suffer?

God is always revealing his hatred to sin, and making examples of sinners, even in natural providence, and has often done this in a marvelous and most signal manner, as in the deluge, the destruction of Sodom and the Canaanites, etc.

But I know not a solitary instance, either in the sphere of natural or supernatural providence, where he has punished the innocent in the place of the guilty, or for their sake.

Besides, the moral effect of such a rule of administration would be only evil. It paralyzes incentives to virtue and dissuasives to vice.

Suppose the plan of family and of civil government was to punish the innocent in the place of the guilty, what would be the result? With so high a premium set on vice, virtue would be impossible.

2. But pretermitting this objection, still another presents itself, viz.: that just to the extent in which Christ was punished in the place of sinners, just to

that extent is punishment twice inflicted. This no one can fail to see, and this fact of itself requires the total rejection of the scheme. Other objections, less obvious, but not less real, lie against the theory, but will not now be named.

Upon the whole, it relieves substitution of some of its troubles, but creates others, perhaps equally fatal.

Having briefly referred to different forms of substitution, as held by libertarians, and having indicated some objections to them, I dismiss this topic with this general statement, viz.: All theories that make Christ a substitute for sinners, or his sufferings a substitute for the penalty due to sinners, involve by necessary consequence a double infliction of the penalty itself, or the infliction of the penalty and the substitute for the penalty. No scheme that does this can be relieved from the charge of absurdity.

SECTION II.—*The impartation of spiritual life not in conflict with natural law.*

God reigns supreme in all departments of his creation—in the realms both of matter and of mind. Though these two departments are widely distinct, one from the other, yet we know that there are many striking analogies between them. We are, therefore, not authorized to believe that God, in the physical world, is in conflict with himself in the spiritual world; or, that he rules in the physical by law, and in the spiritual without law. We are rather authorized to predicate law of both, and of one no more than of the other; also, to expect the

utmost harmony between law in the physical and law in the spiritual world.

This reasonable expectation is not disappointed; for the Bible abounds with analogies between the facts of the physical and those of the spirit world.

The sacred writers generally, and Christ himself, often appeal to the facts and laws of the physical world to illustrate and enforce the truths of the spiritual world, showing that the laws of the latter are not in conflict with the laws of the former, and that Christianity itself is not the "Great Exception," or something without law and order.

Even the impartation of Christ's spiritual life to believers has many analogies and illustrations in the physical world. We find these analogies both in inorganic and organic matter. Among these the following may be noted:

Inorganic.—1. We know that the natural magnet or loadstone imparts its magnetic property to the needle, and permanently magnetizes it without losing its own magnetic power. We know also that this impartation is conditioned upon proximity, or actual contact. We know just as little how the magnet imparts its property to the needle as we know how Christ imparts his spiritual life to believers. In both cases we know something of the law or conditions of the change, but nothing of the *manner* of the change.

2. We have a similar phenomenon in chemical science, when one substance by "catalytic force" changes the state or condition of another substance. This change is secured by mere proximity and with-

out actual contact. Still, it is conditioned, and human agency may supply the conditions, but God in nature does the work. Surely we do not contradict God in nature when we affirm that he can and does, on given conditions, change the spiritual state of the human mind—regeneration is not abnormal, but has its analogies even in inorganic things.

3. *Organic matter.*—In the vegetable kingdom we have in the vine a beautiful analogy illustrating the impartation of Christ's spiritual life to those united to him.

Christ says, "I am the vine, ye are the branches." Paul often uses the same illustration. As the branch, or ingrafted scion, receives its life from the vine, so believers receive their spiritual life from Christ. This is both illustration and proof conclusive that Christ saves by imparting his own spiritual life to those united to him by faith. The impartation of life is as real in one case as in the other.

4. In animate nature we also have striking similitudes in various forms.

(1) In the relation of parent and progeny, the animal life of the former is imparted to the latter. There is no division of nature, for nature is as complete in one as in the other. Entire humanity becomes the common possession of parent and progeny. In like manner, those born of God are made partakers of the nature of the regenerating agent.

(2) In the process of injecting healthy blood into the veins of an invalid, whose life is thereby more

or less prolonged, we have an impartation of animal life—"the life is in the blood"—from one animal organism to another. In like manner spiritual life is an impartation from Christ.

(3) By the assimilation of food, the animal life is sustained. We live by the assimilation of what we feed upon. Hence, our bodies partake of the character of the food upon which we subsist.

Christ says, "Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you." This strong language teaches us that we become partakers of spiritual life by assimilating the spiritual life of Christ.

5. We also have in the domain of moral and spiritual things a similar impartation of nature from parent to progeny. Adam, as we have seen, corrupted himself, and by natural generation his corrupted nature—his state of spiritual death—is imparted to all his posterity.

Paul, as we have seen, makes Adam a type of Christ, and the first the source of spiritual death, and the second the source of spiritual life. The relation between the type and the antitype is sufficient proof that men are saved by becoming partakers of Christ's righteousness, and not by having the merits of a penal death imputed to them, which would antagonize the plan of salvation to all God's methods of administration in all other departments of his dominions. (Has substitution any analogies in nature?)

Certainly we can not know how Christ imparts his spiritual life. "We hear the sound of the

wind, but can not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." But we know as little as to how the magnet imparts its property to the needle, or the vine its life to the ingrafted scion, etc. As to mystery, it confronts us everywhere, and in one sphere no less than another.

What is possible is not to comprehend God, or to understand how he acts, but to ascertain the law or order of his acting. This is the utmost hoped for in reference to the physical world; also in reference to the spiritual world. To do this is the sole mission of science, and just so far, and only so far, as this is done do we have scientific knowledge of any given subject.

We know that the physical and moral are in many instances so intimately related as to be inseparable. The same course of conduct that purifies and elevates a man's spiritual and moral condition, will generally, if not invariably, improve his physical condition.

The same vices that debauch a man's moral and spiritual state have a strong tendency to produce disease, and premature decay, and death. It is a natural retribution rather than a fiat visitation, that "The wicked shall not live out half his days." The physical and the moral largely overlap each other.

It is a highly significant fact that Christ in his earthly ministry dealt with the physical and spiritual infirmities of men in the same summary manner. It is true his action was, in relation to both,

on what seems to us a supernatural plane; but this by no means implies that he deals with the physical after a uniform method, and with the spiritual without any method at all. The summary manner in which Christ dealt with physical and spiritual evils, rather implies that both are subject to similar conditions, both alike under the dominion of natural law, and both subject to supernatural interpositions, or what to us seems to be such.

In view of all the facts known to us, we have, I think, no right to assume that deliverance from the spiritual maladies of human nature, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, as the great sin bearer, the great sin destroyer, the great physician, is the "Great Exception."

This is to exclude the very idea of law and order from the plan of salvation, and to create antagonism between the physical world and the spiritual.

Substitution in every proper sense is abnormal to law, is absolutely subversive of law, and seems to me to render forever impossible any coherent and scientific statement of the plan of salvation.

The Bible teaches the *same* conditionality in relation to our spiritual well-being that it teaches in relation to those physical blessings that come through human activity. Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap, is just as true in the sphere of morals and religion as it is in the sphere of agriculture.

Every command laid upon the human will, and the Bible is full of them, presupposes that there is a

fixed and uniform connection between acts and their consequences.

Just so far as we understand these relations, between consequences and their antecedents or conditions and are able to classify them do we have a scientific knowledge of the plan of salvation. But how is it possible to acquire this knowledge if sins may be punished in a substitute thousands of years before they are committed? The very conception defies the possibility of any scientific statement of the doctrine of retribution, for it denies all necessary connection between acts and their consequences, both as to what the consequences shall be and as to who shall suffer them.

Again, we know that, as free agents, we have power over our own acts, but we have no power over the consequences of our actions; for the relation between our acts and their consequences is a causal or necessary relation. He that believeth not is condemned already, though he may wish not to be condemned; and he that believes is necessarily saved, even if he could will not to be.

We have absolutely no control over the consequences of our faith or unbelief. A man's condemnation or punishment inheres in his unbelief, as the effect inheres in its cause.

This admits of rational apprehension. But to say that the condemnation or punishment which inheres in a sinner's unbelief was endured a thousand years ago is not only contradictory of the plain teachings of the Bible, but defies rational belief.

There is, I feel quite sure, no hope of a scientific

statement of the plan of salvation, if we make substitution its corner-stone.

But, if we reject the unscriptural and unphilosophical doctrine, with all its legal fictions, and allow that the sinless Christ, by obedience unto death and the sacrifice of himself through the eternal spirit, having arisen from the dead, became the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, to whom all may come and be made partakers of his righteousness, then a scientific plan of salvation I think is possible.

To God in nature we look for all secular good, and by the use of appropriate means we seek to acquire that good. In like manner we look to God in Christ for all spiritual good, and by the use of the means God has ordained we seek the attainment of that good.

We do not incumber our theories of physical science with fictions, nor should we our theology, otherwise Christianity must ever remain the "Great Exception."

CHAPTER XVIII.

SECTION I.—*The Anselmic and the Pelagian soteriology compared.*

These schemes are the utmost extremes of the doctrine of salvation by works; both literally save by works. Both are strictly monergistic; the first referring every thing to the divine will, and the second, every thing to the human will.

The first saves strictly by the works of the divine law, rendered exclusively by a substitute; the second saves strictly by works rendered exclusively by men themselves.

Both assert a purely legal salvation, or a salvation earned by obedience to the divine law. Hence, they both save exactly in the same way—that is, both by works, neither by grace; for what is of works is not of grace. (Rom. iv. 4.)

The only difference between them is that in one case the obedience to the law is rendered by a substitute, and in the other by men themselves. This is an incidental, not a vital difference; for works rendered by a substitute and the same works rendered by a principal are of exactly equal value. Both have exactly the same power to save, and save legally or by deeds of the law; and both alike exclude salvation by grace.

If it is said that the sinner can not render perfect

obedience to the law, this is readily granted. But the question is not whether either scheme is possible; for neither is so; but whether both do not propose to save men by the deeds of the law, instead of by grace. This they certainly do.

But if Christ, as a substitute for sinners, obeyed the law, and his obedience is set to their credit, are they not saved by grace?

I answer, By no means; for, what is of law is not of grace.

If salvation by substitution were possible, it would be purely a legal salvation, and not a gracious salvation.

If A is imprisoned for debt, and B pays the debt in his interest, then A is released by the deeds of the law; it is purely a legal transaction, or he is released by law, or justified by works, as truly so as if he had paid the debt himself.

Certainly we might say that kindness prompted the act on the part of B to pay the debt in the interest of A. But that is nothing to the point; for it was not B's kindness, but his legal act that released A from prison. Hence, he is saved purely by a legal righteousness. Hence, it is clear as noon that substitution saves men exclusively by deeds of the law as really so as does Pelagianism.

If it should be said that it was a gracious act in Christ to pay the penalty, this may be granted; still it is true that he paid it with a *legal equivalent.*

But the Bible teaches us in the most explicit manner that salvation is not by the deeds of the law or

by legal righteousness, but by grace, or by the righteousness that is received by faith; it is by grace, and of faith that it might be by grace. It is too plain to require further argument that substitution as literally saves sinners by a legal righteousness as does Pelagianism; also equally plain that both are in direct conflict with the Bible.

Of course all schemes that condition salvation partly upon Christ's substitutionary work, so called, and partly upon human works, save sinners by a mixed, or duplex, legal righteousness. In all such cases the work of Christ and that of the sinner supplement each other. The sinner, it seems, partly saves himself and is partly saved by Christ.

But according to the Bible, salvation is exclusively of grace, and in no sense by works performed either by principal or by substitute; nor partly by one and partly by the other.

Now, the plan that I have attempted to present is radically opposed to all schemes of salvation by works of the law or legal righteousness, whether rendered by principal or substitute.

Regeneration into spiritual life is as literally without works as is generation into natural life. Salvation is all of grace, "but of faith that it might be by grace."

It is no more and no less than being made partakers of Christ's righteousness, "who is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

This honors to the utmost justice, law, and God, because it is Christ's righteousness. The difference

between salvation by works or legal righteousness and salvation by grace is exactly the difference between the legal heirship and heirship by the grace of adoption. The legitimate child is an heir by law, and not by grace; but the adopted child is an heir by grace—not by law, but not in violation of law. One relation as truly satisfies law as the other, though the legitimate child is made an heir by law, and the adopted child by grace.

Legitimate heirship is a matter of law. Adoptive heirship is a matter of will, or grace. All the spiritual children of God are heirs by adoption, and not by law or works (Gal. iv. 1–7; Eph. i. 5).

The doctrine that it was necessary for God to punish the innocent in order to make it possible to pardon the guilty is so abhorrent to our natural instincts, or sense of natural justice, that those who are skeptically inclined can readily persuade themselves that that religion of which it claims to be an indispensable part, is itself false, and as such ought to be rejected.

In the hands of such the doctrine becomes a powerful weapon against Christianity in every form. For nothing is easier than to show its unreasonableness, its injustice, its tendency to destroy all incentives to virtue, or remove all restraints from vice and general lawlessness. To paralyze this natural tendency to lawlessness, its advocates find it necessary to make it the Great Exception in the administration of the world.

It is, perhaps, the most vulnerable part of every scheme of theology of which it forms a part.

It is the most effective argument used by skeptics against Christianity. They use it with great force. It is their most effective argument, simply because it is absolutely unanswerable. I do no hot hesitate to say that all their other arguments admit of ready and rational answers. But as to this one, the best reply is that it forms the "Great Exception," which is no answer at all.

Many persons reject Christianity, not because of what it is in itself, but because of what creed makers represent it to be. The false representation is ignorantly misapprehended for the truth, which is accordingly rejected. By this means Christianity is made to suffer on account of the false theories, as well as the false practices of its friends.

SECTION II.—*Substitution an incubus to Christianity.*

There is something repulsive to the human mind in the very idea of punishing the innocent in the place of the guilty; especially that God should concentrate upon his sinless Son all the suffering due to all humanity through all eternity.

Dr. Hodge recognizes this fact. He says (Vol. II., p. 506):

"He bore the guilt of our sins, and endured the penalty in our stead. We may not approve of this method of salvation. The idea of the innocent bearing the sins of the guilty, and being punished in his stead, may not be agreeable to our feelings or to our modes of thinking, but it can hardly be denied that such is the representation and doctrine of the Scriptures."

Is it not unreasonable that the beneficent Creator should endow the human mind with an instinctive sense of right, and then himself shock that sense of right by punishing the innocent in the place of the guilty? Can we not permit the Creator to be consistent with himself? Did he purposely set the natural instincts of humanity in array against his own administration? Has he purposely set subjective and objective law in opposition to each other? Must we assert to be true what we intuitively know is not true, because a mere theory requires us to do so? Dr. Hodge is certainly right when he admits that to punish the innocent in the place of the guilty "may not be agreeable to our feelings or to our modes of thinking;" and for this all-sufficient reason the doctrine of substitution is a serious impediment to the progress of the gospel. Its tendency is to repel, not to attract. It causes many to doubt and hesitate, and many others to reject the gospel outright.

The modern Jew denies that the doctrine is taught in the Hebrew Scriptures, and assigns as one reason for rejecting Christianity that this doctrine of substitution is held by Christians.

Dr. H. Pereira Mendes says (*North American Review*, June, 1887, p. 606):

"No man can save another by suffering for him (in his place). 'The soul that sinneth it shall die.' 'He who sins against me I will blot out of my book,' was the divine answer to Moses, who sought to be the vicarious atonement for his sinful people. No man can intervene, for not even Moses was accepted to die to save men."

This learned Jew makes atonement consist in obedience to the preceptive side of law—not in suffering its penalty. In this he is thoroughly right. No atonement was ever made by suffering a penalty. The fatal error of the Jew is in assuming that every man can make atonement for himself. It is not at all probable that this Jewish writer would accept Christianity even if substitution had never been held by any professing the Christian faith. The doctrine, however, furnishes him with a powerful argument against Christianity, with which it has been largely, but falsely identified; for probably ninety-nine out of a hundred intelligent and unprejudiced men would accept the Jewish idea of atonement by personal obedience in preference to a penal and substitutionary atonement.

Christianity is thus made to suffer on account of the false theories of its friends.

SECTION III.—*All fiction excluded.*

The plan which I have presented greatly simplifies the plan of salvation—releasing it from all fictions and legal shams, and brings the sinner into direct contact by faith with the present loving Christ, who is willing and able to save to the utmost all that trust in him.

It takes away from the individual all doubt and apprehension as to whether Christ died for him; it removes alike all ground for despair on one hand, and of presumption on the other. It makes salvation available to all, independently of all ritualistic observances and priestly offices by human hands. Contact by faith of the individual soul with the

living, loving Christ insures salvation. Hence, its perfect adaptation to all rational minds in all possible conditions and emergencies.

The blessed, loving Christ is always present with the sinner, able and willing to afford him all needful grace, and to save him at one time and place no more, no less, than another; for the ever-present *now* is the day of salvation.

Salvation is conditioned, but is conditioned only on the states and activities of the mind itself, and upon nothing external to the mind. All faith and hope founded on penance, fastings, prayers, good works, ritualistic observances, sacraments, and priestly manipulations, or any thing else that is interposed between the soul and Christ, is not only worthless, but illusive. Christ has no representatives, no substitutes, no vicegerents commissioned to do his work. He alone can save.

This plan, I fully believe, is sustained by the sacred Scriptures—is not in conflict with a single Bible fact, nor with any known scientific truth in the realm of matter or of mind. Its own self-consistency and its harmony with all known facts is a self-affirmation of its truth, and entitles it to universal acceptance.



PART III.

EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

[The arguments founded upon express declarations of the Holy Scriptures for and against a limited atonement, are for sufficient reasons omitted in this discussion]

SECTION I.—*Argument founded on the humanity of Christ.*

The fact that Christ did die for sinners is not in question, this being conceded. The only issue is whether he died for *some* or for *all* men. I affirm the latter.

1. I base the first argument upon the incarnation and its design.

"God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John iii. 16).

"When the fullness of time had come God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5).

For the accomplishment of his mission the Son took to himself, not the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham (Heb. xi. 16).

He took to himself our common humanity in its wholeness. As every man possesses all the essentials of humanity, so Christ took to himself the humanity common to every other man; for he could not take humanity at all without taking the common property of every man. The apostle distinctly states (*a*) the manner of Christ's incarnation (born of a woman); (*b*) his subjection to the law (made under the law); (*c*) the object of his incarnation—(that he might redeem them which were under the law). Hence, becoming as truly human as was Abraham, or David, or any other man, he became of sheer necessity the brother of every man by consanguinity. All are the offspring of God (Acts xvii. 28). All men constitute one great brotherhood, and Christ is an essential part of that brotherhood. Apart from tribal relationship, he is as truly the brother of one man as another. No person admitting the unity of the human race will question these facts.

Now, let it not be forgotten that Christ, as human, "was without sin." As such he knew nothing of those alienations, selfishness, indifference possible to sinful man. He could not, from the nature of the case, fail to love his neighbor, every member of the one common brotherhood, as he loved himself. If there ever has been one human being, or ever shall be such, whom he does not love as he loves himself, then he can not be sinless; for such love

the divine law under which he was born imperatively requires (Matt. xix. 19).

Such love only is the fulfilling of the law (Rom. xiii. 18). How much bodily pain and mental affliction may a man be required to endure for the sake of the salvation of his soul? What shall a man give in exchange for his soul? If the salvation of the human soul was purchasable or procurable by the sacrifice of the body, would not fidelity to the soul—to self—require it? And would not a true self-love make the sacrifice? Certainly; and the salvation would be cheaply purchased at such a cost. If the sinless soul of Christ could have been put in peril of endless death, and then could have been released from that peril by the sacrifice of natural life, would not fidelity to his soul have required this sacrifice, and would not true self-love have made the sacrifice? Certainly no one who understands the value of the immortal soul will deny this. Now, just what any man would be required to do for himself, the law requires him to do for his brother.

Christ's own soul being sinless is not endangered, but the souls of his brethren are in peril of endless death, and just what he would do for himself in like peril, the law of fraternal love requires him to do for his imperiled brethren. This the law does not require for some, but for the absolute all. If it is not done *for all*—for every one—the law is not fulfilled, is not magnified and made honorable, and he could not be sinless before the law. If it should be said that this presentation of the subject

puts the Savior of men too much on equality with men, I reply that, notwithstanding his immense superiority to men in some respects, yet he truly is a man, and as such was required to obey the law as other men.

It is true this assumption of humanity was voluntary and gratuitous; but having voluntarily assumed it he was as much bound as any other man.

It is one of the glories of Christ, and one of the excellencies of the plan of salvation, that the Son of God, under the promptings of immeasurable love, voluntarily assumed humanity. Put himself under the law as to his humanity for the purpose of redeeming the brotherhood who are under the law by the sacrifice of himself for them. Christ himself, after his resurrection, taught the necessity of his own sufferings.

"O foolish men and slow to believe all that the prophets have spoken, Behooved it not the Christ to suffer these things to enter into his glory" (Luke xxiv. 25; xxvi. 46; Acts xvii. 3; Phil. ii. 4–8).

There are different kinds of necessity:

(*a*) Necessity having its grounds in the relation of means to an end, as the necessity of food to support life.

(*b*) Necessity having its ground in the relation between a prediction and its fulfillment, the event is necessary to the fulfillment of the prediction.

(*c*) A necessity having its ground in the inherent nature of things, as the sympathy of a loving parent for a suffering child—the necessity of an irrepressible spontaneity.

In what sense was the sufferings of Christ necessary? I answer:

(*a*) It was necessary as a means to an end—the remission of sin, "for without the shedding of blood there is no remission" (Heb. ix. 22).

(*b*) His suffering was necessary to fulfill the prophecy; this, however, was only an adventitious necessity, and furnishes no part of the reason of Christ's sufferings, but a ground of faith in him as the Christ.

(*c*) Was there not also a necessity for his sufferings grounded in his humanity in the relation of universal brotherhood? Certainly I can not prove that this doctrine is intended to be taught in the text just cited, though I suspect that it is. I am confident that the contrary can not be made to appear. I am also confident that the idea which I have suggested is plainly involved in the doctrine of the incarnation and its designs.

The law requires us to love others as ourselves, even our enemies (Matt. xix. 19; v. 44). Paul enjoins the Christian to love or account others better than themselves; to look not on their own things, but on the things of others; to have in them the mind which was in Christ, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God—or counted it not a prize to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant being made in the likeness of men, and being formed in fashion as a man. He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death. Yea, even unto the death of the cross" (Phil. ii.

4–8). The beloved disciple says: "Hereby perceive we the love of God because he laid down his life for us, and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren" (1 John iii. 16).

All these biblical utterances are in strict accord with the law. "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Christ, as has been seen, was born under the law, and as a man was really required to fulfill it as any other man. If men are required, if an occasion requiring it should arise, to lay down their natural lives for the salvation of their fellows, it is pertinent to inquire if Christ, as man, was not required by virtue of his being a man, to lay down his life for his brotherhood, even though they were his enemies?

Men, like the angels, are of necessity under this law, irrespective of their own volitions. Christ is under it by his own choice, but the volition which puts him under it is his consent to become man, to take to himself humanity, or the seed of Abraham. Humanity assumed, it is not then a matter of choice whether he keeps the law. The law, he being able to redeem the brotherhood, imperatively requires him to lay down his life, not for some, but for all mankind, for every man, and as before remarked, if any one of the race is excluded the law is not fulfilled.

The law requires me to love all men, even my enemies, and if the sacrifice of my natural life will save their souls, and nothing else could save them, then the law requires the sacrifice. Should I refuse to make the sacrifice, then I would not fulfill the

law, because I would not love my neighbor as myself. Or, if I should love half, and make provision for them, and leave all others unprovided for, I would not obey the law, but be guilty before the law.

Christ is both sinless and divine. He only, of all men, is able to keep the law, and to offer an acceptable sacrifice for sinful humanity. This he did, and by so doing retained his sinlessness as a man, and magnified the law, honored the law, by its fulfillment. But if there ever was or ever will be a human being, or one of the great brotherhood for whom he did not give himself as a sacrifice unto God, it is plain that he has not kept the law or honored it. "If ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?"

In the light of these facts, what becomes of the dogma of a limited atonement? That Christ died for some, and not for others, that he died unequally for the elect and the reprobate? It is simply swept to the winds, and utterly demolished. In the light of these facts, it is perfectly certain that the Savior could make atonement only for all or for none.

SECTION II.—*Argument founded upon the Fatherhood, or the divinity of Christ. Facts connected with the divine side of Christ's character disprove a limited atonement.*

Having considered in a brief way the bearing of the incarnation, or human side of the God-Man, upon the extent of the atonement, let us look briefly at the adverse side.

God is revealed to us in the sacred Scriptures, not less as our Father, benefactor, and friend, than as our Creator, ruler, and judge. These characteristics are in no sense incompatible, but subsist in the utmost harmony (Ps. cxix. 75; Sam. iii. 35). He is repeatedly declared to be "love," without any qualification. His tender mercies are said to be over all his works—to endure forever. But divine love and mercy—no true love is incompatible with justice, or authority, or with chastisement, or punishment, or with anger; justice is the rule of the divine administration in the interests of God's benevolent purposes. Punishment is identical with chastisement, except in the case of the absolutely incorrigible, and is always administered in the interests of those upon whom it falls (Ps. cxix. 75; Sam. iii. 33).

What rational inferences do these facts authorize in relation to God's purposes concerning his creatures and the means necessary to their well-being? If the great Creator is love, if he is the Father of all men, all being his offering in the same sense, as he necessarily is; if he is infinite in every perfection, and inexhaustible in resources, standing in no sort of dependence for his own happiness, is it rational to infer that he has created some for the purpose of everlasting bliss, and others for the purpose of everlasting woe? Such, indeed, is the monstrous presupposition of Calvinism; for this doctrine in its last analysis, whether considered in its supralapsarian or infralapsarian form, leads us by legitimate

logical sequence to the conclusion that God created some men for heaven and some men for hell.

This idea, it is true, is quite abhorrent to the minds of many, who rejoice to call themselves Calvinists. The idea, however, is plainly involved in the "horrible decree." See Calvin's Institutes, III., xxi. 3; xxiii. 7; xxiv. 12, 13. This conclusion, I hesitate not to say, is unreasonable in itself, is abhorrent to the moral instinct of every rational being, even of those who entertain the idea; hence, Calvin himself denominates it a "horrible decree."

Natural religion not only authorizes, but requires us to teach that all men sustain to the Creator the same natural relation, and that all are created for the same end, and all accordingly are the objects of the same beneficent solicitude, and all the provisions are made for the happiness of all (Read Ps. xix. 1–4; also Rom. i. 19, 20). These are facts of natural religion, and they so far reveal God as the proper object of faith and worship, as to leave men without excuse.

But the principal lessons of natural religion are to be drawn from the study of man himself, who is not a creature of God, as are the physical heavens, the earth, and all irrational things thereunto pertaining, but who is in strict propriety of terms the child of God, made in his image and likeness.

Nowhere else can the invisible and only partially revealed parent be so appropriately and effectually studied as in the child. All the distinctive characteristics of the parent may not be found to exist in all their plenitude in the child; but all the essen-

tial attributes of the child are presupposed to exist in the parent. It is, consequently, the high prerogative of natural religion to reason from the less to the greater, or from man to God; to interpret the divine by the universally recognized facts of human nature. What do reason and instinct concurrently teach concerning the parental relationship?

(1) In answering this question it seems almost superfluous to say that the instinctive love of offspring, even in lower animals, is stronger than the self-preservative and instinctive fear of danger, and even death. The wild bear will face death rather than desert her cubs. In human parents this instinctive love and sacrificing devotion are equally strong and irrepressible.

(2) This instinctive love is commended and strongly supported by reason, and the moral intuitions of the rational mind. Hence, in all ages and climes, however perverted in judgment, and debased in moral feeling, parents have ever deemed it one of the plainest dictates of common sense, and one of the first imperatives of conscience to protect and provide for their children. Even where a blinding superstition, the form of a false religion, or mistaken economy, or economic reasons have sanctioned or enjoined infanticide and human sacrifice, the imperative duty of child protection is not denied or ignored. In such cases, what was deemed a less duty was only subordinated to what was deemed a greater one. Such cases furnish no exception to the rule.

Parental obligation is the universal rule, as re-

vealed by natural religion; and this plain teaching of natural religion is supported by the highest sanctions of revealed religion. These instincts, or rational intuitions of the parental heart, are the authoritative utterances of God speaking in nature, and are everywhere in revelation affirmed as a radical characteristic of humanity. (Read Matt. vii. 9–11.)

We have in this beautiful passage *á fortiori* argument—a distinct recognition of parental benefaction as a lineament of the divine image. In this respect the fundamental characteristics of the human and divine parentage are identical, differing only in degree, not in kind.

The parent who would wantonly and purposely disregard the welfare of his child, or deliberately plan its ruin, would be deemed a monster, and would receive the mental execration of savages, as well as of civilized men.

How dare Calvinists impute to the divine Father of all, "in the horrible decree of reprobation," a cruelty of which men in the deepest state of savagery are incapable?

The infliction of physical torture and death is the utmost that human savagery can do, but these compared with the eternal death of the soul, are less than the invisible grain of sand compared with the physical universe.

Natural religion—God speaking in nature—with her multitudinous tongues enters an indignant protest against Augustinian limitarianism, and of course against a limited atonement, and proclaims in countless ways his good-will to all his creatures.

As well might we be restricted by divine decree from the air we breathe, or the fecundity of nature, which furnishes all living things with food, as to limit by decree the good-will of the Father of all to a select few, as the unique objects of a "peculiar and discriminating love."

"If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things unto them that ask him."

Let it be noted that in this utterance Christ announced a universal fact of natural religion, viz.: that parental love and benefaction are the common attributes of human and divine parentage. If it is an innate and irrepressible attribute of sinful men, how much more irrepressible is it in the unerring and unselfish Father of all?

The Augustinian can avoid the force of these facts only by lifting revealed religion quite out of the sphere of natural religion, and creating an unreconcilable conflict between them. This of necessity makes God in revelation contradict himself in nature.

In explanation of this and a hundred other texts, Calvinists can, and often do, resort to a species of special pleading, unworthy alike of their intelligence and the gravity of the subject.

The Calvinist can say as Dr. Hodge, that the justification of even the elect is conditioned upon faith, meaning nothing more than that the several divine acts in bringing the elect to glory sustain to each other the relation of antecedent and sequence,

leaving the unsuspecting reader in utter bewilderment, or in a state of misapprehension. In reference to the text in hand, he can evasively say, "none but the elect ever earnestly ask bread or a fish, and to these the divine Father gives in his own good time the good things pertaining to salvation." In like manner he disposes of all the conditions with which salvation is connected, as prayer, repentance, faith, etc.

Thus reversing the divine order, making all such antecedents and conditions the necessitated sequences of the effectual and irresistible call, or regeneration.

In regard to this method of interpretation, I will make three statements:

1. It is pure sophistry—*a petitio principii*—what is required to be proved is taken for granted.

2. It changes what is divinely intended as the antecedent into its consequent, thus turning theology, and common sense as well, upside down. The condition, or means, and the giving, is the sequence and end. But in the light of Calvinism, the giving is both the end and antecedent, and the asking is the sequence.

Take another example: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life" (John iii. 36). In the judgment of common sense, everlasting life is conditioned upon believing, and hence, that he who, or all that, or whosoever believes in Christ has everlasting life. But in the light of Calvinism, he who, or all that, or whosoever has everlasting life, believes on Christ.

3. This method of interpretation is the result of a studied effort to force the plainest texts of the Bible into harmony with the wild conceits of Augustinianism. It is simply wholesale Bible perversion, and Augustinians would not dare take such liberty with any other language than that of the sacred Scriptures.

If a Calvinist says to his child: "Son, if you will bring me your book, I will teach you your lesson;" both understand the proposition in a common sense way. The father does not mean, nor does the child understand him to mean, that if the father teaches the child the lesson, then it will bring him the book. Yet when Christ says, "Come unto me . . . and I will give you rest," Calvinism requires it to mean: "If I give you rest, regenerate you, save you, then you will come unto me."

By this perverse interpretation, antecedent and consequent are made to change places; conditionality is swept from the Bible, human freedom is ignored, and the Bible forced into an illusive harmony with limitarianism, and a limited atonement of course.

But the whole scheme, as we have seen, overreaches the divine veracity by arraigning natural religion and revealed religion against each other, and therefore can not be true.

Having considered the bearing of the human and also of the divine side of Christ's character, upon the extent of the atonement, I propose now to inquire whether there is any thing in human nature itself that favors the idea of a partial atonement.

1. If, according to the concessions of Calvinists, all men have a common origin or nature—were all alike created in the image or likeness of God—have common characteristics, have the same attributes—mental, physical, and moral; whatever differences come to exist among them are properly referable to adventitious circumstances and individual self-determination, and not to any thing in their original characteristics.

As the whole race existed ideally in the divine purpose anterior to the creation, all sustain the same relation to the Creator. All these ideal human beings were equally meritorious and demeritorious.

That some of these ideal human beings should have actual existence with the inevitability of endless life, and others with the inevitability of endless death, is certainly a conception which no rational mind ever spontaneously conceived.

Nothing but a remorseless logic, founded on false premises, could force such an idea into a rational mind. The false premises are found in the Augustinian assumption of absolute foreordination of all things; or, which is the same thing in another form, viz.: that all the events of time are only the executions of the decrees of eternity. The omnipotent Creator had the power to create some men and angels for heaven, and others for hell, if he willed so to do. But the idea of pretemporal election and reprobation is in any sense preposterous; for, according to the theory, the decree of election was anterior to the creation. There consequently was

nothing from which to choose but the ideals of the divine mind, and those were just what the divine idealizer chose to make them.

The divine volition is not put forth in choosing between existing things, but in determining to what end or destiny non-existent things shall be made.

But, while there can be no ground or reason for a choice between non-existent creatures, there is, so far as human sagacity knows, no reason in the divine mind for creating some men for eternal life, and others for eternal death. Indeed, while human intelligence can assign no such reason, the noblest emotions of the human soul recoil at the idea.

Nothing but the gratuitous Augustinian assumption that all the events of time are purely the execution of the decrees of eternity could reconcile Augustinians to the hard doctrine of their theory, a limited atonement, etc.

2. God in nature is consistent with himself. He makes no mistakes in adaptation of means to ends. He invests none of his creatures with organs and susceptibilities unsuited to the ends of their existence. The law of parsimony, so far as we can conceive, is characteristic of all his works, while nothing is deficient in organs and instrumentalities, nothing is burdened with a wasteful redundancy. If we sometimes encounter in plants or animals organs and susceptibilities whose uses we do not understand, this furnishes us no evidence that they are useless. It only indicates our ignorance of their use.

If, on the other hand, we find individuals who are wanting in some things common to the species, they do not disprove the rule, but as exceptions to the rule only prove it. Hence, every organ and susceptibility of the body presupposes an end, to which it sustains the relation of an appropriate means.

The eye presupposes the existence of objects, which may become known through its instrumentality. So it is of all the senses. If there were no external objects, to which these organs are correlated, and a knowledge of which is acquirable through them, then these eyes, ears, etc., are useless appendages. But their very existence presupposes these objects.

So it is of the physical appetites and desires. Their very existence presupposes ends of which they are the appropriate means, and conditions—*e. g.:* Hunger presupposes bodily sustentation or preservation as an end, and also implies the existence of food as a means to that end. The hungerings of the nursing child presupposes an end, and implies the existence of a nursing mother as the appropriate means to that end.

What we find to be true in the sphere of the physical and perishable, is supposed to be true in the sphere of the spiritual and imperishable. The power of thought presupposes knowledge as an end, and implies the possibility of means or instrumentalities for its attainment. The sensibilities presuppose happiness as an end, and implies the possibility of its acquisition. The faculty of will

presupposes its achievements as an end, and implies the probability of the accomplishment of this end.

The proofs of the immortality of the soul, apart from the Bible, rest exclusively upon this kind of evidence in the presupposition of ends, and the implication of the possibility of their attainment from the susceptibilities, yearnings, and aspirations of the human soul.

The soul recoils at the idea of annihilation, and longs and yearns for continuity of being. This aversion to extinction of being, and yearning for continuity of existence is a divine implantation, and presages the immortality of the soul. Immortality is a presupposition of the soul, without which many of our mental states admit of no rational explanation.

Among these mental phenomena may be noted the sense of accountability, the intuition of rightness or wrongness, or of moral distinctions, of the rectitude of human motives, of the duty of self-restraint, a feeling of dependence upon a power outside of ourselves, a deep longing for help and sympathy and protection from something which we invest with divine attributes and pray to, believe in, rely upon, and worship as God.

These mental phenomena are not the products of education, of habit, or of adventitious circumstances; but are indigenous to the human mind. Hence, they have a sway co-existent or co-extensive with humanity. They are a fundamental part of the mind itself.

Education, prejudice against forms of religion in which they are prominently recognized, and theories of universal doubt may so far hold them in abeyance as to prevent any visible or external manifestation; but nothing short of omnipotence can obliterate them from the soul. They are indigenous to the mind itself, and to exterminate them would be to extinguish the light of the soul. But as in the physical, so in the spiritual world, these hungerings after immortality, which is the future good, presupposes the possibility of the attainment of that good.

Unless this is true, we must suppose that nature is not true to itself, or rather that God has inspired nature with false hopes and tantalizing aspirations and expectations, made incapable of realization by a divine decree.

Man, by the play of his own imagination, may awaken within himself desires, and may fondly cherish expectations which he can never realize; but this is because he misreads the characteristics of his own nature, or surrenders himself to the dominion of fancy, rather than to the law of God within himself.

But God's book of nature is true to the letter. No false promises are there recorded, and no illusive hopes inspired. All promised is *faithfully promised* and is assuredly capable of realization. These facts of natural religion may be summed up in a clear and conclusive argument after this fashion:

All that is presaged or foretokened in the origi-

nal constitution of the human mind is by the Creator made attainable; otherwise humanity is in itself a contradiction. But all mind in its normal and unsophisticated state, desires and hopes for a happy future, a blissful immortality. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that God created all men for such a state, and that its attainment in some stage of every person's life is possible.

If this argument is fallacious, I have not been able to detect its unsoundness. But if the doctrine of pretemporal election and reprobation, and of a limited atonement, as advocated by Calvinists, is true, then it is true that there never was a period in the history of the reprobate when the attainment of this desire was a possibility. And all his thirstings and longings for such a state convict his God-given nature of falsehood.

Or God, in the natural desires and longings of their nature, gave them a guaranty of the possibility of eternal life, but in the meantime recorded it in the book of sacred decrees, that they should suffer eternal death. It thus appears very clear that if pretemporal reprobation and its technical correlative—limited atonement—are true, then the fundamental facts of natural and revealed religion are in hopeless conflict.

If it should be said that this argument might be used in relation to mankind in a normal state, but that the introduction of sin into the world has so sadly changed the order of things that the argument loses all its pertinency and force, I reply that according to Calvinism, the destiny of the repro-

bate was fixed long anterior to the creation of the earth and the fall of man. It might also be said that according to a true theology the sin of Adam, considered in connection with the mediation of Christ, has not compromised the salvation of a single soul, or rendered the destruction of a single soul necessary.

I see no method by which this argument in favor of an atonement for every human being can be set aside or weakened. I accordingly feel authorized in saying that the natural desires in every unsophisticated human breast for eternal life is the voice of God in the soul proclaiming its attainment possible. It should not be forgotten, however, that the possible is not the inevitable. Salvation, as we have had occasion to state, is conditional. Man is free and may never comply with the conditions, and consequently may never be saved.

The possible and the necessary are separated by certain things called conditions, and it is only when the "conditions" are supplied that the possible becomes the necessary.

Salvation to the rational mind is conditioned upon faith, or a trustful surrender to Christ.

Not until this is done, does the sinner's possibility of salvation become a real salvation.


LIBRARY
OF THE

YC 40805

52781

BT265
B84

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY